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EXPLICIT BIAS 
Jessica A. Clarke 
ABSTRACT—In recent decades, legal scholars have advanced sophisticated 
models for understanding prejudice and discrimination, drawing on 
disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and economics. These models 
explain how inequality is implicit in cognition and seamlessly woven into 
social structures. And yet, obvious, explicit, and overt forms of bias have not 
gone away. The law does not need empirical methods to identify bias when 
it is marching down the street in Nazi regalia, hurling misogynist invective, 
or trading in anti-Muslim stereotypes. Official acceptance of such prejudices 
may be uniquely harmful in normalizing discrimination. But surprisingly, 
many discrimination cases ignore explicit bias. Courts have refused to 
consider evidence of biased statements by government officials in cases 
alleging, for example, that facially neutral laws were enacted for the express 
purpose of singling out Muslims. Courts outright ignore explicit bias when 
they consider intentional discrimination to be justified by goals such as law 
enforcement. And courts have developed a “stray remarks doctrine” in 
employment discrimination cases to prevent juries from hearing evidence of 
explicit bias. This Article identifies and criticizes legal arguments against 
consideration of explicit bias, including concerns about the feasibility of 
inquiries into intent, worry about undermining otherwise legitimate policies, 
the desire to avoid chilling effects on free speech, and the fear that 
confronting explicit bias will result in backlash. It argues that discrimination 
law should dispense with doctrines that shield explicit bias from 
consideration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
White supremacy1 and misogyny2 have once again revealed themselves 
as potent forces in American social life. Political scientists discuss the return 
of “old-fashioned racism.”3 Social psychologists document the persistence 
of blatant racism and dehumanization of Muslims.4 Economists describe the 
 
 1 See, e.g., Act of Sept. 14, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-58, 131 Stat. 1149 (joint resolution of Congress 
acknowledging the “growing prevalence” of “hate groups that espouse racism, extremism, xenophobia, 
anti-Semitism, and White supremacy”). 
 2 See, e.g., KATE MANNE, DOWN GIRL: THE LOGIC OF MISOGYNY 205–06 (2018) (recounting 
numerous recent examples of explicit misogyny and explaining how it is excused as “locker room talk,” 
among other things); Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., Can Evidence Impact Attitudes? Public Reactions 
to Evidence of Gender Bias in STEM Fields, 39 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 194, 197–99 (2015) (analyzing 
831 internet comments in response to an article on gender bias and finding 433 negative comments, 
including many expressing overt sexism); Justin Wolfers, Evidence of a Toxic Environment for Women 
in Economics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/upshot/evidence-of-a-
toxic-environment-for-women-in-economics.html [https://perma.cc/B857-2AUJ] (discussing Harvard 
doctoral candidate Alice Wu’s award-winning senior thesis documenting overt misogyny in anonymous 
online comments about women seeking academic jobs in economics); #MeToo, TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/hashtag/metoo [https://perma.cc/D65J-HFAM] (collecting individual revelations of 
sexual assault and harassment). 
 3 See, e.g., Michael Tesler, The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans’ Partisan 
Preferences in the Early Obama Era, 75 J. POL. 110, 111 (2013) (describing empirical evidence that 
“indicate[s] that Barack Obama’s association with the Democratic Party has . . . made [old-fashioned 
racism] a significant factor in white Americans’ partisan preferences after decades of quiescence”); 
Nicholas A. Valentino et al., The Changing Norms of Racial Political Rhetoric and the End of Racial 
Priming, 80 J. POL. 757, 758 (2017) (discussing evidence from nationally representative surveys 
demonstrating that, “[w]hereas explicit racial rhetoric once seemed aversive to large swaths of American 
society, such messages are no longer as widely rejected”). 
 4 See, e.g., Jordan R. Axt, The Best Way to Measure Explicit Racial Attitudes Is to Ask About Them, 
SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1, 8 (2017) (in a nonrepresentative online sample of 800,000 people, 
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increasing social acceptability of racist xenophobia.5 Sociologists 
demonstrate how overt racism and sexism continue to drive workplace 
inequality.6 During his campaign, President Donald Trump made no secret 
about his plan to enact a “Muslim ban” in immigration, explaining, “I think 
Islam hates us.”7 For those committed to antidiscrimination, explicit 
evidence of bias was supposed to have an upside: it would render 
discrimination easy to identify and address.8 But this is not always so. This 
Article identifies and criticizes cases in which courts overlook explicit bias. 
It argues that explicit bias poses a unique threat to antidiscrimination norms. 
Doctrines that would shield evidence of explicit bias from consideration in 
discrimination cases should be rejected. 
Over the past few decades, legal scholarship on discrimination has 
turned its attention away from explicit bias, focusing instead on the subtle 
and complicated ways that bias is expressed. Legal scholars have 
documented how implicit attitudes, which operate outside of conscious 
 
28% reported explicit racial preferences in favor of white people); Patrick S. Forscher et al., The 
Motivation to Express Prejudice, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 791, 812 (2015), data at 
https://osf.io/mfq35 [https://perma.cc/RJ8A-6EUU] (reporting that 10% of a sample of 751 
undergraduates either agreed with or was neutral with respect to the statement, “Avoiding interactions 
with Blacks is important to my self-concept”); Nour Kteily et al., The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and 
Empirical Evidence for Blatant Dehumanization, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 901, 906, 907 
tbl.1 (2015) (reporting that U.S. online survey participants considered Arabs and Muslims less “evolved” 
than Americans by an average of 10 to 14 points on a scale of 1 to 100). 
 5 See Leonardo Bursztyn et al., From Extreme to Mainstream: How Social Norms Unravel 14 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23415, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w23415 [https://perma.cc/2W9A-CYC7] (discussing experimental evidence that the election of President 
Donald Trump made online survey participants more willing to openly donate to an organization whose 
founder advocated “a European-American majority”). 
 6 See, e.g., ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW 
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY, at xiii (2017) (prefacing an empirical study of employment discrimination 
cases with the exhortation that “[m]uch of this book is an argument that—in addition to the less visible 
mechanisms that produce workplace discrimination and inequality—overt racism, sexism, ableism, and 
ageism must remain part of the scholarly and activist agenda”); Devah Pager & Bruce Western, 
Identifying Discrimination at Work: The Use of Field Experiments, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 221, 229 (2012) 
(discussing follow-up interviews of employers after an audit study revealed they were less willing to hire 
black testers, in which “the plurality of employers we spoke with, when considering Black men 
independent of their own workplace, characterized this group according to three common tropes: as lazy 
or having a poor work ethic; threatening or criminal; or possessing an inappropriate style or demeanor”). 
Even the author of the book Racism Without Racists acknowledges the resurgence of “overt racism.” 
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE 
OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 223 (5th ed. 2018). 
 7 Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview with Donald Trump (CNN television broadcast 
Mar. 9, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 
1603/09/acd.01.html)) [https://perma.cc/Z4H2-NEPZ]. 
 8 See, e.g., Valentino et al., supra note 3, at 760 (describing and disputing the “standard model” of 
racial priming, which predicts that when racial arguments are made explicitly, people will reject them and 
their impact will be diminished). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
508 
control, predict discrimination based on race, gender, and other group 
statuses.9 Arguing that “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination is largely 
a thing of the past, scholars have described how inequality is baked into 
structures of interaction in workplaces, schools, housing markets, and other 
domains of social life.10 They have offered new economic models for 
understanding the persistence of inequality.11 They have proposed new legal 
rules, such as negligence and recklessness, to replace the law’s fixation with 
discriminatory intent.12 Scholarly debates over the validity of these “second 
generation” models for understanding discrimination and their utility for 
combating inequality could fill libraries.13 
By contrast, recent legal scholarship has paid little attention to overt, 
explicit, and blatant forms of bias.14 Courts are now surprised when explicit 
 
 9 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (discussing research that “suggests that actors do not always have 
conscious, intentional control over the processes of social perception, impression formation, and 
judgment that motivate their actions,” and the implications of that research for discrimination law). 
 10 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001) (“Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of 
interaction have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued inequality.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality, 124 YALE L.J. 2626, 2629 
(2015) (reviewing DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN 
WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014)) (discussing the claim that, even if racist attitudes were eliminated, black 
Americans would remain locked in a cycle of disadvantage because white families and social networks 
perpetuate racial privilege “through a set of seemingly innocuous, if not laudable, choices people take 
pride in making, such as referring a friend to a job or helping a child pay for college or a down payment 
on a home”). 
 12 See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055 (2017) 
(proposing a recklessness standard); Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jeffrey R. Boles, Intent and Liability in 
Employment Discrimination, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 610–11 (2016) (proposing a liability scheme modeled 
on the criminal law’s approach to differing standards of culpability). 
 13 For example, a Westlaw search of the “Law Reviews & Journals” library for the term “implicit 
bias” yields 2765 results as of November 7, 2018. The overwhelming majority of legal scholarship 
embraces implicit bias research, but there are a few critics. See, e.g., JONATHAN KAHN, RACE ON THE 
BRAIN: WHAT IMPLICIT BIAS GETS WRONG ABOUT THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 18 (2017) 
(arguing that scientific innovations are limited in their ability to advance racial justice); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Implicit Bias’s Failure, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
1, 4–5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015031 [https://perma.cc/VBX7-NAT2] 
(arguing that implicit bias has failed in its political aims of depersonalizing and depoliticizing 
discrimination); Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias 
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1059 (2009) (arguing that 
“unconscious bias discourse . . . reinforces a misguided preoccupation with mental state” and distracts 
from the project of redressing material inequality); Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a 
Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 193 (2018) (arguing for a shift in focus to stereotyping). 
 14 Recent work to address legal approaches to intentional discrimination has argued that the Supreme 
Court should adopt a more capacious understanding of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Ian Haney-López, 
Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1795–96 (2012) (arguing for a contextual approach to 
discriminatory intent); Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1292 
(2018) (arguing for a “return to the appropriately capacious and flexible way in which the Court initially 
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bias appears.15 When President Trump’s executive order targeting Muslims 
for immigration restrictions was first challenged as discriminatory, courts 
described the extensive evidence of anti-Muslim animus as atypical and 
unique.16 While the scholarship on unintentional forms of discrimination has 
been useful in developing a fuller picture of the causes and consequences of 
inequality, labels like “implicit” are misfits for the evidence of intentional 
discrimination cropping up in many cases.17 Such terms may suggest, 
contrary to recent events, that old-fashioned prejudice has been eradicated.18 
More generally, legal scholarship has neglected the threat that the 
legitimation of explicit bias poses to antidiscrimination norms.19 In their 
focus on fighting “new” forms of bias, progressives may be leaving the 
 
proposed to discover unconstitutional, discriminatory intent”); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 
68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 151, 155–56 (2016) (arguing that the “capacious conception of animus” employed 
by the Supreme Court in LGBT rights cases should be applied to race and gender); Reva B. Siegel, 
Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 93 (2013) (arguing the Supreme Court should 
consider the “law’s meaning and impact with attention to the perspectives of the historically excluded”). 
These scholars have not focused on explicit bias. Compare Haney-López, supra, at 1795 (“The Court 
traditionally has eschewed direct evidence of what specific government actors thought, and for good 
reasons.”), with Huq, supra, at 1270–73 (arguing briefly in favor of consideration of official statements 
in constitutional cases). This Article’s main argument is that the law should consider statements of explicit 
bias in intentional discrimination cases. It broadens the focus beyond constitutional law and the Supreme 
Court to examine the full range of discrimination cases insulating explicit bias from scrutiny. 
 15 See, e.g., Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862, 871 (2017) (remarking that evidence 
of “blatant racial prejudice” among jurors is “rare” in a criminal case in which a juror stated, “I think [the 
defendant] did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want”); N.C. State 
Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 226 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding “what comes as close 
to a smoking gun as we are likely to see in modern times” in that “the State’s very justification for a 
challenged statute hinges explicitly on race—specifically its concern that African Americans, who had 
overwhelmingly voted for Democrats, had too much access to the franchise”). 
 16 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(noting that “[i]n the typical case, it will be difficult for a plaintiff to make an affirmative showing of bad 
faith with plausibility and particularity,” but in this case, “[p]laintiffs point to ample evidence that national 
security is not the true reason for [the travel ban], including, among other things, then-candidate Trump’s 
numerous campaign statements expressing animus towards the Islamic faith . . . .”), vacated and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, 
241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1136 (D. Haw. 2017) (“The record before this Court is unique. It includes 
significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive 
Order . . . .”), aff’d on other grounds, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 
377 (2017). 
 17 See supra notes 15–16. 
 18 Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 9 (“Indeed, at a moment in history when overt racism—seen in 
the reaction among some to the election of a black president, and in a significant part of the movement 
that elected Donald Trump—once again seems a major factor in our public life, the suggestion that 
implicit bias is the central problem may be particularly misleading.”); Banks & Ford, supra note 13, at 
1058–59, 1072–89, 1113–21 (arguing that the “explanation for the prominence of the unconscious bias 
discourse relates to the comforting narrative it offers about our nation’s progress in overcoming its racist 
history”). 
 19 See infra Section I.C. 
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homeland of equality law—norms against overt discrimination—
undefended. 
This Article draws attention to ways courts distort discrimination 
doctrines to overlook explicit bias. For example, the Trump Administration 
defended its executive order on immigration by arguing it “is not a so-called 
‘Muslim ban,’ and campaign comments cannot change that basic fact.”20 
This argument echoes a discarded line of reasoning from equal protection 
doctrine that insulated facially neutral rules from scrutiny despite explicit 
evidence that those rules were motivated by bias.21 In upholding the 
executive order, the Supreme Court suggested that it was applying a lower 
standard of review because the plaintiffs had asked it “to probe the sincerity 
of the stated justifications for the policy by reference to [the President’s] 
extrinsic statements—many of which were made before [he] took the oath of 
office.”22 
This phenomenon goes beyond the Trump Administration. In other 
equal protection cases, courts turn a blind eye to the obvious use of racial 
and religious stereotypes if those stereotypes serve other interests, such as 
national security or law enforcement.23 And in the employment 
discrimination context, federal courts have devised a doctrine—called “stray 
remarks”—to prevent juries from hearing evidence that employers made 
explicitly discriminatory comments.24 For example, one court dismissed a 
case brought by a female investment banker whose supervisor routinely 
called her “such epithets as ‘bitch,’ ‘cunt,’ ‘whore,’ ‘slut’ and ‘tart,’” 
reasoning that these remarks were irrelevant to the question of whether she 
was paid less money in bonuses than her male subordinates because of sex 
discrimination.25 These cases deserve attention not only because they deny 
justice to individual victims of discrimination but also because the failure to 
confront explicit forms of discrimination may normalize prejudice.26 
 
 20 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 
(2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 2391562 [hereinafter Trump Cert. Pet.]. 
 21 See infra Section II.A.1 (discussing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)). 
 22 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (offering this reason as one of several bases for 
distinguishing the travel ban case from “the conventional Establishment Clause claim”). 
 23 See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the extension of the doctrine of Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), to cases involving explicit evidence of intentional discrimination). 
 24 See infra Section II.B. 
 25 Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, No. 02 CIV.5191(VM), 2003 WL 22251313, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
30, 2003) (granting summary judgment for the employer and disregarding “these ‘stray remarks in the 
workplace’” because they were “not alleged to have been made as part of any adverse discriminatory 
employment action taken against” the plaintiff), aff’d, 110 F. App’x 160 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 26 See infra Section I.C. 
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Courts, advocates, and scholars have advanced a number of legal 
arguments against considering evidence of explicit bias in discrimination 
cases. This Article demonstrates these arguments are without merit. One 
argument maintains that unofficial remarks are not reliable evidence of 
official intentions.27 While this concern goes to the weight a court might give 
an explicit remark, it is not a reason to conclude that all unofficial remarks 
are irrelevant. Unofficial remarks may be more reliable evidence of intent 
than official statements crafted for purposes of evading legal liability. 
Another concern is fear of judicial overreach in invalidating decisions due to 
the taint of bias, when those decisions would otherwise be sound. But under 
existing law, the remedy for explicit discrimination will not necessarily be 
overturning legislation, reinstating the employment discrimination plaintiff, 
or letting the criminal defendant go free.28 Discrimination doctrines account 
for the possibility that an action may be justified on nondiscriminatory 
grounds, preserving government and employer discretion.29 Nonetheless, it 
is important for courts to straightforwardly recognize bias rather than turning 
a blind eye to it or accepting excuses. 
Yet another concern is that using explicit bias as evidence of 
discrimination will result in repressive forms of censorship by employers and 
counterproductive forms of self-censorship by politicians.30 These arguments 
rest on dubious empirical premises. But ultimately, the threat to free 
expression must be weighed against the countervailing interests in enforcing 
equality law. And a final concern is that directly confronting bias will result 
in backlash against the antidiscrimination project and undermine the 
 
 27 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 373–74 (4th Cir. 2018) (en 
banc) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should not consider a government official’s 
“campaign statements and similar evidence,” such as “musings or tweets,” when assessing whether a 
facially nondiscriminatory policy was motivated by invidious intent). 
 28 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(2)(B) (2012) (where an employee shows discrimination was a 
motivating factor for her termination, but her employer demonstrates it would have made the same 
decision even absent discrimination, reinstatement is not allowed as a remedy); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. 
Ct. 1737, 1744, 1755 (2016) (reversing the Georgia Supreme Court for failing to consider explicit racial 
bias on the part of prosecutors in striking potential jurors, and remanding for a new trial); N.C. State 
Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 233 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that, if discrimination 
was a motivating factor for legislation, the burden shifts to the government, and “[o]nce the burden shifts, 
a court must carefully scrutinize a state’s non-racial motivations to determine whether they alone can 
explain enactment of the challenged law”). But see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (reversing, but not remanding, a case in which a member of an 
adjudicatory body made comments suggesting hostility toward a party’s sincere religious beliefs). 
 29 See infra Section III.B.1. 
 30 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 883 F.3d at 374 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“It is hard 
to imagine a greater or more direct burden on campaign speech than the knowledge that any statement 
made might be used later to support the inference of some nefarious intent when official actions are 
inevitably subjected to legal challenges.”). 
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legitimacy of judicial processes.31 However, it may be impossible to pursue 
any antidiscrimination policy without backlash. The risk of backlash should 
also be assessed against the harms of condoning explicit bias. 
This Article focuses on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
constitutional cases32 dealing with discrimination based on race, sex, and 
religion. It examines when explicit bias is ignored as evidence of 
discriminatory mistreatment.33 Comparison of statutory and constitutional 
contexts is useful because these fields cross-pollinate.34 While there are 
important differences—the Constitution applies to public actors, while Title 
VII applies to many public and private employers—the problem of how to 
identify intentional discrimination is common to both.35 Although Title VII 
scholars have criticized the stray remarks doctrine, they have not given full 
consideration to the underlying arguments in its favor,36 perhaps because 
those arguments are rarely fleshed out in Title VII doctrine. In defending 
President Trump’s travel ban against constitutional challenge, the 
government has fully articulated those arguments so they might be 
challenged with lessons for both contexts.37 And although constitutional law 
scholars are beginning to criticize the Trump Administration’s arguments in 
the travel ban cases, they have not considered the path of Title VII law as a 
cautionary tale.38 Courts and advocates should take care not to make 
arguments that might lead to the adoption of the Title VII stray remarks 
doctrine in the constitutional context. Moreover, the fact that arguments 
 
 31 See infra Section III.D. 
 32 While most discrimination claims are brought under the Equal Protection Clause, the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses also prohibit discrimination against particular religious groups. 
Establishment Clause cases challenging religious symbols and displays are beyond the scope of this 
Article, although they are relevant insofar as courts cite them in cases involving discrimination against 
religious groups. 
 33 Harassment qualifies as discriminatory mistreatment because courts conceptualize it as creating 
unequal workplace conditions. See infra note 46. Debates over hate speech regulation entail issues that 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 34 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1007, 1013 (1989) (describing how constitutional principles have a “gravitational pull” on statutory 
interpretation); Stephen M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 201, 204–05 (2014) (discussing 
convergence and divergence in Supreme Court interpretations of race discrimination in constitutional and 
statutory contexts). 
 35 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2327 (2018) (equal protection case citing Title VII 
precedent for its holding on discriminatory intent); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248–49 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (foundational Title VII case citing equal protection and First Amendment 
precedents for its holding on how to manage problems of mixed motives). 
 36 See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 180 (2012). 
 37 See infra Part III. 
 38 See, e.g., Shawn E. Fields, Is It Bad Law to Believe A Politician? Campaign Speech and 
Discriminatory Intent, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 277 (2018); Huq, supra note 14, at 1270–73. 
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against consideration of explicit bias arise in the mundane area of Title VII 
litigation suggests the problem may be judicial resistance to claims of 
discrimination, not abstract questions of constitutional theory. 
Part I of this Article describes the particular harms of explicit 
discrimination in undermining antidiscrimination norms. Part II exposes how 
courts insulate explicit biases from scrutiny and redress in discrimination 
cases. Part III collects and criticizes the legal arguments for altogether 
ignoring explicit bias. Finally, Part IV argues courts should consider the 
relevance of biased remarks on a case-by-case basis, alongside other 
evidence of discriminatory intent. 
I. HARMS OF EXPLICIT BIAS 
There are unique dangers when employers or government entities offer 
explicitly discriminatory rationales for harmful decisions. The failure to 
recognize this type of overt discrimination may legitimize further 
discrimination. This may be stating the obvious. And yet, this obvious point 
bears fleshing out in light of the continued persistence of explicit bias and 
the curious lack of legal attention to the phenomenon. 
A. Definitions and Scope 
Before proceeding, some definitions and caveats are necessary. This 
Article focuses on discrimination based on race, sex, and religion; other 
categories are beyond its scope.39 For purposes of this Article, I define 
“explicit bias” broadly. By “explicit,” I simply mean expressed, whether 
spoken aloud, written, or otherwise conveyed to some audience by words or 
symbols. By “bias,” I mean what a reasonable listener could consider to be 
views about the attributes of a particular group or the attributes of particular 
individuals due to group membership. 
By “explicit,” I do not mean obvious; bias is often expressed through 
“coded” language or can be deduced through inference.40 Close cases might 
be debated, but a more precise definition is not required for my purposes. 
This Article criticizes cases in which courts foreclosed inquiry into whether 
statements were indicative of bias at all by imposing quasi-evidentiary rules 
or using procedural maneuvers such as summary judgment. 
 
 39 Sexual orientation has received unique legal treatment and cannot be covered in adequate detail 
here. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 151. Age, too, is treated as an exceptional category in 
discrimination law. See, e.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 252 (4th Cir. 1999) (Motz, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that age discrimination is not the same sort of problem as discrimination based on 
race and sex). 
 40 See BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 6, at 80 (“Because post-civil rights racial norms disallow the open 
expression of racial views, whites have developed a concealed way of voicing them.”). 
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By “bias,” I do not mean just animus. Animus is “simple dislike of a 
particular group.”41 Discrimination law is not limited to animus or any other 
particular emotion; it asks simply whether a person was mistreated due to 
race, sex, or religion.42 Thus, my definition does not turn on the speaker’s 
reasons for expressing bias, which may include simple dislike, in-group 
preferences, disgust, discomfort, fear, ignorance, false stereotypes, 
statistically accurate generalizations, paternalism, views about proper 
behavior or relationships for group members, a desire to achieve status or fit 
in with an in-group, or any number of other motives.43 The question is, Did 
the remark reflect views about race, sex, or religion? The question is not, Did 
the remark reflect some particular set of views or feelings about those group-
based characteristics? 
I do not argue that there is anything inherently immoral about biased 
attitudes or expressions. Whether explicit bias is of moral concern depends 
on context. For example, there is nothing wrong with the statement: “African 
Americans have long received inferior educations in the U.S. school 
system.” What is wrong is to refuse to hire a particular African American on 
the basis of that generalization.44 This Article is only concerned with cases 
in which explicit bias may be evidence of discriminatory mistreatment. 
While some of the arguments discussed below may also apply to 
untargeted hate speech, this Article’s topic is not discrimination “in the air.”45 
Rather, it is focused on “discrimination brought to ground and visited upon” 
a person or people who allege they suffered harm or lost a material benefit 
or opportunity on account of that discrimination.46 My conclusions about 
 
 41 WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 2 (2017). 
 42 A few equal protection cases have treated animus according to special doctrinal rules. Id. at 3. But 
these are only a subset of equal protection cases; they are exceptions to the normal approach of analyzing 
discrimination based on tiers of scrutiny. Id. at 3–4. Title VII and other federal civil rights statutes do not 
limit prohibited motives to animus. 
 43 For discussion of some of these motives and how they drive discrimination, see, for example, 
Anthony G. Greenwald & Thomas F. Pettigrew, With Malice Towards None and Charity for Some—
Ingroup Favoritism Enables Discrimination, 69 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 669, 670 (2014) (in-group 
favoritism); Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual Benefits 
Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464 (2009) (paternalism); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 107–15 (2004) (disgust); and 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 150 (2003) (rational and irrational 
stereotypes). 
 44 Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 196 (discussing why it may be morally impermissible to use race 
as a consideration even when race is a “nonspurious indicator” of some relevant factor). 
 45 Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (“Negligence is not 
actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right. ‘Proof of 
negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.’”). 
 46 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“This is not, as Price 
Waterhouse suggests, ‘discrimination in the air’; rather, it is, as Hopkins puts it, ‘discrimination brought 
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explicit bias are limited to contexts in which it may be evidence of intentional 
discrimination. 
Moreover, it is not my argument that discrimination is never morally or 
legally justified. There may be persuasive reasons to discriminate. But this 
is a separate question. One question is whether discrimination occurred; 
another is whether it is justified by, for example, some compelling 
governmental interest or business imperative. This Article criticizes cases 
that muddle the two questions, rendering inconsequential the fact of 
discrimination and its harms. 
Whether discrimination law should carve out exceptions for certain 
official policies of discrimination with remedial motives, such as affirmative 
action, is also beyond the scope of this Article.47 There are special doctrinal 
frameworks for evaluating whether discrimination is justified in such 
instances.48 I note, however, that courts are quick to see explicit remarks as 
evidence of “reverse” discrimination in Title VII cases.49 And the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection doctrine does not give a free pass to facially neutral 
policies where there is evidence that a legislature sought to advantage 
minorities.50 The Court has recently given decisive weight to explicit 
 
to ground and visited upon’ an employee.”). This includes discriminatory workplace harassment that is 
so “severe or pervasive” that it subjects victims to disadvantageous terms and conditions of employment. 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (explaining how discriminatory harassment is a 
violation of Title VII because it “detract[s] from employees’ job performance, discourage[s] employees 
from remaining on the job, or keep[s] them from advancing in their careers”). 
 47 So, too, are discussions of minority group solidarity. See, e.g., TOMMIE SHELBY, WE WHO ARE 
DARK: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK SOLIDARITY 23 (2005). 
 48 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016) (discussing standards 
for permissible race-conscious affirmative action programs by public universities under the Equal 
Protection Clause); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (establishing a framework for analyzing 
when intentional discrimination is justified to avoid a disparate impact under Title VII); Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987) (expounding on the standards for permissible affirmative 
action plans under Title VII). 
 49 See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579 (concluding—based, inter alia, on statements by city officials—
that a city discarded a promotional exam out of concern that it disadvantaged minority candidates in 
violation of Title VII); Lenart v. Coach Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 61, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying an 
employer’s motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case brought by a male tax 
lawyer whose evidence of discrimination was that (a) his job duties were taken over by a woman after his 
position was terminated in a departmental restructuring and (b) a supervisor who was not alleged to have 
been involved in the decision to fire him had “commented on ‘numerous occasions’ that she would ‘like 
to have a staff of all women’ . . . and stated after [the] termination that she had created a ‘girl power’ team 
in New York”). 
 50 Consider Fisher, an equal protection case that upheld the explicit consideration of race as a factor 
in admissions to the University of Texas. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207. In that case, opponents of the law 
argued that the University had a race-neutral alternative: expanding its “Top Ten Percent Law [that] 
guarantees college admission to students who graduate from a Texas high school in the top 10 percent of 
their class.” Id. at 2205. But the Court did not agree that the Top Ten Percent Law was race-neutral, 
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statements of bias denigrating a member of the Christian majority.51 This 
Article’s topic is when explicit bias against disadvantaged groups is not even 
recognized as such. 
B. Expressive and Material Harms 
When discrimination is explicit, it has material and expressive harms 
that are intertwined. 
The basic injury of discrimination is to suffer disadvantage on account 
of a forbidden ground such as race, sex, or religion.52 There are many 
reasons, grounded in our national commitments to liberty and equality, for 
forbidding discrimination in both public policy and employment.53 These 
reasons include, but are not limited to, the principle that individuals be 
judged by their own merits, an abhorrence for caste systems and 
subordination, the right to equal opportunity, freedom from the constraints 
of repressive group-based stereotypes, a universal commitment to human 
flourishing, an insistence that every person be treated with equal respect and 
concern, and fears about the instability and illegitimacy of inequitable 
governments and institutions. Discrimination on certain grounds, such as 
race, sex, and religion, requires legal intervention because inequality on 
those bases is, or has been, a systemic and pervasive problem.54 Harms to 
minorities are compounded when discriminatory mistreatment follows them 
across multiple social domains, as is the case with systems of racial, 
religious, and gender subordination that span employment and housing 
markets, educational and criminal justice systems, and public and private 
interactions.55 
 
noting, “petitioner overlooks the fact that the Top Ten Percent Plan, though facially neutral, cannot be 
understood apart from its basic purpose, which is to boost minority enrollment.” Id. at 2213. 
 51 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018) 
(upholding a free exercise challenge where an adjudicator disparaged a party’s Christian religious beliefs 
by stating, among other things, that “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use [is] 
to—to use their religion to hurt others”). Arguably, this plaintiff’s particular religious belief—that 
marriage is between a man and a woman—places him in the minority. Whether the adjudicator’s remarks 
disparaged him because he is a majority-group member, a minority-group member, or a person with his 
own idiosyncratic faith is immaterial to my argument: courts should give the same attention to explicitly 
biased remarks when they are directed at women, Muslims, and people of color. 
 52 See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 
1358 (2017) (explaining how the injury of discrimination occurs when race, sex, or another such trait 
causes disadvantage, apart from the question of blame or institutional liability). 
 53 See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 141–61 (2017) 
(discussing various theories of the harm of discrimination). 
 54 See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 93 (2015). The law may also 
forbid discrimination on certain grounds because it values particular social groups or regards certain traits 
as irrelevant to one’s social standing and employment prospects. Id. 
 55 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 139 (2014). 
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From the victim’s perspective, the reasons for prohibiting 
discrimination apply whether the form that discrimination takes is overt or 
covert, simple or complex, intentional or mistaken. Legal scholars have long 
criticized the “perpetrator perspective” of discrimination law that only 
examines the mental state of the discriminator.56 And they are right. But they 
are wrong to suggest that the perpetrator’s stated intentions are irrelevant.57 
Evidence of a perpetrator’s discriminatory intent is one way to prove that a 
victim was denied equal opportunity and suffered material harm because of 
race, sex, or religion. 
Moreover, explicit forms of discrimination can create unique harms. 
Some of these harms might be categorized as expressive, sending the 
message that certain people are less worthy of “equal concern and respect.”58 
A large body of medical research has linked self-reported discrimination to 
numerous adverse mental and physical health outcomes.59 But putting 
someone in a second-class position “is wrong in itself, regardless of the 
psychological or economic consequences.”60 This Article does not take a 
position on whether the core problem of discrimination is in what it expresses 
 
 56 See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination 
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (1978) (“The 
perpetrator perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions, but as actions . . . . The focus is more 
on what particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims than it is on the overall life 
situation of the victim class.”). 
 57 See, e.g., Haney-López, supra note 14, at 1795 (“The Court traditionally has eschewed direct 
evidence of what specific government actors thought, and for good reasons.”). 
 58 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977). On an expressive theory of the 
harm of discrimination, the question is when discrimination demeans. In other words, “When does 
drawing distinctions among people fail to treat those affected as persons of equal moral worth?” 
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 7 (2008); see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531–
45 (2000) (discussing equal protection doctrine). 
 59 See, e.g., Yin Paradies et al., Racism as a Determinant of Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, PLOS ONE, Sept. 23, 2015, at 1 (discussing the “growing body of epidemiological evidence . . . 
documenting the health impacts of racism” and reviewing 293 studies); Elizabeth A. Pascoe & Laura 
Smart Richman, Perceived Discrimination and Health: A Meta-Analytic Review, 135 PSYCHOL. 
BULLETIN 531, 531 (2009) (meta-analysis of 134 studies discussing how perceived discrimination creates 
adverse health outcomes by triggering the body’s stress responses, increasing vulnerability to problems 
such as cardiovascular disease, and diminishing a person’s self-control resources, leading to unhealthy 
behaviors). This is not to discount the harms of covert forms of bias, which may be damaging because 
victims blame themselves for their misfortunes. See Kimberly T. Schneider et al., An Examination of the 
Nature and Correlates of Ethnic Harassment Experiences in Multiple Contexts, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
3, 10–11 (2000) (study of 575 Hispanic workers finding not only negative psychological outcomes from 
verbal harassment but also that those who reported high levels of exclusion and low levels of verbal 
harassment experienced even more detrimental effects, perhaps because of the stress of the “ambiguity”). 
 60 ACKERMAN, supra note 55, at 139. Even if a group targeted for indignities was resilient and able 
to succeed despite its second-class status, that would not justify the treatment of the group as second class. 
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 58, at 1543 (“[T]he State is not justified in heaping indignities on people 
just because they can ‘take it.’”). 
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or in its material consequences.61 The two types of harm are entangled when 
discriminatory actions that materially disadvantage a plaintiff are justified 
by explicit bias.62 
C. Undermining Antidiscrimination Norms 
The failure to confront explicit bias may legitimize discrimination in a 
number of ways. Most obviously, if the law fails to even acknowledge the 
most explicit forms of discrimination, it cannot hope to deter discrimination. 
To the extent that a discriminator can get away with explicitly biased 
decision-making in one instance, that person is more likely to discriminate 
in the future.63 Another way that explicit bias is uniquely harmful is in its 
effects on bystanders. In some contexts, explicitly biased remarks may 
persuade an audience that the targets of discrimination are inferior or 
deserving of mistreatment.64 A more likely effect is that explicit bias will 
disable potential allies by causing them to fear that they too will be subjected 
to abuse if they assist the targets of discrimination.65 But explicit bias may 
also operate in more complex ways to legitimize prejudice by undermining 
antidiscrimination norms. 
To understand how discrimination can become normalized, it is helpful 
to consider research from social psychology. While most recent social 
psychology has focused on implicit bias, some researchers have attempted 
to explain overt prejudice.66 Based on decades of empirical studies, Christian 
 
 61 Nor does this Article take a position on whether intentional discrimination is wrong even when it 
is not expressed and when it fails to accomplish the material harm that was intended. Compare HELLMAN, 
supra note 58, at 138–68 (arguing discriminatory motives are not what make an action wrong), with 
Micah Schwartzman, Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of the Travel Ban, in 
NOMOS LXI: POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 19), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3159393 [https://perma.cc/MZY7-X34S] (arguing 
that a person “may act impermissibly on the basis of prejudicial intentions without expressing those 
intentions publicly,” even when the action has no effect). 
 62 When an explicitly biased action did not cause material harm to a plaintiff, because it was 
independently justified on some nondiscriminatory ground, there may still be expressive harms. But in 
such cases, discrimination law eliminates or severely curtails legal liability. See infra Sections III.A.3, 
III.B.1. 
 63 See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation 
in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 519 n.116 (2006) (“It is a fundamental principle of 
psychology that each time a person engages in an act and suffers no negative consequences, he becomes 
more likely to engage in that act in the future.”). 
 64 Ishani Maitra, Subordinating Speech, in SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 
94, 97 (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012) (explaining how hate speech may persuade its 
audience “that members of a particular racial group are inferior and so deserving of persecution”). 
 65 Id. at 97 (“Even those who object to hate speech may feel relieved that they belong to the dominant 
group (relative to the targets), and thus don’t have to be subjected to similar abuse.”). 
 66 Forscher et al., supra note 4, at 792 (discussing “the contemporary focus on unintentional bias” 
despite the persistence of “overt discrimination”). 
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Crandall and Amy Eshleman developed a model to explain overt prejudice 
called “justification-suppression.”67 In this model, everyone experiences 
“genuine prejudices”—feelings about particular social groups—in some 
form or another.68 Rather than openly expressing these prejudices, people 
usually suppress them. They do this to maintain their own self-conceptions 
as egalitarian and to avoid violating social norms.69 But sometimes the desire 
to suppress one’s prejudices is overcome by justifications: beliefs that “allow 
otherwise inhibited prejudices to be expressed, free of guilt and social 
punishment.”70 
There are any number of justifications for prejudice.71 Common 
justifications include arguments that minorities have failed to make progress 
because they hold different values than the majority,72 that male dominance 
in political and economic life is explained by women’s lack of interest in and 
aptitude for leadership,73 that victims are to blame for their own 
misfortunes,74 and that outsiders are threats.75 Some people justify prejudice 
with ideologies like Social Darwinism.76 
 
 67 Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-Suppression Model of the Expression and 
Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414, 414, 425 (2003) (developing a model to explain “the 
best known and empirically supported theories [of prejudice], incorporating many of their common 
elements”). 
 68 Id. at 416–17; see also Cara A. Talaska et al., Legitimating Racial Discrimination: Emotions, Not 
Beliefs, Best Predict Discrimination in a Meta-Analysis, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 263, 263, 285 (2008) (meta-
analysis of fifty-seven studies finding “[e]motional prejudices are twice[] as closely related to racial 
discrimination as stereotypes and beliefs are” and concluding “[t]he central role of emotions and the 
diminished role of beliefs suggest that people may recruit beliefs as a post-hoc justification for their own 
emotion-driven behavior”). 
 69 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 420. 
 70 Mark H. White II & Christian S. Crandall, Freedom of Racist Speech: Ego and Expressive Threats, 
113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 413, 414 (2017). These dynamics are not sequential or 
independent of one another; justifications may increase feelings of genuine prejudice in a “feedback 
loop.” Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 433. Crandall and Eshleman acknowledge that “there is 
little empirical evidence that can be used to sort out whether the justification is a releaser or a cause of 
genuine prejudice.” Id. at 425. 
 71 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 425–32. 
 72 Id. at 430 (discussing Monica Biernat et al., Violating American Values: A “Value Congruence” 
Approach to Understanding Outgroup Attitudes, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 387 (1996)); see 
also David O. Sears & P. J. Henry, The Origins of Symbolic Racism, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 259, 260 (2003) (discussing “symbolic racism” entailing the view that “Blacks’ failure to 
progress results from their unwillingness to work hard enough”). 
 73 See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 430 (discussing stereotypes as justifications). 
 74 Id. at 428 (concluding that “a perception of responsibility for a negative fate leads to a negative 
evaluation of a person or group,” which is then used to justify mistreatment because, as the explanation 
goes, “bad people deserve bad treatment”). 
 75 Id. at 431. 
 76 Id. at 426. 
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Other justifications work by appealing to cherished American values—
such as meritocracy and free speech—to provide cover for racism and 
sexism. People may argue their prejudices are inconsequential because 
American systems of advancement and punishment are fundamentally fair.77 
Research suggests the 2008 election of President Barack Obama may have 
increased popular beliefs that American society is colorblind.78 White 
Americans may justify prejudice with the argument that they are now losing 
ground relative to minority groups.79 Others may invoke free speech 
principles.80 For example, under threat of boycott, one Minneapolis bar 
owner explained his donation to the Senate campaign of white supremacist 
David Duke as “just basically free speech.”81 Free speech justifications 
characterize anti-racist norms as illegitimate political correctness.82 One set 
of studies found that measures of “anti-Black prejudice predicted how likely 
people were to claim that punishing someone for anti-Black prejudice 
violated their rights to freedom of speech.”83 Survey participants high in 
prejudice were less likely to voice First Amendment objections when the 
threatened speech was race-neutral, suggesting their free speech concerns 
were more about the freedom to express racist prejudice than free speech in 
general.84 This may partly explain the appeal of President Donald Trump’s 
rhetorical strategy of assailing “political correctness.”85 
Unlike theories of implicit bias, which assume people are unaware of 
their prejudices and would prefer to suppress them, the justification-
suppression model suggests many people are aware of their biases and would 
 
 77 See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278–79, 1305–06 (2012). 
 78 See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., The Ironic Consequences of Obama’s Election: Decreased 
Support for Social Justice, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 556, 556 (2009). 
 79 See Robb Willer et al., Threats to Racial Status Promote Tea Party Support Among White 
Americans 2 (May 4, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2770186 [https://perma.cc/2PBW-Q8X3]. 
 80 White & Crandall, supra note 70, at 414. This is not to say that there are no valid free speech 
concerns. See infra Section III.C (assessing free speech arguments). 
 81 Nicole Darrah, Minneapolis Bar Closes After Employees Learn Owner Donated to White 
Supremacist David Duke, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 4, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/09/04/ 
minneapolis-bar-closes-after-employees-learn-owner-donated-to-white-supremacist-david-duke.html 
[https://perma.cc/ST7V-WHAX]. 
 82 White & Crandall, supra note 70, at 414. 
 83 Id. at 424 (discussing seven internet surveys with 1078 participants). 
 84 Id. One study assessed responses to speech that was anti-black versus speech that was anti-police. 
Id. at 417. 
 85 See, e.g., The Economist/YouGov Poll, YOUGOV 107 (Mar. 10–12, 2016), 
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/055qdf83nv/econTabReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3A36-8PKM] (reporting that 39% of 201 survey respondents who were likely to vote 
for Trump in the 2016 primary election thought the main reason people supported Trump’s campaign was 
that he was “not politically correct”). 
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prefer to express them.86 Self-censorship drains mental energy, and the 
release of prejudice can be a relief.87 Justifications allow an individual to 
reconcile her prejudices with social norms.88 People who express 
justifications may be attempting to legitimize their prejudices to an 
audience—justifying discrimination against black people by their supposed 
lack of work ethic,89 against women by the fact that “women get pregnant” 
and leave the workplace,90 or against Muslims by the threat of terrorism.91 
People may use justifications to legitimize their prejudices to themselves,92 
or they may use them to justify the prejudices of others they sympathize 
with.93 When justifications become acceptable writ large, particular forms of 
discrimination are not seen as morally problematic.94 
Social norms can constrain people from acting on their prejudices.95 In 
experimental research, people prove more likely to act on prejudice when 
they believe it is socially acceptable, and more likely to condemn bias when 
 
 86 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 416 (“Some models of prejudice imply that if people could 
simply figure out that they were prejudiced, they would quickly take steps to suppress it. Instead, we 
suggest that people are often highly motivated to seek out justifications that allow the unsanctioned 
expression of their prejudices.”). There is evidence that people are aware of but underreport their explicit 
biases. Studies known as “bogus pipeline” experiments, in which people are told that researchers have a 
sort of polygraph machine that will identify their true feelings, result in more self-reports of explicit bias 
than those studies in which people are simply asked their attitudes. See, e.g., Jason A. Nier, How 
Dissociated Are Implicit and Explicit Racial Attitudes? A Bogus Pipeline Approach, 8 GROUP PROCESSES 
& INTERGROUP REL. 39, 39 (2005); E. Ashby Plant et al., The Bogus Pipeline and Motivations to Respond 
Without Prejudice: Revisiting the Fading and Faking of Racial Prejudice, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP REL. 187, 188 (2003). 
 87 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 422–23 (discussing research demonstrating that 
suppression of negative emotions causes both fatigue and anxiety, and impairs performance on tasks). 
 88 Id. at 420–23. 
 89 See, e.g., Pager & Western, supra note 6, at 229 (discussing employers’ characterizations of black 
men “as lazy or having a poor work ethic”). 
 90 See, e.g., Moss-Racusin et al., supra note 2, at 198 (quoting one online comment: “Women get 
pregnant. . . . So given the same qualifications, I would rationally go for the man”). 
 91 See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview with Donald Trump, supra note 7 
(“I think Islam hates us. . . . We have to be very careful. And we can’t allow people coming into this 
country who have this hatred of the United States.”). 
 92 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 421. 
 93 White & Crandall, supra note 70, at 414 (“This can be motivated by self-justification, sympathy 
and concern, or consistency and balance, among many reasons.” (citations omitted)). 
 94 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 67, at 417 (“[A]dequately justified prejudices are not even 
labeled as prejudices (e.g., prejudice toward rapists, child abusers, enemy soldiers).”). The question 
addressed by social psychology is not whether prejudices are morally justified but how they are socially 
justified. It takes a moral theory to explain the harms of discrimination and to identify the traits that should 
be protected. See supra Section I.B. 
 95 See, e.g., Christian S. Crandall et al., Social Norms and the Expression and Suppression of 
Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 359, 359, 366 (2002). 
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they believe it is not.96 For example, in one study, white students were given 
statistics about whether other students at their university either had or did not 
have racist beliefs.97 They were then asked to sit out in the hallway with black 
students. Those who already had racist beliefs and had received information 
indicating their beliefs were typical sat farther away from the black 
students.98 In another study, people who already held hostile sexist beliefs 
were more likely to express tolerance for sexism after hearing sexist jokes.99 
And in yet another study, after the election of President Trump, online survey 
participants were more willing to openly donate to an anti-immigration group 
whose founder had advocated “a European-American majority, and a clear 
one at that.”100 To the extent that the law,101 elected leaders,102 and social 
groups103 endorse justifications for prejudice, discriminators may be less 
likely to suppress their prejudices. The legitimation of explicitly biased 
 
 96 See, e.g., id. at 359 (conducting seven studies of 1504 participants and finding that “[t]he public 
expression of prejudice toward 105 social groups was very highly correlated with social approval of that 
expression. Participants closely adhere to social norms when expressing prejudice, evaluating scenarios 
of discrimination, and reacting to hostile jokes”); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and 
Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 993, 993 
(1994) (study demonstrating that cues from other people that racial discrimination is permissible or 
impermissible affect whether a person will condemn a racist remark); Katie M. Duchscherer & John F. 
Dovidio, When Memes Are Mean: Appraisals of and Objections to Stereotypic Memes, 
2 TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES PSYCHOL. SCI. 335, 341 (2016) (conducting an online experiment involving 
memes about Asian stereotypes in which “seeing another person object to the meme increased the 
likelihood that White participants would object . . . but only when the race of the person was unstated, 
and not when the person was Asian”). 
 97 Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior 
and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 647 (2001). 
 98 Id. at 648. 
 99 See Thomas E. Ford et al., More Than ‘Just a Joke’: The Prejudice-Releasing Function of Sexist 
Humor, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 159, 159 (2008) (experiment showing that “for sexist 
men, exposure to sexist humor can promote the behavioral release of prejudice against women”); see also 
Thomas E. Ford, Effects of Sexist Humor on Tolerance of Sexist Events, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1094 (2000) (similar). 
 100 Bursztyn et al., supra note 5, at 14, 16, 28 (reporting that, prior to the election, 34% of people 
would donate when their anonymity was not assured, compared with 54% when anonymity was assured, 
while that gap virtually disappeared after the election). 
 101 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed, 85 SOC. RES. 73, 74 (2018) (discussing how law can 
change social norms through a “signaling effect” in “offering people information about what other people 
think, or about what it is appropriate to think”). For a historical example, see MANNING MARABLE, HOW 
CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA: PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND 
SOCIETY 217–20 (1983), which discusses how events of the 1970s and 1980s, such as the high-profile 
exoneration of KKK members in a murder trial, gave “green lights” to racial violence and discrimination 
during the Reagan era. 
 102 See Bursztyn et al., supra note 5, at 2. 
 103 See Crandall et al., supra note 95, at 374 (reporting on studies showing “[t]he acceptability of 
discriminatory acts and expressions of hostility . . . closely follow social norms,” a conclusion that 
follows the “common sense” that “[p]eople reflect the social milieu in which they live”). 
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attitudes may therefore increase the prevalence of discrimination and further 
entrench inequality. 
Stereotypes and victim-blaming narratives are an especially pernicious 
set of ideas to legitimize, especially those that are “true,” in the sense that 
they have some basis in fact.104 Not only do these narratives justify 
discrimination to perpetrators, they may also justify it to targets. 
Discriminatory beliefs then become self-fulfilling prophecies. As targets of 
discrimination come to understand their opportunities to be constrained, they 
lower their sights and do not make investments in their own human capital.105 
Thus, a girl who sees the technology field as hostile to women is unlikely to 
pursue studies in computer science. As a result, fewer women end up 
qualified for jobs in technology, and the industry points to the lack of 
qualified women as the justification for the dominance of men in the 
industry.106 Certainly, implicit signals and structures can have this result. But 
blatant forms of discrimination make the message of unwelcomeness all the 
more clear to minority group members.107 These dynamics are likely to 
increase social divisions and foster intergroup hostility.108 
II. HOW COURTS OVERLOOK EXPLICIT BIAS 
Despite the harms of discrimination motivated by explicit bias, many 
courts have categorically excused, erased, or ignored evidence of biased 
remarks rather than considering their relevance on a case-by-case basis. This 
Part will describe constitutional discrimination cases that disregard evidence 
that laws were enacted for explicitly discriminatory purposes because those 
laws are facially neutral, or because government officials intended to achieve 
some nondiscriminatory end, such as law enforcement or national security. 
It will then discuss the Title VII “stray remarks doctrine” that allows courts 
 
 104 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 139–41. 
 105 See, e.g., David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: 
A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for “High-Level” Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 
64–66, 78–85 (1998). 
 106 See, e.g., id. at 64–65 (“[S]tatistical stereotypes may act as self-fulfilling prophecies. Because the 
individual is judged on the basis of her membership in a group rather than her individual merit, 
discrimination reduces incentives for its victims to acquire human capital.”). 
 107 Cf. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The 
Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1643 (1991) (“In the usual case of discrimination, the 
assumption is that a minority employee will perceive that there is discrimination in society and will 
respond by underinvesting in human capital. There is a chance, however, that the minority employee may 
not be well attuned to the level of discrimination in society as a whole and therefore may not respond in 
this way.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Valentino et al., supra note 3, at 769 (“As the public discourse around issues of social 
welfare, immigration, national security, and a whole host of other issues becomes highly racialized and 
explicitly hostile, the potential for open racial conflict may rise.”). 
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to cast aside explicitly biased remarks in considering whether an employee 
was a victim of discrimination. In both these contexts, while explicitly biased 
remarks may constitute relevant evidence of intentional discrimination, 
courts have summarily refused to consider them. 
The purpose of this Part is to identify dysfunctional patterns rather than 
to describe authoritative rules. This Article is focused on contexts in which 
established doctrine requires rather than forecloses consideration of explicit 
bias.109 One of its main arguments is that these cases run contrary to the best 
interpretations of binding Supreme Court precedent. But the Trump 
Administration is advancing legal arguments for ignoring explicit bias.110 It 
is therefore urgent that these arguments be critically analyzed, lest they 
become binding doctrine. Moreover, law is not made only by the Supreme 
Court.111 Appellate courts cannot and do not correct every erroneous lower 
court decision. 
The purpose of this Part is not necessarily to take issue with the 
outcomes of any of the cases it describes. Just because a decision was partly 
motivated by bias does not mean a court should overturn that decision. As 
will be discussed in Part III, sometimes a law or employment decision can 
be justified independently on nondiscriminatory grounds.112 This Part 
highlights discrimination cases in which explicit bias was wrongly excluded 
from consideration altogether. 
A. Constitutional Law 
In constitutional cases, courts may disregard evidence that laws were 
enacted for explicitly discriminatory purposes based on two misguided 
premises: (1) that all that matters is that the law is facially neutral, and (2) 
 
 109 This Article does not analyze contexts in which courts ignore evidence of explicit bias because 
they are required to do so by bright-line rules, such as in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that “[s]ubjective intentions,” including racially 
discriminatory animus, “play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”). Also 
excluded from this Article’s analysis are doctrines that limit an entity’s liability for the acts of its 
constituents, such as the limitation of municipal liability for civil rights violations committed by 
policymakers under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), or the limitations 
on employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors under Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 761–62 (1998). While such doctrines deserve scholarly criticism, they raise issues beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 110 See infra Part III. 
 111 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
1183, 1185 (2017) (providing evidence of dialectical processes in Supreme Court and lower federal court 
decision-making in constitutional cases); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical 
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (because the 
Supreme Court decides relatively few cases, “constitutional law cannot be fully understood by looking 
only at the Supreme Court and its decisions”). 
 112 See infra Section III.B. 
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that all that matters is that government officials intended to achieve another 
end, such as law enforcement or national security. 
1. Facial Neutrality 
A strain of argument in constitutional discrimination cases posits that 
courts should not strike down policies motivated by explicit bias if those 
policies are facially neutral. While this strain has lain dormant for some time, 
it is now at risk of revival by the Trump Administration. 
An infamous example of this argument is the Civil Rights Era case 
Palmer v. Thompson.113 In 1962, a district court ordered that the City of 
Jackson, Mississippi desegregate its parks and recreational facilities, 
including its swimming pools.114 Rather than comply with that order, the City 
opted to close all the pools.115 The mayor had told the local newspaper that 
“neither agitators nor President Kennedy will change the determination of 
Jackson to retain segregation.”116 He had received commendation from 
Mississippi’s governor “for his pledge to maintain Jackson’s present 
separation of the races.”117 The City’s official justification for closing the 
pools was its concern that integrated swimming pools could not be operated 
safely or economically—based on the unstated premise that white people 
would not be willing to swim with black people.118 
In 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that the pool closure did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. The policy was race-neutral because “the city 
has closed the public pools to black and white alike.”119 The Court noted that 
it had never held a law “violate[d] equal protection solely because of the 
motivations of the men who voted for it.”120 This argument drew on a long 
history of judicial skepticism of intent-based inquiries.121 In dissent, Justice 
Byron White argued the pool closure was not race-neutral. Considered in 
context, the pool closure was “an expression of official policy that Negroes 
are unfit to associate with whites.”122 The dissent explained: 
 
 113 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 114 Id. at 219. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 250 (White, J., dissenting). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 260. 
 119 Id. at 225–26 (majority opinion). Yet racial discrimination often harms both black and white 
people. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1967) (striking down a ban on interracial 
marriage even though it applied equally to white and black people). 
 120 Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224. 
 121 See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2016) (discussing skepticism of intent-based arguments in constitutional law cases 
during the era of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), from 1876 through 1954). 
 122 Palmer, 403 U.S. at 240–41 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Whites feel nothing but disappointment and perhaps anger at the loss of the 
facilities. Negroes feel that and more. They are stigmatized by official 
implementation of a policy that the Fourteenth Amendment condemns as 
illegal. And the closed pools stand as mute reminders to the community of the 
official view of Negro inferiority.123 
Palmer was never expressly overruled. But in later equal protection 
cases, the Supreme Court walked back on its doctrine, clarifying that just 
because a law is neutral on its face does not mean it survives equal protection 
scrutiny.124 Scholars regard the 1970s as a turning point for equal protection 
jurisprudence, when the Court rejected effects-based analysis in favor of a 
nearly exclusive focus on intent.125 The turn away from Palmer has been so 
complete that it is now “generally taken for granted” that facially neutral 
actions are invalid if motivated by discriminatory intent.126 Nor does the 
facial neutrality of a law enacted to discriminate against a religious minority 
save it from an Establishment Clause challenge.127 
Nonetheless, President Trump’s defense of his 2017 executive orders 
barring travel to the United States by nationals of certain predominantly 
Muslim countries128 echoed the reasoning of Palmer v. Thompson.129 During 
the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump made a number of statements of his 
anti-Muslim views and his plan to ban Muslim immigration once elected.130 
In March 2016, Trump gave a televised interview in which he stated, “I think 
Islam hates us,” and “[W]e can’t allow people coming into this country who 
 
 123 Id. at 268. 
 124 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (striking down a racially neutral felon 
disenfranchisement law enacted by the Alabama Constitutional Convention in 1901 because the law had 
been motivated by a “zeal for white supremacy”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976) 
(interpreting Palmer as turning on the City’s legitimate purposes of preserving the peace and the public 
fisc, and rejecting “the proposition that the operative effect of the law rather than its purpose is the 
paramount factor”). 
 125 Eyer, supra note 121, at 34–35. 
 126 Id. at 4. 
 127 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“The 
Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination.”). 
 128 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017), revoked by Exec. Order No. 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The third iteration of the travel ban barred or limited 
immigration of citizens from six nations that are predominantly Muslim (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Chad) and two that are not (North Korea and Venezuela). Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 129 Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 9, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 
(2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 2610075 [hereinafter Trump Reply] (“Respondents do not point to any 
case that supports impugning an Executive Order that is neutral on its face and in operation based on a 
candidate’s campaign-trail comments.”). 
 130 See, e.g., Faiza Patel & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, The Islamophobic Administration, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. 2 (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/BCJ_Islamophobic_Administration.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BKH-2R28] (listing remarks). 
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have this hatred of the United States.”131 In later interviews, he candidly 
acknowledged that he planned a “Muslim ban” on immigration, although he 
could not call it that because “[p]eople were so upset when I used the word 
Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I’m okay 
with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”132 In January 
2017, Rudolph Giuliani stated on television that President Trump had asked 
for his advice on how to implement a “Muslim ban,” saying, “Put a 
commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.”133 In granting 
a temporary restraining order to stop enforcement of the travel ban, one 
district court held that “[t]hese statements, which include explicit, direct 
statements of President Trump’s animus towards Muslims and intention to 
impose a ban on Muslims entering the United States, present a convincing 
case that the First Executive Order was issued to accomplish, as nearly as 
possible, President Trump’s promised Muslim ban.”134 
But not all federal judges agreed. In analyzing an Establishment Clause 
challenge to the first version of the travel ban, one district court accepted the 
Trump Administration’s argument, asking only whether the face of the order 
itself was “neutral with respect to religion.”135 The plaintiffs had argued 
religious discrimination was apparent from a provision of the order directing 
that “the Secretary of State . . . ‘prioritize refugee claims made by individuals 
on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the 
individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of 
nationality.’”136 President Trump had explained in a televised interview that 
this provision was intended to benefit Christians.137 But the court held the 
 
 131 Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview with Donald Trump, supra note 7. 
 132 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast July 24, 2016) (transcript available at 
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706 [https://perma.cc/5WF5-
7VUR]). 
 133 Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says — and Ordered a Commission 
to Do It ‘Legally,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/ 
2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally 
[https://perma.cc/7LC4-5YQ3]. 
 134 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558–59 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 
(2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 135 Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 34–35, 38 (D. Mass. 2017) (denying a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and concluding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their 
Establishment Clause claim). 
 136 Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). 
 137 See David Brody, Brody File Exclusive: President Trump Says Persecuted Christians Will Be 
Given Priority as Refugees, CBN NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www1.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/ 
2017/01/27/brody-file-exclusive-president-trump-says-persecuted-christians-will-be-given-priority-as-
refugees [https://perma.cc/3QTM-L5W8] (“If you were a Muslim you could come in [from Syria], but if 
you were a Christian, it was almost impossible and the reason that was so unfair, everybody was 
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provision was not discriminatory because it “could be invoked to give 
preferred refugee status to a Muslim individual in a country that is 
predominately Christian.”138 
The second iteration of the travel ban omitted the provision with respect 
to minority religions, but retained the bar on travel by nationals of six 
majority-Muslim nations.139 The Fourth Circuit concluded that it was likely 
that the new version still violated the Establishment Clause.140 But three 
judges dissented, arguing that the President’s explicitly biased remarks were 
categorically irrelevant, a position that had previously been advanced in a 
dissent by five Ninth Circuit judges.141 
In September 2017, the Trump Administration issued a third iteration 
of its travel ban, this time limiting travel from six majority-Muslim nations, 
Venezuela, and North Korea.142 The proclamation announcing the ban stated 
that these countries were selected because they had inadequate procedures 
for sharing information about whether their nationals presented security 
threats to the United States.143 The Supreme Court upheld this version of the 
ban against an Establishment Clause challenge.144 In the opinion, the Court 
declined to adopt a rule insulating all facially neutral policies regarding the 
entry of noncitizens from judicial scrutiny.145 Rather, it assumed, without 
deciding, “that we may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent 
 
persecuted in all fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody but more so the Christians. 
And I thought it was very, very unfair. So we are going to help them.”). 
 138 Louhghalam, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 35. The court did consider the President’s statements with respect 
to the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claim but concluded that it had to defer to the President’s 
“delicate policy judgment” in the immigration domain. Id. at 33–34. 
 139 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 140 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 620 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated 
and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 141 Id. at 649–51 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 
(9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). 
 142 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2405 (2018). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 2423 (concluding the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their 
Establishment Clause claim and reversing the grant of a preliminary injunction). 
 145 Id. at 2420 (“[O]ur inquiry into matters of entry and national security is highly constrained. We 
need not define the precise contours of that inquiry in this case.”). 
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of applying rational basis review.”146 The Court also refused to hold that the 
President’s statements regarding Muslims were categorically irrelevant.147 
But the Court’s analysis gave short shrift to these statements, which it 
characterized as “extrinsic evidence,” and heavy weight to the policy’s facial 
neutrality.148 Four times the Court repeated that the travel ban was facially 
neutral.149 As for the President’s statements, “many . . . were made before the 
President took the oath of office.”150 In any event, the Court reasoned that 
“the issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements.”151 It saw the 
statements as extrinsic to the question in the case: whether the travel ban’s 
stated justification—preventing foreigners who had not been adequately 
vetted from entering the United States—had a rational basis. In answering 
that question, the Court made no reference to the President’s statements.152 It 
was as though the Court were analyzing a hypothetical situation in which the 
biased statements had never been made.153 It noted that “[t]he entry 
suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could have 
been taken by any other President.”154 In dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
agreed that the issue was not “whether to denounce” the President’s 
statements.155 The issue, rather, was whether those statements, along with the 
other available evidence, suggested that “the primary purpose of the 
 
 146 Id. The Court’s “starting point” was the test set forth by Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 
(1972), which asks “only whether the policy is facially legitimate and bona fide,” a standard the travel 
ban would meet. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. But the Court did not stop there, due to the Solicitor General’s 
concession at oral argument that Mandel would not end the analysis of a hypothetical situation in which 
an avowedly anti-Semitic President asked his cabinet to formulate a neutral policy in accord with his anti-
Semitic views, and the policy that emerged was a ban on travel from Israel. Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 16–17, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392, (No. 17-965). The Solicitor General argued that the travel ban was 
distinguishable from this hypothetical situation because the travel ban was supported by a “cabinet-level 
recommendation” of national security risk. Id. at 19. 
 147 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (“[W]e may consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the 
policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of 
unconstitutional grounds.”). 
 148 See id. at 2420–23. 
 149 Id. at 2418 (“[T]he issue before us is . . . the significance of [the President’s] statements in 
reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive 
responsibility.”); id. (“The Proclamation, moreover, is facially neutral toward religion.”); id. at 2421 
(“The text says nothing about religion.”); id. at 2423 (distinguishing the Japanese internment case, 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), on several grounds, including the fact that the travel 
ban is “a facially neutral policy”). 
 150 Id. at 2418. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 2420–23. 
 153 See id. at 2421 (“[B]ecause there is persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate 
grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility, we must accept that 
independent justification.”). 
 154 Id. at 2423. 
 155 Id. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Proclamation is to disfavor Islam and its adherents by excluding them from 
the country.”156 She concluded that “[t]he answer is unquestionably yes.”157 
Whatever the lessons of Trump v. Hawaii might be, they are limited to 
challenges to immigration policies involving the entry of noncitizens, and 
likely only those policies implicating national security.158 Just one Term prior 
to Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court considered the public statements of 
legislators as evidence of a racial gerrymander.159 Nonetheless, the Trump 
Administration has attempted to advance the facial neutrality argument in 
other contexts. It argued that the President’s biased statements were 
irrelevant in an equal protection case challenging the rescission of the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on the ground that 
the President’s remarks about Mexicans demonstrate he was motivated by 
racial animus.160 
Thus, the Trump Administration may be attempting to give new life to 
Palmer’s argument that courts should ignore evidence that explicit bias 
inspired a facially neutral rule. Moves in this direction will further eviscerate 
the potential for equal protection doctrine to protect minorities. 
Contemporary equal protection doctrine is fixated on intent, eschewing any 
test based on effects.161 If a plaintiff cannot argue that discriminatory intent 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, and she cannot argue that 
discriminatory effects violate the Equal Protection Clause, then she is only 
able to challenge official policies of explicit segregation, which are all but 
gone. This would render the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of racial 
nondiscrimination useful only to invalidate affirmative action programs.162 
 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 2419–20 (majority opinion) (explaining that a more deferential standard of review applies 
with respect to immigration policy, and that “our inquiry into matters of entry and national security is 
highly constrained”); see also id. at 2420 n.5 (“[A] circumscribed inquiry applies to any constitutional 
claim concerning the entry of foreign nationals.”); id. at 2423 (distinguishing Korematsu on several 
grounds, including the fact that the case involved “forcible relocation of U.S. citizens”). 
 159 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1475–78 (2017). And in the same Term as Trump v. Hawaii, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the relevance of explicit statements of anti-religious bias in a Free Exercise 
Clause challenge to an adjudication by a Colorado Commission. See supra note 51 (discussing 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018)). 
 160 Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 276–77 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Defendants do not 
defend the President’s comments but argue instead that the court should simply ignore them.”). In that 
case, the district judge held that the plaintiffs’ allegations of racial animus were sufficient to survive a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 277. 
 161 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976) (“[T]he invidious quality of a law 
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose . . . . 
This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face 
of the statute.”). 
 162 Cf. Haney-López, supra note 14, at 1781–84. 
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2. Rationalized Bias 
In other constitutional cases in which courts refuse to consider explicit 
bias, the underlying assumption may be that discrimination is permissible if 
it is intended to achieve some nondiscriminatory end, such as protecting 
national security, controlling crime, or winning trials or elections. 
This is a distortion of the logic of a 1979 equal protection precedent, 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.163 Feeney was a sex 
discrimination lawsuit challenging a Massachusetts statute giving absolute 
employment preferences to veterans.164 At the time, women were restricted 
from pursuing most aspects of military service.165 As a result, the veterans’ 
preference “operate[d] overwhelmingly to the advantage of males.”166 The 
plaintiff argued that the severe impact on women’s opportunities was “too 
inevitable to have been unintended.”167 But the Supreme Court saw no 
discrimination. It understood the veterans’ preference law not as expressing 
women’s inferiority, but, rather, as expressing the honor and value of 
military sacrifice.168 Feeney set forth a rule: that discriminatory purpose 
means “the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of 
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group.”169 Courts have invoked this rule to justify a wide 
array of practices with dramatic and devastating discriminatory impacts.170 
In a sleight of hand, courts also invoke Feeney to foreclose inquiry into 
discriminatory intent. Ashcroft v. Iqbal took Feeney’s “in spite of” logic a 
step further, eliminating the very possibility of discovering evidence of 
explicit bias due to the exigencies of the War on Terror.171 Shortly after the 
 
 163 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 164 Id. at 259–65. Feeney’s claim rested on an equal protection theory because Title VII includes an 
exception for veterans’ preferences. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–11 (2012). 
 165 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 283–84 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 166 Id. at 259, 270 (majority opinion) (“When this litigation was commenced, then, over 98% of the 
veterans in Massachusetts were male; only 1.8% were female.”). 
 167 Id. at 276. 
 168 Id. at 265 (“The veterans’ hiring preference in Massachusetts, as in other jurisdictions, has 
traditionally been justified as a measure designed to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military 
service . . . .”). The majority refused to inquire into the obvious and explicit history of sex discrimination 
in the military or the gendered premises of the state’s valorization of military service. Id. at 278 (“[T]he 
history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case.”). 
 169 Id. at 279. This rule has a philosophical pedigree: the doctrine of “double effect,” under which “it 
may be permissible to perform an act with both a good effect and a bad effect, provided that the bad effect 
is a mere side effect; if it is either your goal or a means to your goal, the act is forbidden.” Siegel, supra 
note 14, at 47 n.230 (quoting SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 103 (1998)); id. at 47 (critiquing the 
doctrine of double effect in Feeney for forestalling any interrogation of the “proportionality of the 
government’s ends and means”). 
 170 Siegel, supra note 14, at 50 (listing examples). 
 171 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009). 
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World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, plaintiff Javaid Iqbal 
and approximately 700 other noncitizens, almost all from South Asia, the 
Middle East, or North Africa, were rounded up and detained for immigration 
violations and related infractions.172 Many of them were arrested after 
members of the public, suspicious of their Muslim, Middle Eastern, and 
South Asian neighbors, called in anonymous tips to the FBI.173 While 
investigators may initially have had reasons to suspect some of the detainees 
had been involved with the September 11 attacks,174 most would never have 
aroused any suspicion were it not for their race and religion.175 
Iqbal and the other detainees all ended up on an FBI list of people 
connected to the September 11 investigation.176 However, the government 
never came forward with any evidence linking Iqbal to September 11.177 
Indeed, none of the over 700 detainees were ever convicted of any terrorism-
related offenses.178 A report by the Department of Justice’s Office of the 
Inspector General concluded that labels related to the September 11 
investigation “were applied to many aliens who had no connection to 
terrorism.”179 While waiting to be cleared, some of these detainees were 
imprisoned for months in a special unit of New York’s Metropolitan 
Detention Center,180 where they were confined to cells except for one hour a 
 
 172 Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 414 (2017); see also OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT 
OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 2, 21, 41–42 (2003), https://oig.justice.gov/special/0306/full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7G2E-HHK7] [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. 
 173 OIG REPORT, supra note 172, at 15–16. For example, one tipster expressed concern that there 
were “numerous Middle Eastern men” working at all hours at a nearby grocery store. Id. at 17. 
 174 Sinnar, supra note 172, at 420 (“Although none of the detainees were ultimately implicated in the 
attacks, the initial information in [some] cases included facts that would likely have created an 
investigative interest independent of racial or religious affiliation. In many other cases, however, no such 
individualized factual basis for suspicion appears to have existed.” (footnote omitted)). 
 175 This is not to say law enforcement can never consider a particular suspect’s appearance or 
background in deciding who to investigate. This practice may be narrowly tailored to meet law 
enforcement needs. But in Iqbal, the defendants imprisoned the plaintiffs for months because of race and 
religion without any apparent law enforcement justification. 
 176 OIG REPORT, supra note 172, at 2. 
 177 Sinnar, supra note 172, at 413 (“[D]uring the five years in which [Iqbal] pursued the case, the 
government never publicly indicated that it had had a credible basis for suspecting him of terrorism, 
although it presumably had every incentive to share such information.”). 
 178 Id. at 423–24. Three detainees were charged but “acquitted, and the government repudiated its 
case against them and investigated the prosecutors who brought the case for ethical violations.” Id. at 
423. Zacarias Moussaoui, who pleaded guilty to involvement in the September 11 attacks, was not one of 
these detainees; he was arrested before September 11. Id. at 424 n.348. 
 179 OIG REPORT, supra note 172, at 70. 
 180 Id. at 51–52, 182. 
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day, suffered physical and verbal abuse, and were denied contact with the 
outside world.181 
After they were eventually released, the detainees brought suit against 
government officials, including Attorney General John Ashcroft, alleging 
intentional discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin.182 The 
defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims of discriminatory intent 
were not plausible, and the Supreme Court agreed.183 In applying the 
substantive law, the only equal protection precedent the Court discussed was 
Feeney.184 Analyzing the case under Feeney, the Court asked whether 
government officials had acted “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’” a 
discriminatory impact.185 The Court concluded it was implausible that high-
level law enforcement officers would act with discriminatory intent.186 
Because “[t]he September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim 
hijackers,” the Court reasoned that “[i]t should come as no surprise that a 
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, 
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy 
was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”187 The Court concluded that all the 
complaint “plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s top law enforcement 
officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep 
suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects 
could be cleared of terrorist activity.”188 This “obvious alternative 
explanation”—protecting homeland security—ruled out discriminatory 
intent.189 
Because the complaint was dismissed at the pleading stage, Iqbal never 
had a chance to engage in discovery to uncover evidence of discriminatory 
intent on the part of government officials.190 Other detainees in a related 
 
 181 Id. at 152 (discussing the recreation policy allowing “one hour of recreation a day, five days a 
week”); id. at 142 (stating “the evidence indicates a pattern of physical and verbal abuse against some 
September 11 detainees”); id. at 113 (describing the “communications blackout”). 
 182 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 676–77. 
 185 Id. at 676 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
 186 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. 
 187 Id. Iqbal was Pakistani, not Arab. Out of the 762 detainees, 254 were from Pakistan. Sinnar, supra 
note 172, at 417. Sinnar explains that the groups “Arab” and “Muslim” became conflated in “the post-
9/11 period, when race and religion merged in social constructions of the enemy.” Id. at 418. 
 188 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683. 
 189 Id. at 682. 
 190 This is a general criticism of Iqbal’s holding. See, e.g., Sinnar, supra note 172, at 428 (“Legal 
scholars noted that the information needed to plead discriminatory intent, such as facts regarding the 
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lawsuit191 alleged that Ashcroft had expressed anti-Muslim animus, 
reportedly saying, “Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send 
your son to die for him. Christianity is a faith in which God sends his son to 
die for you.”192 This statement “identif[ies] Christianity by its central 
theological tenet, but Islam, in contrast, by the views of a small group of 
extremists.”193 After September 11, Ashcroft had also announced: “Let the 
terrorists among us be warned. If you overstay your visa even by one day, 
we will arrest you. If you violate a local law we will . . . work to make sure 
that you are put in jail and . . . kept in custody as long as possible.”194 This 
sounds suspiciously like what happened, not to terrorists, but to South Asian 
and Middle Eastern immigrants with no involvement in terrorism.195 
If the plaintiffs had been permitted to depose government officials, they 
may have uncovered additional evidence. Journalist Steven Brill reported, 
based on a composite of sources, that 
Ashcroft told [FBI Director] Mueller that any male from eighteen to forty years 
old from Middle Eastern or North African countries whom the FBI simply 
learned about was to be questioned and questioned hard. And anyone from these 
countries whose immigration papers were out of order—anyone—was to be 
turned over to the INS.196 
According to Brill’s sources, when Mueller expressed qualms about a 
“dragnet” that would entangle suspects “simply because they were Muslim 
 
defendant’s state of mind or the internal development of government policies, would frequently be within 
the defendant’s sole possession.”). 
 191 This lawsuit suffered its own defeat in the Supreme Court in 2017. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1869 (2017) (holding that the plaintiffs had no implied right of action to bring suit for most of the 
alleged constitutional violations and that federal officers had a qualified immunity defense against the 
plaintiffs’ statutory claims). In the interest of full disclosure, I was a part of the team that represented the 
plaintiffs in the Ziglar litigation, then-captioned Turkmen v. Ashcroft, from 2007 to 2008. 
 192 Fourth Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 60(d), Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 915 F. 
Supp. 2d 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 02-CV-2307) [hereinafter Turkmen Complaint]. Ashcroft’s office 
issued a repudiation of the statement, saying the remarks “do not accurately reflect the attorney general’s 
views.” Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Disputes Report on Islam Views, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2002), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/02/12/ashcroft-disputes-report-on-islam-
views/2656a726-3a34-46ce-8e1b-8db36cc15982 [https://perma.cc/NCJ8-Y3H2]. 
 193 Turkmen Complaint, supra note 192, ¶ 60(d). 
 194 Id. ¶ 60(e). 
 195 Id. In the Turkmen litigation, the Second Circuit found the allegations of discriminatory intent 
sufficient even without considering these remarks. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“[I]t is reasonable to infer that Ashcroft, Mueller, and Ziglar possessed the requisite discriminatory intent 
because they knew that the New York List was formed in a discriminatory manner, and nevertheless 
condoned that discrimination by ordering and complying with the merger of the lists, which ensured that 
the MDC Plaintiffs and other 9/11 detainees would be held in the challenged conditions of confinement.”), 
rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843.  
 196 STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 38 (2003). 
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men,” Ashcroft insisted the only way to prevent terrorism “was to round up 
anyone who fit the profile.”197 
But perhaps such facts, even if proven, would not have mattered to the 
result in Iqbal. As Professor Shirin Sinnar suggests, one explanation of the 
case’s holding is the unstated premise “that even if law enforcement officials 
did take into account ethnicity and religion in their investigation, such 
considerations were legitimate because of the ethnic and religious 
composition of the hijackers and al Qaeda.”198 This would explain why the 
Court described the mass detentions as “unsurprising.”199 The Court ought to 
have been surprised to see “mass detentions of any kind in the United 
States.”200 But the Court “treated the mass detentions as banal—as if it were 
entirely natural that horrific violence committed by nineteen men should 
generate suspicion of thousands of others who shared (or appeared to share) 
their broadly defined racial or religious identity.”201 
Iqbal, however, sets no precedent on the substantive law of 
discrimination. Iqbal’s rule is procedural—it affirms that specificity is 
required in factual pleading before a plaintiff is allowed discovery.202 Apart 
from the allegations of discriminatory purpose, Iqbal had also alleged a 
facially discriminatory policy—that the government had explicitly classified 
the detainees based on race and religion.203 When a plaintiff challenges a 
facial classification, the Court does not ask whether the classification was 
made “because of” or “in spite of” a desire to discriminate.204 But the Court 
dismissed Iqbal’s allegation of a facially discriminatory policy as 
“conclusory,” in other words, as a “bare assertion” not supported by factual 
allegations.205 Iqbal thus foreclosed discovery into discriminatory intent and 
 
 197 Id. at 149. 
 198 Sinnar, supra note 172, at 389–90. 
 199 See supra text accompanying note 187. 
 200 Sinnar, supra note 172, at 429 (“The sheer scope of the alleged detentions in this case—thousands 
of individuals in a matter of months—might be expected to raise questions, even in the wake of a 
devastating terrorist attack.”). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (discussing the principle that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure on pleading do “not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing 
more than conclusions”). 
 203 Id. at 680. 
 204 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (striking down an 
affirmative action program on the ground that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, 
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”). 
 205 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (“It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations [of a 
discriminatory policy], rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the 
presumption of truth.”). 
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classifications under certain conditions; it did not hold that discriminatory 
intent or classifications are irrelevant. 
And yet, Iqbal’s normative undercurrents are troubling. As Professor 
Sinnar demonstrates, Iqbal’s reasoning has been used to justify racial 
profiling in a number of contested decisions.206 For example, consider the 
controversy over Floyd v. City of New York, a class action lawsuit alleging 
that the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy of temporarily detaining, questioning, 
and searching people on the street targeted black and Hispanic people.207 In 
that case, the district court recognized explicit evidence of discriminatory 
intent on the part of law enforcement officials.208 For example, “the highest 
ranking uniformed member of the NYPD . . . was especially frank about the 
NYPD’s policy of targeting racially defined groups for stops, provided that 
reasonable suspicion is also present.”209 The New York police commissioner 
stated “that he focused on young blacks and Hispanics ‘because he wanted 
to instill fear in them, every time they leave their home, they could be 
stopped by the police.’”210 The judge concluded, “The Equal Protection 
Clause does not permit the police to target a racially defined group as a whole 
because of the misdeeds of some of its members.”211 The case generated 
intense political attention and, unusually, a panel of the Second Circuit 
expressed doubt about the merits of the ruling while adjudicating a 
 
 206 Sinnar, supra note 172, at 430–35; see Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 388–89 
(4th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal in support of dismissal of an equal protection challenge to a police 
department’s DNA testing of 190 young black men over the course of several years of investigating a 
serial rapist who had been described as a young black man); Hassan v. City of New York, No. 12–cv–
3401, 2014 WL 654604, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014) (dismissing an equal protection challenge to an 
NYPD surveillance program of mosques, Muslim student organizations, and Muslim-owned businesses, 
on the ground that “[t]he more likely explanation for the surveillance was a desire to locate budding 
terrorist conspiracies”), rev’d, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 207 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (bench trial). 
 208 Id. at 665. 
 209 Id. at 603; id. at 604 (characterizing a colloquy at trial and quoting the witness as admitting that 
many street stops are not based on specific complaints from the public, but rather are “based on the totality 
of, okay, who is committing the—who is getting shot in a certain area? . . . Well who is doing those 
shootings? Well, it’s young men of color in their late teens, early 20s”). 
 210 Id. at 606 (quoting the senator who reported the comment as testifying “that he was ‘amazed’ that 
Commissioner Kelly was ‘comfortable enough to say that in the setting’” of a meeting at the Governor’s 
office in July 2010); id. at 606 n.297 (noting that “Defendants did not object to this out of court 
statement”). 
 211 Id. at 563; see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and 
Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2456 (2017) (arguing that stop and frisk 
policies are “indeed explicitly defended on the basis of a generalization—a stereotype about racial 
minorities that is not merely derogatory, but that has historically been a keystone of discriminatory legal 
architectures. And its advocates make no bones that the price of public safety will be borne 
disproportionately by only some, and only because of the color of their skin”). 
113:505 (2018) Explicit Bias 
537 
preliminary motion.212 Before the Second Circuit could reverse the district 
court’s decision, New York City decided to settle the case, to adopt most of 
the district court’s recommendations, and to drop its appeal.213 
The extension of Feeney’s “in spite of” logic helps to explain other 
instances in which evidence of explicit bias is surprisingly controversial. For 
example, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that legislatures cannot use 
race as a proxy for partisan affiliation in redrawing the boundaries of voting 
districts.214 But lower federal courts do not always follow this reasoning.215 
Perhaps this is because legislators who use race as a proxy for partisan 
affiliation could be said to be acting “in spite of” the racially disproportionate 
effects of new election laws.216 Their ultimate goal is to stay in office; 
reducing the influence of African American voters is just a side effect. Three 
Supreme Court Justices may be sympathetic to this side-effect argument.217 
Or consider the widespread lack of compliance with Batson v. 
Kentucky.218 Batson is a 1986 Supreme Court case holding that it is 
unconstitutional for prosecutors to strike prospective jurors based on race.219 
Batson doctrine is often criticized for ignoring all forms of bias except the 
most explicit, but it comes close to ignoring explicit bias as well. In an 
 
 212 See Anil Kalhan, Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper 
Appearances, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1043, 1046 (2014) (describing how a Second Circuit panel 
recused district court Judge Shira Scheindlin from the case and, “after expressing deep skepticism over 
the merits of Judge Scheindlin’s decisions during oral argument, the three judges, who had been assigned 
the case only to adjudicate preliminary motions, grabbed jurisdiction for themselves to decide the merits 
of the appeal, rather than leaving the merits to be randomly assigned to another Second Circuit panel”). 
 213 Id. at 1045. 
 214 See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464, 1464 n.1 (2017) (“A plaintiff succeeds . . . 
even if . . . a legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, 
including political ones.”). 
 215 N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 226 (4th Cir. 2016) (reversing 
a district court for overlooking evidence that reforms to North Carolina election law were explicitly 
motived by race, and concluding that “[w]hen a legislature dominated by one party has dismantled 
barriers to African American access to the franchise, even if done to gain votes, ‘politics as usual’ does 
not allow a legislature dominated by the other party to re-erect those barriers”). 
 216 See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 488, 502–03 
(M.D.N.C. 2016) (citing Pers. Adm’r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), to conclude the 
election bill was enacted in spite of its obvious disparate impact on African American voters), rev’d and 
remanded, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 217 See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1490 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 218 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than the 
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2011) 
(“[V]irtually every commentator (and numerous judges) who have studied the issue have concluded that 
race-based juror strikes continue to plague American trials.”). 
 219 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986). 
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infamous 1987 training video on Batson compliance, a Philadelphia district 
attorney instructed: 
[L]et’s face it, . . . the blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to 
convict. . . . There is a resentment for law enforcement, there’s a resentment for 
authority and, as a result, you don’t want those people on your jury. And it may 
appear as if you’re being racist or whatnot, but, again, you are just being 
realistic. You’re just trying to win the case.220 
It took thirteen years for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to hold this 
video was evidence of race discrimination.221 A lower court had excluded the 
tape as irrelevant.222 The district attorney’s logic—that acting on racial 
stereotypes is not wrongful discrimination if the real objective is winning 
trials—may have been persuasive to the lower court. In another Batson case, 
the prosecutor’s files included a document with the names of all the black 
jurors highlighted in green to “represent[] Blacks,” and notes such as, “If it 
comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be 
okay.”223 Nonetheless, a Georgia state court denied habeas review, and the 
Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied the petitioner’s application for 
appeal.224 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately reversed,225 but the state 
courts’ refusal to consider even the most explicit evidence of racial 
discrimination is remarkable. 
Thus, some courts may rely on the idea that there is a safe harbor for 
actions taken with some ostensibly nondiscriminatory purpose to overlook 
explicit discrimination. The implicit reasoning may be that the Constitution 
should only prohibit animus, in other words, the “bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group.”226 On this view, discrimination law does not 
prohibit the intent to harm a politically unpopular group as a means to 
accomplishing some other end. But discriminatory emotions are not limited 
to animus.227 Moreover, this logic conflates the question of whether 
intentional discrimination occurred with the question of whether that 
 
 220 Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 730 (Pa. 2000). The tape goes on like that. Id. (“[I]n 
my experience, black women, young black women, are very bad. . . . I guess maybe because they’re 
downtrodden on two respects . . . .”). 
 221 Id. at 731–32. 
 222 Id. at 732. 
 223 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1744 (2016). 
 224 Foster v. Humphrey, No. S14E0771 (Ga. Nov. 3, 2014), reprinted in 1 Joint Appendix at 246, 
Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349), 2015 WL 4550238. 
 225 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755. 
 226  U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis added). Moreno is often 
described as expounding a special rule for the treatment of animus in equal protection law. See ARAIZA, 
supra note 41, at 29–36. 
 227 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination was justified. And it assumes discrimination was justified 
without giving the government’s justification any degree of scrutiny and 
without giving any weight to the harms suffered by the victims. 
Another reason judges refuse to acknowledge explicit bias unless it is 
naked animus is out of concern for those accused of discrimination. 
Accusations of bias are understood as referenda on the goodness or evil of 
those charged with discrimination.228 Courts regard these inquiries as 
“unseemly.”229 Judges are wary of accusing discriminators of bigotry.230 
Perhaps because accusations of prejudice are such grave indictments, courts 
have erected barriers to recognizing explicit bias.231 By contrast, courts have 
little trouble understanding explicit statements as evidence of “reverse 
discrimination.”232 This may reflect judicial empathy for insiders accused of 
discrimination233 and lack of empathy for outsiders who are victims of 
discrimination.234 But the question in a discrimination case is not whether 
any particular person should face moral condemnation as a bigot.235 The 
 
 228 Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 7 (“To be accused of racism, in the United States after the Civil 
Rights Era, is to be accused of a heinous act or disposition.”). 
 229 Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1164 
(1978). 
 230 See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1490 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) (“When a federal court says that race was a legislature’s predominant purpose 
in drawing a district, it accuses the legislature of ‘offensive and demeaning’ conduct. . . . That is a grave 
accusation . . . .” (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995)). 
 231 Consider the argument by one judge in the travel ban litigation that the problem with the district 
court’s preliminary findings of discrimination was its failure to clarify “when, if ever, the President could 
free himself from the stigma of bias.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 659 n.8 
(4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Shedd, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 
(2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). Judge Shedd’s “‘ironic 
repurposing’ of the term ‘stigma’” might be read as a deliberate effort to “sideline[]” the stigmatizing 
harms of anti-Muslim discrimination. Aziz Huq, The Lingering “Stigma” of the Fourth Circuit’s Travel 
Ban Ruling, JUST SECURITY (May 27, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/41462/ 
lingering-stigma-fourth-circuits-travel-ban-ruling [https://perma.cc/2J8B-TS97]. 
 232 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 233 See, e.g., Karst, supra note 229, at 1164–65 (arguing that, in cases involving discriminatory 
motive, “the ultimate issue will be posed in terms of the goodness or the evil of the officials’ hearts” and 
“that a judge’s reluctance to challenge the purity of other officials’ motives may cause her to fail to 
recognize valid claims of racial discrimination even when the motives for governmental action are highly 
suspect”). 
 234 See, e.g., Sinnar, supra note 172, at 430 (arguing that the Iqbal decision’s “dismissive attitude . . . 
toward the communities affected by law enforcement policies” signals a lack of empathy). On the role of 
empathy in discrimination cases generally, see Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining 
Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 324–27 
(2012). 
 235 See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. Entities like governments and employers, not 
individuals, are generally liable for discrimination. 
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doctrinal architecture does not and should not account for this harm.236 The 
question is whether discrimination caused harm to the plaintiff and whether 
the government is liable for it.237 
B. Title VII Doctrine 
Another example of judicial disregard for explicit bias is the so-called 
“stray remarks doctrine” from Title VII. The basic idea behind this doctrine 
is that “alleged discriminatory remarks that happen in a casual setting outside 
discussions regarding the dismissal decision do not support an inference of 
discrimination.”238 As in other discrimination cases, the central issue in most 
Title VII cases is causation—whether an employer took action against an 
employee because of race, sex, or some other forbidden ground. It is true, of 
course, that biased comments alone may not be sufficient to show causation. 
But the stray remarks doctrine is not applied in a nuanced manner. Rather, it 
is often used to altogether exclude evidence of explicit bias from 
consideration.239 The doctrine is now invoked, as a matter of course, by 
district courts whenever a plaintiff alleges evidence of explicitly biased 
comments.240 This development cannot be explained away as a mere product 
of busy district judges’ efforts to clear their dockets and avoid time-
consuming trials because it is regularly endorsed by circuit courts as well.241 
The stray remarks doctrine finds no support in any employment 
discrimination statute.242 Nor is it consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
The doctrine was inspired by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion in a 1989 case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.243 That case dealt with 
how a plaintiff can prove discrimination where an employer may have had 
 
 236 Cf. Mary Anne Franks, Injury Inequality, in INJURY AND INJUSTICE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF 
HARM AND REDRESS 231–32 (Anne Bloom et al. eds., 2018) (explaining how “outsized solicitude for 
elite injuries [can] create[] indifference to marginalized injury” and even “promote[] marginalized injury 
as a sacrifice necessary to preserve the interests of the powerful”). 
 237 See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 238 Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 11 CV 2450, 2014 WL 4413768, at *13 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 5, 2014), aff’d, 811 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 239 See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 59–66, 88–89 (2017); Stone, supra note 36, at 180. 
 240 A search of the Westlaw federal cases database on July 13, 2018 for “‘stray remarks’ and ‘Title 
VII’” yielded 2943 results. 
 241 The discussion that follows describes dismissals affirmed by circuit courts. It focuses on race and 
sex discrimination to demonstrate that the stray remarks doctrine is not motivated solely by skepticism of 
age discrimination claims. 
 242 SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 239, at 61 (“The stray remark doctrine is not required by the text 
of any of the discrimination statutes. Instead, courts have created it.”). 
 243 Stone, supra note 36, at 151 (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring), and noting that lower court cases began using the “stray remarks” terminology 
following that opinion). 
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both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons for denying a promotion. 
Justice O’Connor proposed that a plaintiff be required to come forward with 
“direct evidence” that discriminatory motive “was a substantial factor” in an 
employer’s decision, at which point the burden of proof would shift to the 
employer to prove “that the decision would have been the same absent 
consideration of the illegitimate factor.”244 She added: “[S]tray remarks in 
the workplace,” such as the mere reference to a worker as “a lady candidate,” 
could not justify this shift in burden.245 “Nor can statements by 
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the 
decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden in this 
regard.”246 
Justice O’Connor did not say that a reference to “a lady candidate” 
could never be evidence that could contribute to a finding that gender played 
a role in a decision. Such a rule would defy common sense and empirical 
research.247 In Price Waterhouse, the partners who wanted to deny Hopkins’ 
promotion had stated that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” that 
her swearing was objectionable “because it’s a lady using foul language,” 
and that if she wanted to make partner, she should “walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.”248 A majority of Justices agreed the remarks about 
plaintiff Ann Hopkins were consequential.249 
Just two years later, Congress amended Title VII to reject Justice 
O’Connor’s proposed legal standard and her heightened evidentiary 
requirements for proof of discriminatory motive.250 Under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, a plaintiff need only persuade a jury “by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice.’”251 “Direct evidence” is not required; 
 
 244 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 245 Id. at 277. 
 246 Id. 
 247 It ought to depend on context. Compare Elizabeth L. Cralley & Janet B. Ruscher, Lady, Girl, 
Female, or Woman: Sexism and Cognitive Busyness Predict Use of Gender-Biased Nouns, 24 J. 
LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 301 (2005) (study finding sexism correlates with the use of gender-
based terms like “lady” and “girl” in inappropriate contexts, and hypothesizing that “[w]hether 
individuals follow the norm to avoid less inclusive or potentially gender-biased terms probably depends 
upon the extent to which they hold egalitarian attitudes toward women”), with Ann Friedman, Hey 
“Ladies”: The Unlikely Revival of a Fusty Old Label, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 26, 2013), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/112188/how-word-lady-has-evolved [https://perma.cc/F68D-ZUDT] 
(discussing ironic millennial reappropriation of the term “ladies”). 
 248 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality opinion). 
 249 Id. at 251; id. at 272–73 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 250 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2012). 
 251 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
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normal rules of evidence apply.252 At that point, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show it would have made the same decision even absent 
discrimination.253 Nonetheless, Justice O’Connor’s aside about “stray 
remarks” has been formalized into legal doctrine and spread from cases 
invoking the “motivating factor” framework to cases using the McDonnell 
Douglas method of circumstantial proof of discrimination.254 The Supreme 
Court has twice corrected lower courts for categorically refusing to consider 
evidence of explicit bias.255 
Yet the stray remarks doctrine continues to spread like a cancer through 
lower court opinions in a number of procedural contexts.256 Judges use the 
doctrine not only to reject the sufficiency of evidence of discrimination at 
the summary judgment stage or to reverse jury verdicts but also to rule 
remarks inadmissible, as a matter of evidence, excluding them from jury 
consideration altogether.257 The stray remarks doctrine screens out remarks 
based on context (how close in time or related was the remark to the 
employment decision?), speaker (was it the decision-maker?), and content 
(how biased was the remark?).258 Any one of these factors can result in a 
court writing off a remark.259 
 
 252 Id. at 100–01. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a statement is inadmissible if “its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by [the] danger of . . . prejudice . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 403. With respect 
to the hearsay rule, biased remarks may be admissible because they are not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted, see id. 801(c)(2), are statements against interest, see id. 804(b)(3), are party admissions, 
see id. 801(d)(2), or are “statement[s] of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, 
or plan),” id. 803(3), among other potential arguments and exceptions. 
 253 This is a defense to most forms of damages, but even if an employer can make out this defense, 
it is still liable for attorney’s fees and costs, as well as certain forms of declaratory and injunctive relief. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 254 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 255 See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (overturning a decision where the court 
had refused to consider evidence that a supervisor had referred to an adult African American male as 
“boy”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (overturning a decision 
disregarding a supervisor’s remarks that the plaintiff “was so old [he] must have come over on the 
Mayflower” and “was too damn old to do [his] job” (alterations in original)). 
 256 SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 239, at 62–63. 
 257 See, e.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 251 (4th Cir. 1999) (Motz, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the district court erred in excluding evidence that a police chief had “commented that he 
‘bet’ a woman ‘ha[d] good pussy,’” and criticizing the defendant’s argument that “‘this is [a] kind of man 
talk situation. When men get together and talk they say certain things’” (alterations in original)). 
 258 See, e.g., Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). These are the most 
typical questions, although federal courts differ in their formulations of the doctrine. Reid v. Google, Inc., 
235 P.3d 988, 1008–11 (Cal. 2010) (describing inconsistent holdings and “widely divergent views” on 
the scope of the stray remarks doctrine among federal courts). 
 259 But see Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We did not mean 
to suggest that remarks should first be categorized either as stray or not stray and then disregarded if they 
fall into the stray category.”). 
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Sometimes courts screen out statements of explicit bias because those 
statements were not made in the context of the particular employment 
decision260 or about the particular plaintiff.261 In one such case, a court 
disregarded a litany of sexist comments, including: a reference to women in 
the pharmaceuticals industry as “Barbie dolls,” a request to a plaintiff during 
a group activity to “let the pretty girls go first,” the suggestion that a plaintiff 
“discuss her career and commitment to her current position with her 
husband,” and an instruction to another plaintiff “that she could not attend a 
meeting with an important doctor because it was a ‘guys [sic] meeting.’”262 
In another case, a court granted summary judgment for an investment bank, 
despite the fact that the female plaintiff’s supervisor “frequently used such 
epithets as ‘bitch,’ ‘cunt,’ ‘whore,’ ‘slut’ and ‘tart’ when referring to her.”263 
The plaintiff had alleged this supervisor was behind the decision to cut her 
bonus from $750,000 to $50,000, while paying larger bonuses to her male 
subordinates.264 The district judge reasoned that the supervisor’s “crude” 
“epithets” “do not necessarily indicate that [the supervisor] had a misogynist 
attitude which can be deflected to illuminate an intent behind any adverse 
employment action taken by Credit Lyonnais against a particular woman.”265 
In other cases, courts screen out explicit bias because the remarks were 
not made by the immediate decision-maker.266 For example, in one case, a 
 
 260 See, e.g., Wilson v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 580 F. App’x 395, 399 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(supervisor called plaintiff a “black dyke bitch” but “[b]y the time of the comment, the predicates for 
firing [plaintiff] had already taken place”); Harris v. Cobra Constr., 273 F. App’x 193, 194–95 (3d Cir. 
2008) (evidence that company owner had pointed a gun at the plaintiffs and yelled, “What are you two 
black mf---ers looking at? Now get back to work”); Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 693, 695 
(7th Cir. 2006) (supervisor told plaintiff “you’re old, you’re Polish, and you’re stupid” and “that she 
would be better suited as a cleaning lady”); Trotter v. BPB Am., Inc., 106 F. App’x 272, 275–76 (5th Cir. 
2004) (“straw boss” and “the n-word”); Schreiner v. Caterpillar, Inc., 250 F.3d 1096, 1098 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(where a supervisor said the area where the female worked was “not a woman’s area,” explaining, 
“Women can play in the NFL but do you see them on the field?”); Rubinstein v. Adm’rs. of Tulane Educ. 
Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Russian Yankee,” “Jews are thrifty,” and the comment, “if ‘the 
Russian Jew’ could obtain tenure, then anyone could”); Perez v. St. John Med. Ctr., No. 08-CV-0533-
CVE-FHM, 2009 WL 3254926, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 6, 2009) (supervisor repeatedly called plaintiff a 
“wetback”), aff’d, 409 F. App’x 213 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 261 See, e.g., Perry v. City of Avon Park, 662 F. App’x 831, 837 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[A] woman’s 
place is in the home taking care of children and not being in the work place.”). 
 262 Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App’x 831, 835–38 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original). 
 263 Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, No. 02 CIV.5191(VM), 2003 WL 22251313, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
30, 2003), aff’d, 110 F. App’x 160 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 264 Id. at *1–2, *5. 
 265 Id. at *11. The supervisor had also said, “Credit Lyonnais shouldn’t be giving that bitch any 
fucking options,” but the court reasoned this remark was about stock options, not bonus compensation or 
any other adverse action taken against the plaintiff. Id. The argument that such insults are meaningless or 
indiscriminate is addressed infra Section III.A.2. 
 266 See, e.g., Nelson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 337 F. App’x 561, 563 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
a comment by plaintiff’s manager that she was going to “fire that nigger” could not be considered direct 
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plaintiff alleged his supervisor called him a “‘black motherfucker’ and ‘an 
ugly black man,’” and said that black people “can be a lot of trouble.”267 The 
court concluded that the remarks were stray because it was not just that 
supervisor, but also two other employees who had been involved in the 
decision to deny a promotion to the plaintiff.268 In another case, a female 
doctor of Indian origin—the only woman in her surgical residency 
program—alleged she had been unfairly terminated.269 One of the doctors 
evaluating her had repeatedly described her deficiencies as “cultural.”270 He 
testified that his “impression of women in the Indian culture [was] that they, 
in general, are in an environment in which they are not as assertive as their 
American counterparts . . . .”271 Another doctor “testified that he had 
concerns about why women would put themselves through a surgical 
residency, especially if they are planning on having children.”272 The doctor 
explained: “[T]hey’re constantly tired, and they don’t have time to put on 
their makeup and put on clothes and do a lot of the things girls need to do, 
and [it’s] difficult.”273 The court concluded these remarks were irrelevant to 
the question of whether discrimination motivated the plaintiff’s termination 
because there were no specific allegations of bias against “most” of the 
doctors who gave her poor reviews.274 
In other cases, courts screen out explicit bias because they regard 
remarks as too ambiguous to be interpreted as evidence of bias. For example, 
in one case, a court concluded that calling the plaintiff “mom” was not 
evidence of age discrimination, because “motherhood and advanced age—
plainly are not synonymous.”275 In context, a reasonable jury could 
 
evidence because the decision to terminate plaintiff was made by someone else); Hampton v. City of 
South Miami, 186 F. App’x 967, 970 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (disregarding a supervisor’s use of a slur 
because that supervisor was not the decision-maker and the decision-maker “did not rely solely on [the 
supervisor’s] ‘biased recommendations’”); Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1211–12 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (describing where two employees who had input in a decision, but were not the final decision-
makers, had complained, “They bring a woman to do a man’s job?”).  
 267 Brief of Appellant at 4, McNeal v. Montgomery County, 307 F. App’x 766 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 
07-1323), 2007 WL 2195566. 
 268 McNeal, 307 F. App’x at 774. 
 269 Sreeram v. La. State Univ. Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314, 319 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. at 318. Title VII does not require that a doctor remain in a residency program if she was 
terminated on account of her lack of qualifications. But where discrimination was also a motivating factor, 
as it plainly was here, she is entitled to her attorney’s fees and injunctive and declaratory relief. See supra 
notes 248–53 and accompanying text. 
 275 Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2002). That the insult also had gendered 
dimensions should not be exculpatory, because sex is also a prohibited basis for discrimination. It seems 
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understand that the insult “mom” works by implying the plaintiff was old 
enough to be her coworker’s mother.276 In another case, the court disregarded 
as ambiguous two remarks by a company owner: (1) that the only African 
American woman she employed “was not black, but a woman who happen[s] 
to be black,” and (2) “that if a federal contract required [her company] to hire 
a certain number of minorities, she would close her shop.”277 The comment 
distinguishing between “black people” and “women who happen to be black” 
is reasonably interpreted as the employer’s insistence that workers downplay 
their racial identities, particularly in the context of the case, in which the 
plaintiff, who was then one of two African American women at the company, 
was fired for no apparent reason other than her “attitude.”278 
In another case, supervisors fired an African American plaintiff after 
instructing her to behave like an “Uncle Tom.”279 The supervisors had said: 
“‘[I]ntelligence and outspokenness in black employees is not welcomed’ and 
that ‘qualities that would make a Caucasian a golden child, being aggressive 
and intelligent and outspoken and a go-getter, would do exactly the reverse 
to a person of color.’”280 Accordingly, they “advised her to develop a 
deferential persona, as ‘a good black’ that ‘would be accepted by the 
Caucasians at Wells Fargo.’”281 The court reasoned that these supervisors 
were trying to help the plaintiff, not hurt her.282 
The stray remarks doctrine is inconsistent with procedural rules283 that 
require that inferences be drawn in favor of the non-movant and that courts 
 
unlikely that this comment’s message was that the plaintiff was parental in some gender-neutral way, but 
the question is best left for a jury. 
 276 Id. at 66. The plaintiff alleged that this same person, the director of human resources, had told the 
plaintiff that she had “manias de vieja” (an “old person’s ways”), compared her haircut to octogenarian 
Phyllis Diller’s, and told her “she should have retired and gone to live with her grandchildren in Florida 
long ago,” among other age-related comments. Id. 
 277 Diamond v. Bea Maurer, Inc., 128 F. App’x 968, 972 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 278 Id. at 970. The plaintiff was reprimanded for attempting to get a flu shot, while a white coworker 
was not, and after that incident, the company’s president became outraged about the plaintiff’s “attitude,” 
eventually firing her for “chew[ing] gum” and “singing,” behaviors that white employees engaged in 
without comment. Id. at 970, 972. 
 279 Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 931 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 934. (“[The] alleged ‘Uncle Tom’ statements, while racially offensive and misguided, were 
apparently made in the context of attempting to preserve and promote Twymon’s career at Wells Fargo, 
not in relation to deciding to terminate Twymon.”). 
 283 The Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the 
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, 
whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the 
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–
59 (1970)). 
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refrain from weighing the evidence.284 The dysfunctions of the stray remarks 
doctrine are compounded by the general problem of overly formalistic 
analysis in Title VII cases.285 Courts “slice and dice” discrimination claims 
into various theories, which they call: (1) direct evidence of discrimination, 
(2) circumstantial evidence considered via the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, and (3) harassment.286 The motivating-factor framework set out 
by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is largely ignored.287 This slicing 
and dicing allows courts to avoid contextual analysis of explicitly biased 
remarks. Courts count biased remarks as falling into the direct evidence 
category, where they consider whether, standing alone, those remarks are 
sufficient to prove discrimination caused an employment decision.288 After 
dismissing the remarks as direct evidence, courts refuse to consider those 
remarks alongside circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that male or 
white workers received preferential treatment.289 This is notwithstanding the 
fact that the combined weight of the evidence might support a finding of 
discrimination.290 Harassment claims are considered on an entirely separate 
 
 284 Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Vance v. Union 
Planters Corp., 209 F.3d 438, 442 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000)) (expressing the concern that the stray remarks 
doctrine “is itself inconsistent with the deference appellate courts traditionally allow juries regarding their 
view of the evidence presented and so should be narrowly cabined”); Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 
762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335 (D. Mass. 2011) (“[W]hether a given remark is ‘ambiguous’—whether it 
connotes discriminatory animus or it does not—is precisely what a jury should resolve, considering all of 
the facts in context. What may be ambiguous to me, the judge, may not be to the plaintiff or to her peers.”). 
 285 See generally SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 239. 
 286 See Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by Example: An Holistic Approach to Individual Disparate 
Treatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2001); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & 
Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001). 
 287 See, e.g., Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing how plaintiffs’ 
lawyers fear that if they raise the motivating factor theory, the jury will “split the baby” and find that the 
defendant has proven its defense). 
 288 See, e.g., Curry v. Menard, Inc., 270 F.3d 473, 475–77 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that evidence 
that the black plaintiff’s supervisor “had a practice of calling the store’s department managers and security 
personnel to warn them when black or Hispanic customers came into the store” and had said that “‘blacks 
don’t like to work as much as Mexicans’ and that ‘Mexicans will work for little or nothing’” was 
insufficient as direct evidence of discriminatory motive). 
 289 Id. at 481 (Rovner, J., concurring) (“[A]lthough I agree with the majority that Curry’s testimony 
regarding Horvath’s racial remarks was not direct proof of discrimination, that should not prevent Curry 
from introducing the same evidence to prove pretext should Menard renew its motion for summary 
judgment.”); see also Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 n.3 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to consider 
whether comments by coworkers and supervisors that plaintiff was a “black girl” and a “token” were 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination based on the formalistic logic that such comments could only 
be direct evidence of discrimination or evidence of harassment). 
 290 This is one reason the California Supreme Court refused to adopt a stray remarks doctrine. Reid 
v. Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988, 1008 (Cal. 2010) (noting that “[a]lthough stray remarks may not have 
strong probative value when viewed in isolation, they may corroborate direct evidence of discrimination 
or gain significance in conjunction with other circumstantial evidence”). 
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track, in which courts often find discriminatory remarks insufficiently 
“severe or pervasive” to amount to a claim.291 
Thus, the stray remarks doctrine enables courts to altogether exclude 
explicit bias from consideration in employment discrimination cases. In both 
the Title VII and constitutional law contexts, courts distort discrimination 
law to ignore explicit bias. This phenomenon may be underwritten by a set 
of legal arguments common to both contexts. The next Part will address 
those arguments. 
III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR DISREGARDING EXPLICIT BIAS 
Court decisions and legal briefs offer arguments in favor of 
categorically refusing to account for explicit bias. This Part attempts to 
construct the best versions of these legal arguments and then to criticize 
them. One set of arguments relates to the evidentiary value of explicit bias: 
that a person’s statements are not a reliable guide to her true intentions, 
assuming intentions could even be determined by the law. A second set of 
concerns is about remedies: for example, the concern that if certain courses 
of action are forever tainted by the illicit motives that first inspired them, 
then institutions will be precluded from ever enacting those policies, even if 
later motives are honorable. A third concern is about competing First 
Amendment rights: that introducing evidence of explicit bias will chill free 
speech, thought, and expression. And a final concern has to do with political 
consequences: the fear that recognition of explicit bias will spur backlash, 
undermining antidiscrimination projects and judicial legitimacy. None of 
these concerns holds up to scrutiny. 
A. Interpretive Difficulties 
One set of reasons legal actors give for ignoring explicit bias is related 
to the difficulty of ascertaining intentions. These concerns may take a 
number of forms. One is the “mindreading” objection: that an actor’s 
subjective intent is always unknowable, and therefore, the law should rest 
only on evidence of official purposes. Or the argument might be that certain 
types of statements—such as campaign rhetoric, commentary on social 
media, or casual conversations—are not reliable indicators of a person’s true 
attitudes. Another variation on this argument is that multi-member bodies, 
like legislatures and corporations, do not have discernable purposes or 
intentions apart from their official enactments. These concerns amount to the 
 
 291 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 36, at 170 (discussing the extension of the stray remarks doctrine to 
harassment cases). 
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claim that explicit bias does not aid courts in their truth-seeking function and 
should therefore be excluded, like other misleading forms of evidence. 
1. Mindreading 
One version of this argument is that, because determining a defendant’s 
true intentions would require “mindreading,” courts should defer to official 
statements of purpose.292 Although courts use the language of subjective 
intentions in conducting inquiries into purpose, strictly speaking, it is not just 
“the thought that counts.”293 Courts have proven themselves capable of 
interpreting statements of explicit bias, among other objective facts, as 
indicia of discriminatory purpose. Because an important part of the harm of 
discrimination is the message of inferiority it expresses, this inquiry is 
appropriate.294 
The mindreading objection is an old one.295 In Palmer v. Thompson, the 
Court deferred to the city’s ostensibly race-neutral cost and safety reasons 
for closing the pools and refused to consider the mayor’s public statements 
about his intent to maintain segregation because it was too difficult to 
determine subjective motives.296 In the travel ban cases, the government’s 
briefs quoted McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, an Establishment 
Clause case that directed courts to come to “an understanding of official 
objective . . . from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial 
psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”297 The government argued that 
President Trump’s public statements about Muslims were not “readily 
discoverable fact[s].”298 While the government admitted “it is readily 
discoverable that the statements occurred,” the question is “what candidate 
Trump and his aides meant by them.”299 On this theory, meaning is elusive 
because campaign statements contradict official rationales, and judges are 
 
 292 I use the terms motive, purpose, and intent synonymously here, following the common practice 
of courts. But see Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1122 
(2018) (discussing distinctions among these concepts in the scholarship). This Article is interested in 
intent in the sense of whether someone meant to discriminate, not their motives or reasons for 
discriminating. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 293 Cf. HELLMAN, supra note 58, at 138–39. 
 294 See supra Section I.B (discussing the interrelationships of material and expressive dynamics of 
discrimination). 
 295 See, e.g., Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 711 (1885) (“The diverse character of such 
motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes 
all such inquiries as impracticable and futile.”). 
 296 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971). 
 297 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (invalidating a county’s decision 
to post the Ten Commandments in a courthouse). 
 298 Trump Cert. Pet., supra note 20, at 27 (alteration in original). 
 299 Id. 
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left with no way to determine which are the true reasons.300 Variations on this 
reasoning can be heard in cases invoking the stray remarks doctrine, in which 
courts express perplexity at the meaning of comments about race and gender, 
and opt to defer instead to the employer’s proffered reasons.301 
The argument that courts can never assess the weight of conflicting 
statements amounts to a sort of interpretive nihilism. In McCreary County, 
the Court rejected this precise argument.302 It considered the assertion that 
judges cannot discern purpose “as seismic as . . . [it is] unconvincing.”303 It 
was “seismic” because inquiries into purpose are mundane modalities of 
statutory interpretation.304 In fact, judicial determinations of motive are 
commonplace, required not just by discrimination law, but by an array of 
constitutional, criminal, tort, and other doctrines.305 Courts consider 
statements of intent “evidence that is competent to convict a defendant of 
murder—and thereby render the defendant eligible for our society’s most 
serious punishment.”306 It would be anomalous in the extreme if such 
statements could not be evidence of discrimination. 
Courts can and do determine intent by assessing objective evidence 
such as explicit statements.307 Rather than prying into the minds of officials, 
 
 300 Compare Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“If a court were to find that campaign skeletons prevented an official 
from pursuing otherwise constitutional policies, what could he do to cure the defect? Could he stand up 
and recant it all (‘just kidding!’) and try again? Or would we also need a court to police the sincerity of 
that mea culpa—piercing into the public official’s ‘heart of hearts’ to divine whether he really changed 
his mind . . . ?”), with Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 627 (D. Md. 2017) 
(“Particularly where, in August 2017, President Trump tweeted a statement that a method hostile to 
Islam—shooting Muslims with bullets dipped in pig’s blood—should be used to deter future terrorism, 
there is no record of public statements showing any change in the President’s intentions relating to a 
Muslim ban.”). 
 301 See supra notes 273–278 and accompanying text. 
 302 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 863 (“declining the invitation to abandon concern with purpose 
wholesale”); id. at 861 (explicitly rejecting the argument that “true ‘purpose’ is unknowable and its search 
merely an excuse for courts to act selectively and unpredictably in picking out evidence of subjective 
intent”). 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. (“Examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up the daily fare of 
every appellate court in the country . . . .”). 
 305 See, e.g., Verstein, supra note 292, at 1111, app. B at 1170 (cataloguing legal doctrines that turn 
on motives in areas including “legal ethics, constitutional law (voter districting, school desegregation, 
jury selection, free speech and censorship, takings), labor law, landlord-tenant law, intentional torts, 
vicarious liability, evidence, property, health law, contract law, corporate law, employment 
discrimination, securities enforcement, taxation, bankruptcy, and more”). 
 306 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 344 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Wynn, 
J., concurring). 
 307 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 600–01 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(“We . . . see nothing ‘intractable’ about evaluating a statement’s probative value based on the identity of 
the speaker and how specifically the statement relates to the challenged government action, for this is 
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courts searching for discriminatory intent often ask about the meaning a 
reasonable observer would attribute to a particular policy.308 This inquiry 
“unfolds in two steps: first, an ascription to a statute of an expressive 
meaning and, second, an imputation of an ‘objective’ legislative intent to 
communicate that meaning.”309 Explicit statements are relevant to this 
inquiry. As Professor Richard Fallon explains, “In imputing intentions to 
people whom we know, we often rely on a mix of contextual factors, 
biographical information, and explicit statements. We can do the same with 
legislators.”310 The Supreme Court expressed no qualms about undertaking 
this interpretive task in Masterpiece Cakeshop, where it held the remarks of 
a Colorado commissioner reflected anti-religious animus.311 
A similar inquiry takes place in employment discrimination cases in 
which courts examine evidence of explicit bias rather than excluding it based 
on the stray remarks doctrine. By necessity, judgments about intent require 
inferential reasoning. Judges cannot go back in time and demand candor 
from decision-makers.312 But just as they can discern intent in criminal, tort, 
and other cases, judges can do so in employment discrimination cases.313 In 
Title VII cases, the Court has repeatedly affirmed the relevance of remarks 
that might be interpreted as evincing bias.314 For example, in Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., two African American men alleged they were denied 
promotions that went to white men instead.315 The plant manager, who had 
made the decision, had referred to each of the adult male plaintiffs as “boy,” 
 
surely a routine part of constitutional analysis.”), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), dismissed 
as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 308 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 
549 (2016) (discussing cases in which “courts invoke a conception of legislative intent derived from 
statutes’ expressive meanings. That conception involves, as a first approximation, the communicative 
significance that a competent, informed participant in a society would attach to a statute as an indicator 
of prevailing societal values”). 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. at 580. 
 311 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018) 
(carefully parsing statements suggesting explicit bias and interpreting ambiguous statements that became 
clearer in light of later statements and a pattern of decisions). 
 312 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190–91 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Sometimes 
we speak of determining or discovering motives, but more often we ascribe motives, after an event, to an 
individual in light of the individual’s thoughts and other circumstances present at the time of decision.”). 
 313 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 314 See supra note 255. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Justice O’Connor characterized the proof 
presented as demonstrating the following: “It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the 
room where partnership decisions were being made. As the partners filed in to consider her candidacy, 
she heard several of them make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership.” 490 U.S. 
228, 272–73 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 315 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006). 
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which the plaintiffs claimed was evidence of racial animus.316 The Court of 
Appeals reasoned: “While the use of ‘boy’ when modified by a racial 
classification like ‘black’ or ‘white’ is evidence of discriminatory intent, the 
use of ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.”317 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding, “Although it is true the disputed word will not always be 
evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is 
always benign.”318 The Court required an inquiry that was sensitive to 
“various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, 
and historical usage.”319 
Thus, courts can ascribe discriminatory intent by examining context, 
including explicitly biased remarks. This interpretive inquiry directly 
identifies when a policy expresses discriminatory meaning, and is the closest 
possible proxy for identifying when discriminatory motives caused harm. 
2. Cheap Talk and Pandering 
Another variation on this argument is that all remarks apart from formal 
declarations of purpose are throwaway comments, not serious statements of 
intent.320 While the context in which a comment was made is relevant to the 
weight a court affords a particular piece of evidence, there is no basis for 
automatically excluding all such evidence. 
In the travel ban litigation, the government argued that campaign 
“statements are irrelevant because only an ‘official objective’ regarding 
religion can violate the Establishment Clause.”321 This point must have been 
persuasive to the Supreme Court, because the Court made reference to the 
fact that some of the President’s statements were made on the campaign trail 
in its characterization of those statements as “extrinsic.”322 The government 
made three arguments against reliance on campaign statements. First, they 
are made before a candidate has taken the oath of office and agreed to uphold 
the Constitution.323 Second, “[t]hey often are made without the benefit of 
 
 316 Id. at 456. 
 317 Id. (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (cautioning against reliance on “unguarded declarations” by a politician 
during a campaign, which “are often contradictory or inflammatory”). 
 321 Trump Reply, supra note 129, at 9. 
 322 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 323 Trump Cert. Pet., supra note 20, at 28 (“Taking that oath marks a profound transition from private 
life to the Nation’s highest public office, and manifests the singular responsibility and independent 
authority to protect the welfare of the Nation that the Constitution reposes in the President.”). But see 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 630 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Thacker, J., 
concurring) (accepting the government’s argument that campaign statements are irrelevant but still 
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advice from an as-yet-unformed Administration.”324 And third, campaign 
statements are like rough drafts, which “cannot bind elected officials who 
later conclude that a different course is warranted.”325 
These arguments resonate with the reasons for requiring formality in 
contracting.326 If the law makes clear precisely how and when promises will 
be legally effective, people will have fair warning about when their 
statements will be taken seriously, and courts will have ready evidence of 
what commitments were made.327 Such considerations make sense when a 
person will later be bound to some course of action by their promises and 
others will rely on those guarantees to structure their affairs.328 As Professor 
Katherine Shaw has argued, in saying what the law is, courts may have good 
reasons not to consider “presidential statements offered in the spirit of 
advocacy, persuasion, or pure politics, where those statements do not reflect 
considered legal positions.”329 Accordingly, the argument that no one should 
rely on unofficial statements has force in situations in which courts are called 
upon to determine the scope of a law or policy, or to interpret how it applies 
to a particular situation. For example, if the President announces a new 
policy barring transgender servicemembers via social media, military 
officials will wait for an official directive before carrying out that policy.330 
 
finding evidence of an Establishment Clause violation “based solely on remarks made or sentiments 
expressed” after President Trump’s inauguration), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), 
dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 324 Trump Cert. Pet., supra note 20, at 28. 
 325 Id. The government’s brief quoted a Fourth Circuit dissent that argued: “‘Because of their nature, 
campaign statements are unbounded resources by which to find intend of various kinds . . . [t]hey are 
often short-hand for larger ideas’ and ‘are explained, modified, retracted, and amplified as they are 
repeated and as new circumstances and arguments arise.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 
857 F.3d at 650 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)). 
 326 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801–02 (1941). The 
Supreme Court’s use of the term “extrinsic evidence” calls to mind contract-law doctrines that limit 
consideration of evidence outside the text of an agreement. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract 
Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 273 (1985) (“If the writing appeared to be a complete (integrated) 
expression of the parties’ intent, the common law parol evidence rule barred introduction of extrinsic 
evidence to contradict or supplement the written terms.”). 
 327 See Fuller, supra note 326, at 800–01 (describing these as the “evidentiary,” “cautionary,” and 
“[c]hanneling” functions of legal formalities). 
 328 Id. 
 329 Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71, 
129 (2017). 
 330 Cf. Note, Recent Social Media Posts: Executive Power—Presidential Directives—In Tweets, 
President Purports to Ban Transgender Military Servicemembers, 131 HARV. L. REV. 934, 934, 936 
(2018) (discussing the argument that social media announcements of a new policy to exclude transgender 
servicemembers “upset the reasonable expectations” of those who would have been excluded by that 
policy). 
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But this argument is misplaced when the law is asking a different 
question—Was this law a result of discrimination? This inquiry is not 
attempting to pin down the positive effect of the law or clarify its scope. 
Therefore, no reliance interests are at stake. When the question is whether 
discriminatory purpose motivated executive action, “statements by executive 
branch officials supply the most relevant evidence of intent.”331 While not 
every statement will be probative, courts can evaluate statements on a “case-
by-case basis.”332 Statements such as those in the travel ban case provide easy 
evidence “probative of purpose because they are closely related in time, 
attributable to the primary decisionmaker, and specific and easily connected 
to the challenged action.”333 To the extent that the law is concerned about 
whether an official action expresses a discriminatory meaning to the public, 
an official’s statements are all the more important. The public is more likely 
to be familiar with the President’s pronouncements than with statements of 
purpose in an executive order or briefs filed in litigation.334 
Precisely because they are crafted with the benefit of advice and 
caution, formal statements of purpose may be pretextual. A politician’s own 
statements will often be the more reliable guide to meaning.335 This includes 
campaign statements. Perhaps the ceremony of the oath of office could 
persuade a politician of the gravitas of his duties, transforming his purposes 
from unconstitutional to constitutional.336 But to assume this occurs 
automatically is magical thinking. At the very least, a politician’s statements 
should not be categorically excluded from judicial consideration. 
A different variation on this argument—one not made expressly—
might be that politicians make explicitly biased remarks to pander to the base 
emotions of voters, and so these remarks cannot be taken as genuine 
indications of discriminatory intent. But the question is not whether the 
 
 331 Shaw, supra note 329, at 138. 
 332 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 574 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), vacated 
and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 333 Id. at 599. While this might be true of the President’s comments regarding the travel ban, appellate 
courts should be wary of including such language in constitutional discrimination cases. The lesson from 
the “stray remarks” cases is that lower courts may formalize these descriptions into tests used to arbitrarily 
screen out evidence of explicit bias. See supra Section II.B. 
 334 Shaw, supra note 329, at 139. 
 335 Id. (“When it comes to the President’s purpose, other executive branch submissions could not 
possibly overcome the President’s own words. Accordingly, presidential statements should clearly 
control in such cases.”). 
 336 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 
17-965). When posed with Justice Anthony Kennedy’s hypothetical question, “[S]uppose you have a 
local mayor and, as a candidate, he makes vituperative . . . hateful statements, he’s elected, and on day 
two, he takes acts that are consistent with those hateful statements. . . . whatever he said in the campaign 
is irrelevant?” Solicitor General Noel Francisco responded, “[Y]es, because we do think that oath marks 
a fundamental transformation.” Id. 
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official is a bigot. If an official takes action to harm minority groups not 
because he is a bigot, but because his supporters are, it is no less 
discriminatory.337 The cause of the harm to the plaintiffs was the 
discriminatory views of a group of constituents, passed through the politician 
as a conduit.338 Moreover, this objection fails to account for how the harms 
of discrimination are both material and expressive.339 If a politician 
campaigns on a promise of discrimination and, once elected, takes an action 
that harms minority-group members, that action may very well express that 
minorities are not full members of the community. This is so regardless of 
the official’s true feelings. 
Courts may imagine that slurs and insults are just jokes that do not 
reflect a speaker’s true attitudes and have no bearing on serious decisions.340 
Judge Alex Kozinski put the point vividly: “We’ll quest aimlessly for true 
intentions across a sea of insults and hyperbole.”341 This argument resonates 
with a certain understanding of rhetoric in the internet age. Online 
commentary does not always mean what it says. Some comments are just 
“trolling”: attempting to elicit offense for the sake of offense, or pushing the 
bounds of transgression for the sake of transgression.342 Or they are just 
“locker room talk”: insignificant male banter.343 Similar views may explain 
the stray remarks doctrine.344 Yet social science evidence is to the contrary.345 
 
 337 See Heidi Kitrosser, Is Speech from the Campaign Trail Relevant to Religious Discrimination 
Claims?, ACSBLOG (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/should-elected-officials-be-held-
accountable-in-court-for-campaign-speech [https://perma.cc/RQN7-KQD5] (“A presidential action that 
is taken to appeal to a constituency’s perceived bigotry is no less discriminatory in purpose than is an 
action that manifests the president’s personal biases.”). 
 338 In the Title VII context, courts have long rejected the “customer preference” defense to 
discrimination for this reason. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 339 See supra Section I.B. 
 340 Cf. Joan P. Emerson, Negotiating the Serious Import of Humor, 32 SOCIOMETRY 169, 169 (1969) 
(discussing how “humor officially does not ‘count’” and “[n]ormally a person is not held responsible for 
what he does in jest to the same degree that he would be for a serious gesture”); A. Michael Johnson, The 
“Only Joking” Defense: Attribution Bias or Impression Management?, 67 PSYCHOL. REP. 1051, 1054 
(1990) (presenting survey research that “suggests that people believe that their own jokes do not usually 
reflect their attitudes even when other people are offended”). 
 341 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
 342 See, e.g., WHITNEY PHILLIPS, THIS IS WHY WE CAN’T HAVE NICE THINGS: MAPPING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONLINE TROLLING AND MAINSTREAM CULTURE 1, 2 (2015) (discussing 
“trolling” that attempts “to disrupt and upset as many people as possible”). 
 343 See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 2, at 206–07 (discussing the difficulty “of giving a close reading of 
some of the least literate remarks in human history,” such as the phrase “I moved on her like a bitch”). 
 344 See, e.g., supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 345 Research suggests the unsurprising finding that prejudice correlates with favorable reactions to 
humor that disparages outgroups. See Gordon Hodson et al., A Joke Is Just a Joke (Except When It Isn’t): 
Cavalier Humor Beliefs Facilitate the Expression of Group Dominance Motives, 99 J. PERSONALITY & 
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Some empirical research even supports the commonsense idea that sexist 
language is correlated with sexist beliefs or lack of concern about sexism.346 
Another variation on this argument may be that some people are 
indiscriminately vulgar. For example, in Title VII cases in which supervisors 
insulted women in gendered terms, courts may imagine that those 
supervisors would have been equally vulgar had the plaintiffs been men, 
referring to the plaintiffs instead with those crude epithets generally reserved 
for men.347 If this were true, surely there would be evidence that men were 
also subjected to gender-based insults, but such evidence is absent in the 
stray remarks cases.348 
In employment discrimination cases, courts should consider 
discriminatory remarks in context, rather than excluding them based on the 
formalistic application of special rules. While “a slur, in and of itself, does 
not prove actionable discrimination,” combined with other evidence, “an 
otherwise stray remark may create an ‘ensemble [that] is sufficient to defeat 
summary judgment.’”349 The fact that the statement was not made in the 
context of a particular employment decision goes to the weight a jury should 
give that statement; it is not a reason to rule it out categorically. Refusing to 
consider such evidence is inconsistent with the everyday practice of 
determining a person’s purpose from their statements.350 As one court put it, 
“[M]anagement’s consideration of an impermissible factor in one context 
may support the inference that the impermissible factor entered into the 
decisionmaking process in another context.”351 And there are reasons casual 
 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 660, 662 (2010) (citing studies demonstrating that “[m]en who are hostile toward 
women . . . appreciate sexist humor”); id. at 672 (reporting the results of studies demonstrating “that those 
higher in personal biases . . . consider [jokes] disparaging Mexicans . . . favorably”). 
 346 This is even for “subtle” sexist language. See Janet K. Swim et al., Understanding Subtle Sexism: 
Detection and Use of Sexist Language, 51 SEX ROLES 117, 117 (2004). 
 347 While this argument is not made explicitly in stray remarks cases, it is the stated assumption 
behind the “equal-opportunity harasser” response to a sexual harassment claim. See Jessica A. Clarke, 
Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 540–41 (2013) (discussing the argument). 
 348 In harassment cases, some courts do ask whether harassers who abuse both men and women 
treated men or women in a way that was qualitatively or quantitatively different. Id. at 540, 540 n.61. In 
any event, discrimination law does not include a loophole for employers who penalize both men and 
women for failing to conform with sex stereotypes. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 
853 F.3d 339, 348–49 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (discussing the analogy to discriminatory anti-
miscegenation laws that penalize both black and white people). 
 349 Reid v. Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988, 1008 (Cal. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Shager v. 
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990)) (rejecting the stray remarks doctrine). 
 350 Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 251 (4th Cir. 1999) (Motz, J., dissenting) (“If a 
supervisor’s own words reflect the illegal bias he is accused of harboring, those words generally constitute 
strong, direct evidence of that animus, admissible in an employment discrimination action brought against 
him.”). 
 351 Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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remarks may be more probative than an employer’s official statements. On 
the advice of management lawyers, corporations are not likely to include any 
statements regarding prohibited grounds for discrimination in official 
documentation, and they may even “sanitize” records to eliminate evidence 
of explicit bias.352 
Thus, informal statements, rather than being disregarded, should often 
be considered telling evidence of purpose. 
3. Groups and Mixed Motives 
A final variation on this argument is that, while the intentions of 
individuals may be discernable, group intentions are not.353 The motives of 
groups are mixed.354 This argument carries over from debates over statutory 
interpretation, and, notably, Justice Antonin Scalia’s general skepticism of 
the probative value of legislative history.355 Concerns about discerning 
collective intent have also cropped up in employment discrimination cases,356 
and may underscore the judicial preoccupation with identifying “decision-
makers” in cases applying the stray remarks doctrine.357 But in constitutional 
and Title VII cases, the Supreme Court has established workable standards 
 
 352 See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC 
CIVIL RIGHTS 163–64 (2016) (reviewing “management lawyers’ webinar and other materials” and 
concluding they “show[] that management attorneys continue to advise employers to sanitize their 
personnel files and to proactively create a record that will obscure discrimination”); Susan Bisom-Rapp, 
Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 
26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 993 (1999) (discussing advice from a management lawyer to “[m]aintain 
well-kept ‘clean’ personnel files; [and] eliminate unnecessary references to sex, age, etc.” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Douglas L. Williams, Handling the EEOC Investigation, in 2 ALI-ABA RESOURCE 
MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW 1121, 1145 (Peter M. Panken ed., 7th ed. 1995))). 
 353 This was a prominent objection in equal protection litigation up until Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976). Haney-López, supra note 14, at 1789, 1793–96 (tracing this argument through 
Supreme Court cases in the Civil Rights Era). 
 354 Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (“[I]t is extremely difficult for a court to 
ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment.”). 
 355 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
Fallon, supra note 308, at 527 (“In statutory interpretation cases, a growing panoply of commentators—
with apparently increasing influence on the Justices—has disparaged and indeed ridiculed inquiries into 
subjective legislative intent as a gauge of statutory meaning.”). 
 356 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 273 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reflecting on 
the dilemma of determining intent “in the context of the professional world, where decisions are often 
made by collegial bodies on the basis of largely subjective criteria”). 
 357 See supra notes 246, 258, 266–274 and accompanying text. 
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for determining collective intent.358 It regards the explicit statements of 
decision-makers as relevant to those standards.359 
In Establishment Clause cases outside of the immigration context, the 
Court has imposed a standard that is difficult for plaintiffs to meet, not one 
that is impossible to apply.360 The Court asks whether the “predominant 
purpose” of the law was religious.361 In conducting this inquiry, courts give 
deference to the legislature’s stated secular purposes.362 They ask whether 
the secular rationales are so “implausible or inadequate” as to be “sham[s]” 
or “merely secondary to a religious objective.”363 In practice, this inquiry 
does not require that all members of a legislative body be deposed about their 
intentions. Rather, courts ask whether the legislature’s secular aims are so 
specious, post-hoc, or irrational as to be pretexts for more obvious religious 
purposes.364 This “predominant purpose” inquiry is qualitative, keyed more 
to the expressive than the material harms of discrimination. 
In equal protection and Title VII cases, courts have adopted a more 
plaintiff-friendly rule. In the 1977 equal protection case Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Supreme Court 
adopted a burden-shifting framework to address concerns about the mixed 
motives of legislators.365 It rejected an inquiry that would have required a 
 
 358 See Verstein, supra note 292, at 1113 (“Mixed motive analysis is much easier than commonly 
thought. Courts should be less reluctant to allow mixed motive analysis because when they do it, they can 
cabin its scope to the pertinent issues.”). 
 359 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–31 
(2018) (holding that an adjudication violated the Free Exercise Clause based on the remarks of one of the 
adjudicators disparaging a party’s religious beliefs); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1475–76 (2017) 
(examining, among other evidence of a racial gerrymander, the public statements of legislators that race 
was an explicit consideration). 
 360 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005) (noting the Court has seldom 
invalidated legislation under the Establishment Clause merely because it lacked a genuine secular 
purpose). McCreary County was a case about a Ten Commandments display, not about discrimination 
against a particular religion. In a free exercise challenge to a law that targeted a particular religious group, 
the Court applied strict scrutiny. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. But in a free exercise challenge to a 
decision of an adjudicatory body that was tainted by anti-religious bias, the Court overturned the decision 
without applying strict scrutiny. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
 361 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860. The predominant purpose test is also used in cases involving 
racial gerrymanders. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464 (holding that the design of a voting district must survive 
strict scrutiny if racial considerations were predominant); see Verstein, supra note 292, at 1134 
(explaining that the “primary purpose” analysis is one of four tests courts commonly use in analyzing 
mixed motives). 
 362 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 864. 
 363 Id. at 864–65. 
 364 Id. at 871–73 (noting, among other things, that the legislature had created “new statements of 
[secular] purpose . . . only as a litigating position,” that it omitted matters one would have expected if its 
purposes were secular, and that it had not disclaimed its obvious religious objectives). 
 365 429 U.S. 252, 265–66, 270 n.21 (1977). 
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showing of sole purpose or primary purpose.366 Instead, the Court held that 
the question was “whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a 
motivating factor.”367 This required that a plaintiff show, at the threshold, 
“[p]roof that the decision . . . was motivated in part by a racially 
discriminatory purpose.”368 This “demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”369 Courts 
should consider the historical background of the decision, particularly if it 
reveals a pattern of official actions taken for discriminatory reasons, or a 
suspicious sequence of events.370 Once a plaintiff has shown that 
discrimination had some part in motivating a policy, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to establish “that the same decision would have resulted even had 
the impermissible purpose not been considered.”371 In Title VII cases, the 
Supreme Court borrowed this burden-shifting approach,372 and a similar 
standard was later codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.373 This approach 
is keyed to the material harms of discrimination: it asks, Was race, sex, or 
another forbidden ground a “but for” or necessary cause of the plaintiff’s 
material misfortune? 
The Supreme Court has held that statements of explicit bias are “highly 
relevant” to its contextual inquiry into whether discrimination was a 
motivating factor.374 The Court has even analyzed the statements of 
legislators long dead. Hunter v. Underwood was a 1985 decision about 
whether the voter disenfranchisement provisions of the Alabama 
Constitution of 1901 were enacted with discriminatory intent.375 The Court 
noted the historical record was replete with statements about the “zeal for 
white supremacy” that had motivated the constitutional changes.376 
 
 366 Id. at 265–66. 
 367 Id. at 266. 
 368 Id. at 270 n.21 (emphasis added). 
 369 Id. at 266. 
 370 Id. at 266–67. 
 371 Id. at 271 n.21. 
 372 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 268 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting, about 
the Court’s burden-shifting approach, that “[w]e adhered to similar principles in Arlington Heights . . . , 
a case which, like this one, presented the problems of motivation and causation in the context of a 
multimember decisionmaking body authorized to consider a wide range of factors in arriving at its 
decisions”). 
 373 See supra notes 248–51 and accompanying text. 
 374 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 (“The legislative or administrative history may be highly 
relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, 
minutes of its meetings, or reports.”). 
 375 471 U.S. 222, 223–24 (1985). 
 376 Id. at 229. 
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This contextual approach to discriminatory intent has also proven 
workable in equal protection cases challenging recent laws. It was used by 
the Fourth Circuit to find discriminatory intent in North Carolina State 
Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, a case striking down North 
Carolina’s omnibus elections bill because that bill was passed with intent to 
discriminate against African American voters.377 In McCrory, the court 
examined North Carolina’s history of racial discrimination and voter 
suppression, stretching back to slavery, through the Jim Crow era, and 
continuing even after the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which 
North Carolina attempted to violate on several occasions.378 North Carolina’s 
2013 omnibus elections bill was rushed through the legislature within days 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, a case that 
released North Carolina from the obligation to seek federal approval of 
proposed changes to voting laws to ensure they were not discriminatory.379 
The challenged law had no persuasive justification for restricting voting 
practices used disproportionately by African Americans, like Sunday voting, 
but not voting practices used disproportionately by whites, like absentee 
voting.380 
For the McCrory court, evidence of explicit bias was relevant. The state 
had argued before the district court that its reason for eliminating Sunday 
voting was that “[c]ounties with Sunday voting in 2014 were 
disproportionately black and disproportionately Democratic.”381 While the 
district court saw nothing discriminatory about this statement, the Fourth 
Circuit thought it came “close to a smoking gun.”382 The Fourth Circuit 
reasoned: “[T]he State’s very justification for a challenged statute hinges 
explicitly on race—specifically its concern that African Americans, who had 
overwhelmingly voted for Democrats, had too much access to the 
franchise.”383 
Once a plaintiff has presented evidence that discrimination was a 
motivating factor, the burden shifts to the government or employer to 
demonstrate it would have made the same decision even absent 
discrimination.384 Such a showing might be made with evidence that a 
 
 377 831 F.3d 204, 226 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 378 Id. at 223. 
 379 Id. at 223, 227 (discussing Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)). 
 380 Id. at 230. 
 381 Id. at 226 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 382 Id. 
 383 Id. 
 384 See supra notes 248–51 and accompanying text. In cases involving corruption of the criminal 
justice process by explicit bias on the part of prosecutors or jurors, a new trial may result. See supra note 
28. 
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majority of decision-makers voted for the proposal for nondiscriminatory 
reasons.385 But rather than this sort of head-counting, courts generally 
scrutinize the plausibility of nondiscriminatory motives as explanations for 
legislative or employer action, asking whether, as an objective matter, they 
are credible explanations.386 Although the aim of this inquiry is to assess what 
motivated the legislature as a descriptive matter, not to balance competing 
interests, in practice, this inquiry resembles the balancing of strict scrutiny. 
As the McCrory court explained: “Once the burden shifts, a court must 
carefully scrutinize a state’s non-racial motivations to determine whether 
they alone can explain enactment of the challenged law.”387 This inquiry will 
often entail assessment of the weight of the state’s purported interests.388 
Thus, courts are able to assess mixed motives and the motives of 
collective entities with inquiries that examine the totality of the 
circumstances, including explicitly biased statements. 
B. Remedial Problems 
Courts may refuse to consider explicit bias because they are worried 
about the remedy. One concern is that evidence of explicit bias might 
“taint[]” otherwise valid policies and decisions.389 This could lead to good 
policies and decisions being undermined by a few biased statements, causing 
public policy and employment markets to suffer. A second type of argument 
is that official decision-making processes eliminate explicitly biased inputs. 
Underlying this argument is the worry that institutions with sound 
procedures will be unfairly penalized for the biased statements of some of 
their constituents. And a third argument relates to institutional competence: 
judges may be concerned that if the threshold for finding discrimination is 
low, they will too often be called upon to second-guess the merits of political 
and employment decisions, matters outside their ken. 
 
 385 See Fallon, supra note 308, at 581 (arguing that such inquiries are not impractical). 
 386 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985); Verstein, supra note 292, at 1161–64 
(making a similar point). 
 387 N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 233 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 388 See id. at 233–34 (“A court assesses whether a law would have been enacted without a racially 
discriminatory motive by considering the substantiality of the state’s proffered non-racial interest and 
how well the law furthers that interest.”). 
 389 Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the 
Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25 (“Just as the Supreme Court has 
held that convictions tainted by the introduction of illegally obtained evidence should be reversed, so one 
might imagine a court holding that laws or regulations tainted by ‘admission’ into the law-making process 
of some forbidden consideration should be set aside.”). 
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1. Taint and Lock-In 
If a challenged policy is forever tainted by the discriminatory motives 
that first inspired it, then the government can never implement that policy, 
no matter how circumstances might change or how noble its new reasons 
may be. Thus, it is forever “locked in” to the status quo.390 A legislature that 
passed a law forbidding murder for racially discriminatory reasons could 
never repass the law for nondiscriminatory ones.391 In the same vein, 
employers fear being “locked in” to retaining poorly performing employees 
because a supervisor has made discriminatory remarks. These concerns 
apply not just to explicit bias but to all inquiries into illicit intent. They 
implicate larger debates about judicial involvement in policymaking392 and 
intrusion into business prerogatives.393 Yet in constitutional and employment 
discrimination contexts, courts balance the interests of policymakers and 
employers through causation inquiries that resemble strict scrutiny review. 
Additionally, courts have proven able to respond to changing circumstances 
that show a policy or decision is no longer motivated by discrimination. 
Fear of lock-in was central to the result in Palmer v. Thompson.394 The 
concern there was that even if, at some point in the future, integrated 
swimming pools became a drain on the city’s finances, the city would be 
forbidden from closing them because its decision had once been tainted with 
racial animus.395 Lock-in arguments have also featured prominently in the 
travel ban litigation.396 Dissenting judges criticized the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision to invalidate the travel ban on the ground that the court gave “the 
President no guidelines for ‘cleansing’ himself of the ‘taint’” of religious 
 
 390 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 230 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 391 Cf. Fallon, supra note 308, at 531 (offering a more plausible example from the Establishment 
Clause context: “[F]ew would judge it tolerable for courts to strike down a law prohibiting murder if 
historical examination revealed that most members of the legislature voted for it solely for the 
constitutionally forbidden purpose of enforcing one of God’s commandments”). 
 392 See Tribe, supra note 389, at 25 (arguing that while allowing one guilty person to go free may be 
a fair price to pay to deter police misconduct, “[r]espect for the Congress as a coordinate branch, and for 
the sovereign state legislatures, is difficult to reconcile with such a strong prophylactic use of judicial 
review”). 
 393 See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 239, at 78–83 (discussing judicial reluctance to act as a 
“super-personnel department” in evaluating the business reasons for employment decisions). 
 394 403 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, 
403 U.S. 217 (No. 107)). 
 395 Id. 
 396 See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (“Even if a politician’s past statements were utterly clear and consistent, 
using them to yield a specific constitutional violation would suggest an absurd result—namely, that the 
policies of an elected official can be forever held hostage by the unguarded declarations of a candidate.”). 
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animus.397 The underlying concern was that President Trump would be 
forever constrained in his ability to make policy with respect to majority-
Muslim nations.398 Related concerns undergirded the Court’s deference to 
law enforcement arguments in Iqbal as well.399 
In characterizing the racial animus motivating a law or policy as “taint,” 
these arguments minimize the harm of discrimination. This language may 
carry an implicit premise: that discriminatory intent, on its own, is not 
harmful.400 In the introductory paragraphs of one recent opinion, the Court 
put the word “taint” in quotation marks, as if to distance itself from the very 
concept.401 It is as though inquiries into explicit bias are no more than 
referenda on the characters of policymakers and discrimination could be 
alleviated if those policymakers would simply repent, do penance, and seek 
absolution. But this “sticks and stones” objection does not apply here. In 
none of the cases discussed in this Article is a plaintiff complaining simply 
of symbolic harm.402 Rather, plaintiffs are complaining that, on account of 
race, sex, or religion, they have lost opportunities to work, vote, or use public 
services, they or their associates have been denied admission to the United 
States, or they have suffered abuse in the criminal justice system. The 
Court’s standing doctrine requires that a plaintiff demonstrate this type of 
concrete injury.403 In addition to these material consequences, policies 
enacted on explicitly biased rationales may express that some people, by 
virtue of their race, sex, or religion, are not worthy of equal concern. Such 
policies stigmatize and burden minority groups, compounding the material 
harms.404 
 
 397 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 651 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 
116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 398 Id. 
 399 See supra notes 185–89 and accompanying text. 
 400 Philosophers might argue that sometimes people do the right thing for the wrong reason. See, e.g., 
HELLMAN, supra note 58, at 138–68. 
 401 Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313 (2018). 
 402 By contrast, the “taint” argument may have more traction in Establishment Clause cases in which 
plaintiffs allege the harm is government endorsement of religion: for example, in cases about displays of 
religious symbols or slogans. Those cases are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 403 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302 (2017) (quoting Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)) (discussing requirements for standing to challenge 
discrimination, including Article III’s requirements of “an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘fairly traceable’ to the 
defendant’s conduct and ‘that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision’”). While 
Establishment Clause cases about government use of religious symbols, rather than religious 
discrimination, have received unusual treatment, again, that topic is outside the scope of this Article. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 119 (2017). 
 404 See supra Section I.B. 
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Moreover, the law avoids “lock-in” problems from the start by asking 
whether a policy or decision was supported by compelling nondiscriminatory 
reasons.405 When courts find discriminatory motives, they do not generally 
invalidate policies automatically. Rather, in some cases, courts apply strict 
scrutiny, asking whether the policy was narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest.406 In cases following Arlington Heights, once the 
plaintiff makes a showing that a decision was motivated, even partially, by 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that it 
would have taken the challenged action even absent discriminatory 
motive.407 And in Establishment Clause cases outside the immigration 
context, courts ask whether secular or religious concerns were the primary 
reasons for the law.408 In conducting all of these inquiries, courts ask 
questions that go to whether the policy is a good one, as an objective 
matter.409 Thus, even if statements of explicit bias in the record demonstrate 
a legislature passed a law prohibiting murder due to racial animus, a court 
would be likely to find that the law was justified for nondiscriminatory 
reasons.410 
Theoretically, inquiries into actual motives could still result in the lock-
in problem. Under Arlington Heights, for example, if the legislature would 
not have passed its murder law but for racial animus, then the murder 
prohibition would be invalid. Then, the question is whether a later legislature 
could repass the same law for good faith, nondiscriminatory reasons. No one 
argues it could not.411 In Establishment Clause cases, courts ask whether a 
reasonable observer would understand the lawmaker’s reasons to have 
changed.412 There is no bright-line rule for determining changes in meaning. 
 
 405 Fallon, supra note 308, at 569 (“Despite assertions in some cases that statutes with 
constitutionally forbidden predominant motivations are categorically invalid, I know of no case in which 
the Supreme Court has ever struck down a law that it plausibly could have adjudged necessary to promote 
a compelling governmental interest.”). 
 406 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (equal protection redistricting case); Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (free exercise challenge to a 
statute targeted at a religious minority). 
 407 Fallon, supra note 308, at 555–56. Courts might apply both Arlington Heights and strict scrutiny. 
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (finding Arlington Heights instructive 
on the intent question prior to applying strict scrutiny). 
 408 See supra notes 358–64 and accompanying text. 
 409 See, e.g., supra notes 364, 387–88 and accompanying text. 
 410 See supra note 405. 
 411 In Palmer v. Thompson, for example, the dissenting Justices argued that good faith, nonracial 
reasons could justify a later change in policy. 403 U.S. 217, 258–60, 271 (1971) (White, J., dissenting); 
id. at 273 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 412 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866, 874 (2005) (concluding that district courts 
can “take account of genuine changes in constitutionally significant conditions” although the history 
behind a policy matters, because “the world is not made brand new every morning” and “reasonable 
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The Supreme Court has assessed whether the taint of discriminatory motive 
has faded by analyzing context and circumstances.413 It asks whether 
policymakers have “disavowed” their biased remarks.414 While the Supreme 
Court did not engage in any such analysis in the travel ban litigation,415 lower 
courts grappled with the changing meaning of the ban as the Trump 
Administration repeatedly revised its executive order to address judicial 
concerns.416 In conducting this interpretive task, they considered factors such 
as the President’s continued public statements and changes made to the terms 
of the executive order in response to prior judicial decisions.417 They 
scrutinized whether the government’s new national security justifications 
were plausible or pretextual.418 
Price Waterhouse recognized an analogous lock-in problem under Title 
VII.419 If an initial decision to fire an employee was tainted by discriminatory 
motives, an employer would be locked in to retaining that employee, no 
matter how poor that employee’s performance was.420 Such a result would 
 
observers have reasonable memories”). McCreary County involved three attempts by a county to install 
a Ten Commandments display in its courthouse, in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 855. The 
same analysis applies to cases where the government has discriminated against a religious group. 
 413 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–26 (2018) (assessing all relevant “direct and 
circumstantial evidence” to find no discriminatory intent in a Texas redistricting plan enacted two years 
after a court had found discriminatory intent in a prior plan); McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 861 
(discussing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which upheld laws requiring businesses to close 
on Sundays on the grounds that, although the laws were once religiously motivated, “when the 
government maintains Sunday closing laws, it advances religion only minimally because many working 
people would take the day as one of rest regardless,” and noting the result would have been different “if 
the government justified its decision with a stated desire for all Americans to honor Christ”). 
 414 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730 (2018). 
 415 See supra notes 142–158 and accompanying text. 
 416 Compare, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 624, 627–28 (D. 
Md. 2017) (concluding that the third iteration of the travel ban was still likely to have been motivated by 
anti-Muslim purpose, and observing that, rather than repudiating his anti-Muslim statements, the 
President had only made more of them since taking office), with Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719, 
737–38 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“[T]he substantive revisions reflected in [the second version of the travel ban] 
have reduced the probative value of the President’s statements to the point that it is no longer likely that 
Plaintiffs can succeed on their claim that the predominate purpose of [the order] is to discriminate against 
Muslims based on their religion and that [the order] is a pretext or a sham for that purpose.”). 
 417 See supra note 416. 
 418 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 625 (concluding that the 
government’s new national security rationale—that the travel ban was a result of a Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) review of the information-sharing practices of the targeted states—was 
deficient because of evidence that the results of the DHS review were “preordained” rather than 
objective). 
 419 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 420 See id. at 249 (discussing a similar issue raised in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285–86 (1977), where the Court held that a public employee “ought not to be able, 
by engaging in . . . [conduct protected under the First Amendment], to prevent his employer from 
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go too far in abridging an employer’s “freedom of choice,” which Title VII 
sought to preserve.421 Title VII is not “‘for cause’ legislation” that requires 
that employers justify every employment decision; it only removes sex, race, 
religion, and national origin as permissible considerations.422 For this reason, 
when a plaintiff has evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor in 
her termination, an employer can raise the defense that it would have still 
terminated her absent discrimination.423 This inquiry requires that the 
employer show that it actually “would have” fired the employee, not that it 
could have fired her for some nondiscriminatory reason.424 But, as in the 
equal protection context, in terms of proof, these two questions blur.425 For 
example, an employer who discovers, in the course of defending against an 
employment discrimination claim, that an employee has committed a fireable 
offense, is not required to reinstate that plaintiff.426 
In Title VII cases alleging race, sex, or religious discrimination, unlike 
in equal protection cases, defendants do not emerge unscathed if they 
establish they would have taken the same action absent discrimination. They 
must pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs, and they may be required 
to change their policies to comply with the law.427 These limited remedies 
address the expressive harms of discrimination.428 They provide some 
measure of deterrence against future discrimination and ensure that 
 
assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 421 Id. at 242. 
 422 Id. at 239. 
 423 See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text. 
 424 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 425 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring) (“[W]here the legitimate motive found 
would have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the action 
would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof.”). 
 426 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995) (“It would be both 
inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and 
will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.”). Under this rule, a plaintiff’s damages are limited 
to losses incurred up until the time the evidence was discovered. Id. A plaintiff who is fired after 
complaining of discrimination can bring a claim of illegal retaliation under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a). To prevent plaintiffs from making opportunistic complaints of discrimination, putting their 
employers in a position where termination might result in a retaliation suit, courts hold plaintiffs to the 
entire burden of proving retaliatory motives were the cause of the termination. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358–60 (2013). The burden never shifts to the employer. Id. at 362–63. 
 427 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (providing that the court may not grant damages or any “order 
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,” but it “may grant declaratory 
relief, injunctive relief . . . and attorney’s fees and costs”). 
 428 See Section I.B. In such cases, discrimination was not the necessary cause of the material harm 
to the plaintiff. 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers are compensated for bringing cases.429 While prophylactic 
rationales may offend principles of separation of powers in the equal 
protection context, no such concerns exist when Congress is regulating 
private actors.430 
Thus, in both constitutional and statutory cases, courts can consider 
evidence of explicit bias while balancing concerns about impairing 
policymaking, law enforcement, and employment markets. 
2. Whitewashing 
Another argument is that institutional decision-making processes 
cleanse any taint from explicit bias. This argument sounds in procedural 
justice: that the law should do no more than ensure that institutions use 
certain formal processes for decision-making. So long as the processes are 
adequate, their outputs cannot be questioned. Whether they have received 
explicitly biased inputs is irrelevant. Thus, in the stray remarks cases, courts 
consider only the employer’s formal decision-making processes, excluding 
evidence of explicit bias outside the context of that process.431 In the travel 
ban cases, the government asked the courts to look only to official rationales 
vetted by legal advisors, not to campaign statements, social media 
commentary, or interviews by President Trump or his surrogates.432 While 
the Supreme Court did not go so far as to hold that the President’s remarks 
were irrelevant, its analysis gave no weight to those statements.433 Rather, it 
characterized the ban as “the result[] of a worldwide review process 
undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies.”434 In a case 
challenging the DACA rescission, the government asked the court to 
consider only statements of purpose from an acting secretary, rather than the 
President.435 
 
 429 Cf. Katz, supra note 63, at 534–36 (arguing this provision is inadequate in its ability to deter 
employers from discrimination and incentivize plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring suits, and proposing more 
meaningful punitive damages and attorney’s fees awards). 
 430 See supra note 392. Deterrence also makes sense in contexts in which the law seeks to restrain 
the behavior of individual, low-level government officials. Fallon, supra note 308, at 531 (giving the 
example of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor, which may require a new trial). 
 431 See supra notes 239, 244, 258–63 and accompanying text. 
 432 See supra notes 321–25 and accompanying text. 
 433 See supra notes 145–53 and accompanying text. 
 434 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018). 
 435 Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278–79 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (rejecting the “remarkable 
argument that” only the motives of an acting secretary, rather than the President, were relevant to an equal 
protection challenge to DACA’s rescission, and noting, “If, as Plaintiffs allege, President Trump himself 
directed the end of the DACA program, it would be surprising if his ‘discriminatory intent [could] 
effectively be laundered by being implemented by an agency under his control’” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). 
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Institutions should not avoid liability for explicit bias by adopting 
formal procedures and practices that create no more than the appearance of 
fairness. A rule that focuses solely on formal processes eliminates potentially 
relevant evidence of whether discrimination caused harm to a plaintiff. It is 
a fiction that only remarks made within the bounds of a formal decision-
making process can motivate a decision. It is also a fiction that official 
decision-makers are never influenced by others.436 The fiction is particularly 
implausible when the person influencing the decision is in leadership (or, 
needless to say, is the President of the United States). 
Even when explicit bias is expressed by those without immediate 
authority, it may be reasonable to infer an institution’s discriminatory intent 
from the fact that it allowed explicit bias to go unchecked.437 What is more, 
in employment discrimination cases, explicitly biased remarks may also 
show that a plaintiff never had a chance in the first place because her 
coworkers presumed she was incompetent from the start due to sexist or 
racist stereotypes.438 When such predictions of failure are explicit, they fulfill 
themselves by undermining the confidence and expectations of their 
targets.439 
In the Title VII context, the better explanation for deference to process 
is not that courts regard “stray remarks” as irrelevant, but rather that they 
have concluded that employers should not be held accountable for policing 
the remarks of employees made outside of formal decision-making 
processes.440 But this judgment errs too far on the side of preserving 
 
 436 Remarks by coworkers who were not decision-makers may evince a “corporate culture” of 
discrimination. See, e.g., Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 300–01 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“It is not unfair to observe that the corporate culture evinced a very specific yet pervasive aversion 
to the idea of female Pickup and Delivery drivers. Old Dominion employees, of all ranks, seemed to share 
a view that women were unfit for that position.”). Moreover, remarks by people who are not direct 
decision-makers may influence direct decision-makers. See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 
417 (2011) (discussing cases in which the official making the employment discrimination decision “has 
no discriminatory animus but is influenced by previous company action that is the product of a like animus 
in someone else”). 
 437 See Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 368 (2008) (“If the decisionmaker acted in a work 
environment in which discriminatory remarks and behavior were common and went unchecked by the 
employer, then it is more likely that the decisionmaker acted with discriminatory bias.”); Sandra F. 
Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61 ALA. L. REV. 773, 791–92 
(2010) (“[W]ork environments in which discriminatory remarks and behavior are common and unchecked 
may show not only that a decisionmaker acted with discriminatory bias, but also that the employer 
intended such a result.”). 
 438 See supra notes 269–274 and accompanying text (discussing the Sreeram case). 
 439 See supra notes 104–108. 
 440 See Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1410 (2014) (“For Justice O’Connor, Title VII does not require employers to 
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employer discretion. In explaining why the law has stalled in eliminating 
racial and gender disparities in the workplace, sociologist and law Professor 
Lauren Edelman describes how courts defer to “symbolic” gestures by 
employers.441 Rather than looking at results, courts ask only whether an 
employer uses what management lawyers regard as best practices, such as 
having an independent committee decide on promotions and terminations.442 
As employers win more cases due to judicial deference to “symbolic” 
processes, those processes become more popular with employers.443 In turn, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers become unlikely to take cases if an employer has formal 
processes in place, leaving victims with no recourse when those processes 
fail.444 Professor Edelman writes, “[W]hen courts . . . rely on myth and 
ceremony, inferring nondiscrimination from the mere presence of symbolic 
structures, rights themselves become merely symbolic.”445 
In the constitutional law context, the conclusion that the judiciary 
should never take seriously the public statements of an elected official is 
even more untenable. When the question is whether discriminatory purpose 
animated a policy, an official’s statements to the public are particularly 
probative.446 To be sure, there may be circumstances in which courts should 
give weight to the fact that a decision was later vetted through unbiased 
processes.447 But the idea that courts should invariably defer to a 
whitewashed version of the Executive Branch’s purpose offends the 
principle that government should be transparent and accessible.448 When a 
politician’s own public statements conflict with his administration’s official 
 
police their employees’ thoughts and expression generally, but it does require employers to keep sexism 
out of [the] figurative boardroom [where decisions are made].”). 
 441 EDELMAN, supra note 352, at 168–96 (offering examples from case law and discussing empirical 
research demonstrating that courts increasingly defer to organizational processes to infer a lack of 
discriminatory intent and, when they do, plaintiffs are more likely to lose their cases). 
 442 Id. 
 443 Id. at 196. 
 444 Id. 
 445 Id. at 217. 
 446 See supra notes 329–33 and accompanying text. 
 447 Huq, supra note 231 (arguing that, in the travel ban context, courts would have given more 
deference to the Trump Administration “if the White House had required publicly requested relevant 
departmental heads to consider and to propose a new immigration-related regime in respect to terrorism-
related risk” and “such bodies had convened internal experts and expeditiously proposed a new measure, 
supplying some relevant evidence of why it was needed, and presented it to the president”). 
 448 Cf. Huq, supra note 14, at 1273 (“Those who urge the disregard of campaign statements implicitly 
treat the democratic process as little more than a cheap vaudeville—bright lights, thickly caked makeup, 
and nought of enduring substance.”); Shaw, supra note 329, at 132 (arguing that the values of 
“accessibility, transparency, and accountability” counsel for judicial consideration of a President’s public 
statements as evidence of purpose). 
113:505 (2018) Explicit Bias 
569 
position, judicial disregard for those public statements “‘blur[s] the lines of 
political accountability’” and is likely to confuse voters.449 
Deference to procedure may reflect the unstated assumption that 
prejudice is atypical and inconsequential.450 Judges may imagine that fair, 
meritocratic decision-makers, whether they be supervisors or cabinet 
officials, always override prejudiced ones.451 This view might be explained 
by deeply held “meritocracy beliefs”: convictions that American systems of 
advancement and punishment are colorblind and gender neutral.452 There are 
reasons for skepticism of meritocracy beliefs.453 In any event, this is an 
explanation, not a legal argument. The question in an individual 
discrimination case is not whether we live in a just world or one marred by 
systemic inequality.454 It is whether the cause of a particular plaintiff’s 
misfortune was discrimination based on race, sex, or religion. 
Automatic deference to bureaucratic procedures renders the guarantee 
of equal rights hollow and is not a reason for blanket exclusion of evidence 
of explicit bias. 
3. Institutional Competence 
Another remedial concern is related to the judiciary’s competence. 
Judges may disregard evidence of explicit bias because, if the trigger for 
finding discriminatory intent is too sensitive, they will constantly be called 
 
 449 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 347 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(Wynn, J., concurring) (quoting Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 678 (2012) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)); see also id. (“Voters would be confused as to whether the Proclamation advances the 
President’s promise to ban entry of Muslims, as the President has proclaimed, or is intended to prevent 
entry of aliens from countries that fail to maintain or share adequate information regarding their nationals, 
as the Government and the Proclamation claims. Voters, therefore, would not know which policy to hold 
the President accountable for at the polls.”). 
 450 Haney-López, supra note 14, at 1859 (arguing that “[t]he ‘intentional blindness’ of [equal 
protection doctrine] . . . represents not a genuine application of equal protection law, but a successful 
effort by conservative Justices to protect themselves from discomfiting evidence that racial mistreatment 
persists”); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1164 (2008) 
(arguing that the stray remarks doctrine “may actually be [a] vehicle[] for judicial skepticism about the 
prevalence of discrimination”). 
 451 Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011) (“[L]eft to their own devices most 
managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex 
discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion . . . .”). 
 452 Eyer, supra note 77, at 1278–79 (arguing that the “resistance to ‘seeing’ discrimination appears 
to derive, moreover, not . . . from the specifics of discrimination doctrine, but instead from widely shared 
and deeply intractable background beliefs regarding discrimination and meritocracy in America”). 
 453 See, e.g., supra notes 1–6. 
 454 Meritocracy beliefs are an American take on the “just world” outlook: “[M]ost individuals feel a 
strong need to believe that they live in a world that is just, in the sense that people generally get what they 
deserve and deserve what they get.” Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Belief in a Just World, Blaming the 
Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 311, 312 (2009) (describing the psychological 
literature on just world beliefs). 
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upon to interrogate the merits of political and employment decisions. These 
concerns are heightened in areas where courts are traditionally loath to 
invalidate executive action, such as immigration455 and national security.456 
And a recurring mantra in Title VII cases is that “[f]ederal courts ‘do not sit 
as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business 
decisions.’”457 
And yet, courts cannot neatly extract themselves from analysis of 
business and policy decisions if they are to decide discrimination cases. In 
nearly every discrimination case, courts are asked to sift through evidence of 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motives. Both procedural and 
substantive irregularities in a defendant’s decision-making are relevant, even 
at the outset of the inquiry.458 At this stage, courts do not abandon their 
deference to business or policy objectives, but they must still inquire into 
whether the defendant’s nondiscriminatory explanation holds up on its own 
terms.459 If not, it is more likely that discrimination occurred. To be sure, 
some explicit statements, considered in the context of all the evidence, may 
not be sufficiently indicative of discrimination for a case to proceed past 
summary judgment. But it is illogical to categorically exclude this particular 
genre of evidence. 
Evidence that a decision was motivated, even partially, by 
discrimination requires that courts abandon their traditional deference. In 
Arlington Heights, the Court explained: 
[I]t is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with 
balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from 
reviewing the merits of their decisions . . . . But racial discrimination is not just 
 
 455 Under the plenary power doctrine, courts regarded immigration decisions as impervious to 
constitutional challenge. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
602–04 (1889) (upholding the government’s ability to exclude immigrants based on race and nationality). 
The strong version of the plenary power argument was not invoked by the government in the travel ban 
cases. See supra note 145; see also Margo Schlanger, Symposium: Could This Be the End of Plenary 
Power?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 14, 2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-
end-plenary-power [https://perma.cc/VXM4-D8CV]. 
 456 While full consideration of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article, there are persuasive 
arguments in favor of judicial review of factual determinations made by the Executive Branch with 
respect to national security. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign 
Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1965–68 (2015). 
 457 See, e.g., Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Mechnig 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988)); SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 239, at 
78 (discussing the “super-personnel department” concern as a trope in Title VII litigation). 
 458 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1977) 
(explaining the various types of evidence that must be examined, including whether a pattern is 
“unexplainable on grounds other than race” and “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence”). 
 459 Id. at 267 (“Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually 
considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.”). 
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another competing consideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory 
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is 
no longer justified.460 
That some lawmakers acted for biased reasons calls into question 
whether a legislative body took seriously its constitutional duty of equal 
protection, requiring more careful judicial scrutiny into whether a law is in 
the public interest.461 The same goes for the Executive.462 Similarly, in Title 
VII cases, even partial reliance on a discriminatory factor calls into question 
the credibility of an employer’s decisions.463 
C. Conflicting First Amendment Rights 
Judicial refusal to recognize explicit bias may also be rooted in concerns 
about free speech values. First Amendment doctrine draws a line between 
(a) the impermissible suppression of speech due to its particular message,464 
and (b) the permissible consideration of speech as evidence of illicit 
motives.465 The Supreme Court has suggested that antidiscrimination law,466 
including prohibitions on discriminatory harassment,467 falls on the 
 
 460 Id. at 265–66. 
 461 Cf. Fallon, supra note 308, at 577 (arguing that “when the legislature demonstrably breaches its 
deliberative responsibilities by acting for forbidden purposes, courts should respond by applying elevated 
scrutiny as a compensatory hedge against the risk that a challenged statute violates constitutional rights”). 
 462 Cf. Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 45–46), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3200695 [https:// 
perma.cc/4X4W-GX45] (arguing that the Constitution’s lack of any privilege for public speech by the 
executive akin to legislative immunity “may provide an affirmative constitutional warrant for considering 
presidential statements and presidential intent in constitutional cases”). 
 463 See supra notes 370–371 and accompanying text. 
 464 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (striking down a hate speech ordinance on 
the ground that “[w]hat we have here, it must be emphasized, is not a prohibition of fighting words that 
are directed at certain persons or groups . . . ; but rather, a prohibition of fighting words that contain . . . 
messages of ‘bias-motivated’ hatred and in particular, as applied to this case, messages ‘based on virulent 
notions of racial supremacy’” (citation omitted)). 
 465 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (upholding a hate crimes law that established 
enhanced penalties for racially motivated crimes on the reasoning that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does 
not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or 
intent”); Tribe, supra note 389, at 13 & n.30 (explaining the distinction in First Amendment law between 
inquiries that ask whether particular facts—like a person’s race—triggered a behavior, and inquiries that 
ask about whether internally held beliefs or values—such as particular opinions or specific stereotypes 
about racial groups—triggered the behavior). 
 466 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) 
(“Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The 
fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign reading ‘White Applicants Only’ hardly means 
that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the employer’s speech rather than conduct.”). 
 467 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389–90 (“Thus, for example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among 
other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual discrimination in 
employment practices . . . . Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive 
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permissible side of the line. Nonetheless, doctrines shielding biased 
expression from legal consideration may stem from concerns about the 
chilling effects of discrimination law on free speech. This argument can be 
refuted on empirical and normative grounds. 
The genesis of the stray remarks doctrine was in concerns about free 
expression.468 In Price Waterhouse, Justice O’Connor noted that Title VII’s 
critics in Congress in 1964 argued the statute was a “thought control bill” 
aimed at eradicating prejudicial beliefs and worldviews.469 To avoid such a 
construction, the bill was crafted to “eradicate discriminatory actions in the 
employment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts.”470 Thus, Justice 
O’Connor concluded liability should only attach if impermissible 
discrimination caused a plaintiff to be denied some opportunity or advantage, 
not on account of “stray remarks in the workplace.”471 
The stray remarks doctrine may reflect a desire to avoid giving 
employers incentives to censor employee expression.472 If judges have 
discretion to decide whether to admit evidence of discriminatory remarks, a 
litigation-averse employer might simply forbid all employee speech with 
respect to protected classifications, not just such speech with respect to 
formal decisions on hiring, firing, pay, and promotions, and not just speech 
that might be demeaning, stereotyping, or otherwise threatening to equal 
opportunity. Speech suggesting biased motivations often expresses political 
viewpoints, such as opposition to discrimination law or affirmative action.473 
Some theorists have argued that the workplace is an essential site for civil 
society, in which freedom of expression makes an important contribution to 
 
content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or 
philosophy.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment 
Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (“Somewhat surprisingly, in light of increased publicity 
about collisions between speech and equality interests and despite briefing of free speech issues by both 
sides, the Court’s opinion in Harris [v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), on speech that constituted sexual 
harassment] made no reference to the First Amendment.”). 
 468 See supra note 241. 
 469 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 
100 CONG. REC. 7,254 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin (D–NC))). 
 470 Id. 
 471 Id. at 277. Congress ultimately rejected Justice O’Connor’s proposed rule that discriminatory 
motive be shown with “substantial” and “direct” evidence. See supra notes 248–51 and accompanying 
text. 
 472 Ford, supra note 440, at 1413 (“Justice O’Connor’s concern with ‘thought control’ suggests that 
imposing Title VII liability for sexism ‘in the air’ might lead to an excess of caution on the part of 
employers, leading them to police legitimate, if controversial, expressions of opinion.”). 
 473 See, e.g., supra note 277 and accompanying text (discussing Diamond v. Bea Maurer, Inc., 128 F. 
App’x 968, 972 (4th Cir. 2005), a case in which an employer commented “that if a federal contract 
required [her company] to hire a certain number of minorities, she would close her shop”). 
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democracy.474 If speech outside the workplace is fair game for discovery, 
employers have incentives to fire workers who express bigoted attitudes on 
their own time as well. 
In the travel ban litigation, the government argued that considering a 
candidate’s campaign statements as proof of discriminatory intent would 
have a chilling effect on political speech.475 A dissenting Fourth Circuit 
opinion agreed, arguing that examination of a politician’s past statements 
would have no stopping point.476 Courts might consider “statements from a 
previous campaign, or from a previous business conference, or from 
college.”477 A Ninth Circuit dissent made this point as well, arguing that 
“[p]ersonal histories, public and private, can become a scavenger hunt for 
statements that a clever lawyer can characterize as proof of a -phobia or an -
ism, with the prefix depending on the constitutional challenge of the day.”478 
The result would be to “chill campaign speech, despite the fact that our most 
basic free speech principles have their ‘fullest and most urgent application 
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.’”479 While these 
dissenting opinions emphasized the impact on campaign speech, the worry 
about whether a court might one day consider a candidate’s “college essay” 
harkens to controversies over free speech on campuses. The reference to 
“proof of a -phobia or an -ism, with the prefix depending on the 
constitutional challenge of the day” likens constitutional litigation to broader 
debates over political correctness. It suggests equal protection litigation is 
about chasing trends rather than preserving enduring national values. 
Chilling effects arguments are ostensibly empirical ones, which might 
be disputed with arguments about the likely behavior of employers, 
employees, and politicians.480 But chilling effects arguments are more 
fundamentally about a normative question: whether the law should favor the 
risk averse who will over-comply with legal restrictions and err on the side 
 
 474 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of 
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 695 (1997). 
 475 Trump Cert. Pet., supra note 20, at 30. 
 476 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 650 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 
116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 477 Id. 
 478 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial 
of reconsideration en banc). 
 479 Id. (quoting McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 191–92 (2014)). 
 480 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488–89 (1993) (rejecting a “chilling effect” 
argument against a hate crimes law as speculative because “[w]e must conjure up a vision of a Wisconsin 
citizen suppressing his unpopular bigoted opinions for fear that if he later commits an offense covered by 
the statute, these opinions will be offered at trial to establish that he selected his victim on account of the 
victim’s protected status”). 
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of protecting free speech, or whether “a substantial governmental interest 
can be safeguarded only by restricting free speech to some extent.”481 The 
answer to this question depends on the relative weight afforded the values of 
free expression and equal opportunity in a particular context.482 
As an empirical matter, in the employment context, there are reasons to 
be skeptical of predictions that abandoning the stray remarks doctrine would 
lead to further restrictions on employee speech. This is because, entirely 
apart from discrimination law, few employees have rights to free expression 
vis-à-vis their employers, and norms that might protect employee speech are 
weak. Most employees can be fired at will, for any sort of speech the 
employer objects to, for almost any reason.483 Employers already fire and 
reprimand employees for discriminatory speech, both on and off the job, for 
reasons independent of legal compliance.484 For example, in one case, a 
Texaco gas station fired a supervisor after learning from newspaper reports 
that he was “operating a ‘mail order neo-Nazi skinhead music company’” on 
his own time.485 The court regarded as justified the employer’s concern that 
if it continued to employ this supervisor, the public might “learn of the views 
expressed on his website and believe that [the employer] condoned such 
ideas.”486 In another example, James Damore, a Google employee, was fired 
for posting an internal memo pointing to “biological” reasons for women’s 
underrepresentation in technology, in violation of Google’s internal Code of 
Conduct.487 Google’s decision was prompted by concern about the 
productivity and retention of female employees, who would worry that 
 
 481 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 730–31 (1978) (arguing that chilling effects arguments do not and cannot turn on 
“specific, and most likely unprovable, predictions of human behavior”). 
 482 See Ford, supra note 440, at 1418. 
 483 See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection 
Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012) (cataloguing state laws that 
provide varying levels of protection against employer reprisals for employee speech and political 
activity); David C. Yamada, Voices From the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee 
Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 45–46 (1998) (discussing 
potential sources of free speech protection for employees). 
 484 See Jessica A. Clarke, Should Employers Fire Employees Who Attend White Supremacist 
Rallies?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/should-employers-fire-employees-
who-attend-white-supremacist-rallies [https://perma.cc/SKV7-BUUM] (discussing cases in which 
employees were fired after being exposed as participants in a white supremacist rally); see also White & 
Crandall, supra note 70, at 414–15 (offering other examples). 
 485 Wiegand v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 465, 466 (D.N.J. 2003) (assuming, without 
deciding, that a tort cause of action for termination in violation of public policy was available under New 
Jersey law and concluding that the termination was not contrary to public policy). 
 486 Id. at 477. 
 487 You’re Fired: A Google Employee Inflames a Debate About Sexism and Free Speech, ECONOMIST 
(Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21726078-sacked-james-damore-has-
become-hero-alt-right-google-employee-inflames-debate-about [https://perma.cc/5VQQ-M84A]. 
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Damore might not treat them as equals.488 Employers have business reasons 
for terminating these employees that do not depend on formal legal doctrine. 
A rule forbidding evidence of stray remarks in typical discrimination 
cases is a poorly designed instrument for avoiding employer suppression of 
speech. Employment discrimination law will inevitably create incentives for 
employers to limit employee speech so long as there is liability for 
harassment. Harassment law gives employers incentives to censure 
employees who express sexism, racism, or other such biases. The incentive 
exists notwithstanding the fact that an employer is only liable for harassment 
that is “severe or pervasive.”489 Because discriminatory speech creates a risk 
of harassment litigation and rarely serves the employer’s interests, employers 
have every incentive to ban it.490 Harassment doctrine cannot be cabined to 
avoid this effect without eliminating the possibility of meaningful 
harassment law in the first place.491 
At some level, equality law always requires suppression of speech 
because discriminatory speech, such as a sign reading “White Applicants 
Only”492 or a remark on a negative performance review that a candidate for 
promotion “overcompensated for being a woman,”493 is inseparable from 
discriminatory conduct. To exclude this evidence is to fail to see 
discrimination and to preclude all remedy. 
 
 488 See Sundar Pichai, Note to Employees From CEO Sundar Pichai, GOOGLE: KEYWORD (Aug. 8, 
2017), https://www.blog.google/topics/diversity/note-employees-ceo-sundar-pichai [https://perma.cc/ 
6XEL-QZ2J] (“Our co-workers shouldn’t have to worry that each time they open their mouths to speak 
in a meeting, they have to prove that they are not like the memo states, being ‘agreeable’ rather than 
‘assertive,’ showing a ‘lower stress tolerance,’ or being ‘neurotic.’”). 
 489 See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 239, at 32–40 (discussing how courts are ungenerous to 
plaintiffs in applying this standard). 
 490 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 
1811 (1992) (“A prudent employer who is faced with even a small possibility of liability would quite 
likely demand that its employees avoid even arguably harassing speech.”). 
 491 Professor Kingsley Browne has proposed that hostile environment claims exclude all evidence of 
speech that does not count as fighting words, obscenity, defamation, or some other such form of 
unprotected speech. Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and 
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 544 (1991) (arguing that not even workplace displays of 
pornography should be evidence of sexual harassment). But racial harassment rarely falls into these 
categories, and most forms of sexual harassment do not either. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing 
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687 (1998) (discussing forms of harassment that undermine 
women’s competence rather than using obscenity or threats). Eugene Volokh has proposed an exception 
for speech that is not intentionally targeted at a particular employee, but this would not avoid the problem 
of overcompliance by rational employers. Volokh, supra note 490, at 1848–51. 
 492 See supra note 466. 
 493 See supra note 248. 
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This is not to say discrimination law should reach all workplace 
speech.494 But once an employer chooses to close a door to a member of a 
minority group, it should not expect discriminatory statements to fall outside 
the realm of evidence that would be relevant to the question of whether it 
acted for discriminatory reasons. Those employers who can demonstrate that 
discrimination was not a factor in the employment decision will escape 
liability. And of course, the further a discriminatory comment was from the 
context of an employment decision, the less relevant it is likely to be to a 
factfinder. But courts go too far in creating special rules to exclude this type 
of evidence from any consideration. Employment discrimination cases, 
already among the hardest to prove,495 are made all the more impossible by 
such extreme protection for expressive liberties. 
As for politicians, there are also reasons to believe, as an empirical 
matter, that considering biased statements in litigation is not likely to have 
any unique chilling effects. Most politicians are already circumspect, 
avoiding gaffes for reasons related to the desire to be reelected rather than in 
anticipation of lawsuits.496 In the travel ban litigation, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected the chilling effects argument as off the mark, pointing out that few 
campaign statements are likely to be relevant to the motives behind a 
challenged government action, and that statements from further back in a 
politician’s history are even less likely to be relevant.497 
Some politicians, however, may rise to prominence by eschewing 
“political correctness” and making overtly racist and sexist campaign 
promises.498 This group is unlikely to be deterred by the prospect of litigation 
 
 494 For example, harassment law should not create liability for discriminatory public statements by 
business owners, if those business owners do not close their doors to employees for discriminatory 
reasons and do not create hostile workplace environments. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech 
Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2016) (advancing 
this argument in the context of laws forbidding discrimination against customers). In Title VII cases, 
harassment must be severe or pervasive to be actionable. See supra note 46. Public statements are unlikely 
to meet this bar. 
 495 See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 77, at 1282–91 (describing studies). 
 496 See, e.g., JOHN SIDES & LYNN VAVRECK, THE GAMBLE: CHOICE AND CHANCE IN THE 2012 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 115–17 (2013) (discussing how politicians try not to make gaffes that will 
attract adverse media coverage in the twenty-four-hour news cycle). 
 497 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 599 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“A 
person’s particular religious beliefs, her college essay on religious freedom, a speech she gave on the Free 
Exercise Clause—rarely, if ever, will such evidence reveal anything about that person’s actions once in 
office.”), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), dismissed as moot, 876 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2017). 
Testimony on discriminatory intent may also be barred by legislative or executive privilege. See Benisek 
v. Lamone, 241 F. Supp. 3d 566, 574 (D. Md. 2017) (“[I]n deciding whether legislative privilege protects 
a state legislative actor from discovery, we must balance the significance of the federal interests at stake 
against the intrusion of the discovery sought and its possible chilling effect on legislative action.”). 
 498 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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either. The Fourth Circuit was candidly unconcerned with the risk: “To the 
extent that our review chills campaign promises to condemn and exclude 
entire religious groups, we think that a welcome restraint.”499 A dissenting 
judge argued this was “an approach that will limit communication to 
voters.”500 The concern may be that voters should hear the biased views of 
candidates so those voters have important information. Perhaps the argument 
is that the public is better served by honest declarations of bias from 
politicians than “dog whistle” signals that only communicate a candidate’s 
discriminatory agenda to in-the-know supporters.501 But when voters hear 
biased views and then elect candidates to enact discriminatory policies, 
courts cannot disregard evidence of explicit bias in evaluating those policies 
unless they wish to abdicate their role in enforcing the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection. That this will cause politicians to better veil 
discriminatory motives is an inevitable effect of any legal doctrine that gives 
force to the concept of discriminatory intent. 
Courts may be wary of identifying explicit bias because biased 
statements are difficult to distinguish from political opinions. Recent 
research shows racial appeals may be legitimate with a significant segment 
of American voters.502 Justifications for prejudice may be both evidence of 
discrimination and political arguments against antidiscrimination law. The 
implicit argument is that, by considering these statements, the law 
stigmatizes the accused for their political beliefs, a harm that, on a superficial 
level, is akin to the stigmatizing harms of discrimination against women and 
minorities. But the law does not prohibit discrimination just because it is 
stigmatizing. Sexism, racism, and religious intolerance are systemic 
problems with material implications.503 Individual instances of these forms 
of discrimination compound broad patterns of group-based inequality in 
employment markets, politics, and other domains of social life.504 The harms 
to employers and government officials stigmatized by the law’s judgment 
that their statements are evidence of discrimination are not comparable. Such 
harms are inevitable if the law is to recognize and condemn intentional 
 
 499 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 600. 
 500 Id. at 651 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 501 See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE 
REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS, at ix (2014) (discussing “‘dog whistle 
politics’: coded racial appeals that carefully manipulate hostility toward nonwhites”). 
 502 Valentino et al., supra note 3, at 758. 
 503 See supra Part I. 
 504 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination.505 Discrimination law inevitably stakes out a position against 
justifications for discrimination; it cannot remain neutral. 
Another variation on this argument may be that judges fear that 
evidence of explicit bias will unfairly influence juries, who will penalize 
defendants for transgressing norms of political correctness rather than 
evaluating the merits of their decisions. Yet this concern is rarely raised 
expressly.506 This is because it would generally be difficult to demonstrate 
that the danger of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of 
such evidence.507 Biased statements are highly probative of biased attitudes 
and workplace cultures.508 And social science evidence suggests reasons to 
doubt that jurors will be unduly prejudiced against decision-makers who 
make explicitly biased remarks.509 
As an empirical matter, it is doubtful that recognizing explicit bias will 
have unique chilling effects. As a normative matter, ruling out evidence of 
explicit bias incapacitates discrimination law and legitimizes prejudice. Free 
speech concerns do not justify this result. 
D. Prudential Concerns 
A final set of concerns about recognizing explicit bias may be related 
to possible political repercussions of judicial decisions. Legal actors may be 
skeptical of the law’s ability to create social change by regulating 
 
 505 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 21 (discussing how even accusations of implicit discrimination 
are understood as moral judgments). 
 506 Compare Walker v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., No. 02-CV-74698-DT, 2005 WL 8154351, at *13 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2005) (“Comments made by non-decisionmakers have no bearing on whether 
discrimination played a part in the Plaintiff’s demotion and allowing these remarks may mislead the jury 
as to its importance.”), with Burlington v. News Corp., No. 09-1908, 2015 WL 3439149, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 
May 27, 2015) (holding that evidence that nonsupervisory coworkers used the word “nigger” was relevant 
because “[a] reasonabl[e] jury could conclude that Defendants maintained an atmosphere that permitted 
treatment of employees differently on the basis of race”). 
 507 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 508 See, e.g., Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that 
the importance of evidence of statements of “formal or informal managerial attitudes . . . seems to become 
ever more critical as sophisticated discriminators render their actions increasingly more subtle to 
circumvent adverse judicial precedent”). In any event, that such statements are prejudicial should not 
generally preclude admission. See, e.g., White v. Honeywell, Inc., 141 F.3d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(reasoning that “[t]he possibility that a jury might be so inflamed by the contents of the [racist] remark so 
as to decide the case based on passion, needs to be balanced against the fact that such remarks are potent 
evidence of attitude and environment” in concluding the evidence was admissible). 
 509 See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 77, at 1278–79 (collecting studies showing survey participants’ 
resistance to seeing discrimination, even when obvious); see also Phoenix v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 
No. 15-00072, 2016 WL 3000823, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2016) (discussing a trial in which the jury 
heard evidence of the decision-maker’s overt racism, including text messages about wanting to get rid of 
black employees—including the plaintiff—that used the n-word and referred to lynching, but the jury 
found the plaintiff was terminated for poor performance evaluations). 
113:505 (2018) Explicit Bias 
579 
employment markets and politics, fearing backlash that might undermine the 
antidiscrimination project or even judicial review itself. For this reason, 
courts may find ways to withhold judgment.510 Backlash may be more of a 
concern when courts draw attention to explicit bias. Charges of old-
fashioned bigotry can engender defensiveness and “poison the atmosphere” 
for problem-solving and settlement.511 They may “hand[] a political weapon 
to . . . racial intransigents.”512 While this Article is not the place to rehash 
debates over the role of the judiciary as a countermajoritarian institution,513 
it can attempt a brief discussion of two recent case studies in which courts 
straightforwardly confronted explicit bias. These case studies offer qualified 
support for the claim that “[c]onflict is not only or always destructive.”514 
Additionally, hostile reactions to charges of implicit bias demonstrate that it 
may be impossible to pursue antidiscrimination goals without backlash. 
Moreover, judicial legitimacy may be undermined if the public believes 
judges are ignoring obvious bias for partisan reasons. 
One possible case study is NAACP v. McCrory, the 2016 Fourth Circuit 
opinion holding that a North Carolina election reform law was expressly 
motivated by discrimination.515 North Carolina’s NAACP president, 
Reverend William J. Barber, “declared the ruling ‘another major victory for 
justice’ that allows people to vote without ‘expansive restrictions by racist 
 
 510 Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 70 (1962) (discussing the “passive virtues,” in other words, how the Supreme Court 
“stays its hand” by “withholding constitutional judgment” in controversial matters). 
 511 See Karst, supra note 229, at 1165. 
 512 Id. at 1166 (offering this explanation for Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s that found grounds 
other than illicit motives for invalidating legislative action). 
 513 Compare, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 422 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that courts cannot cause social change, although they may 
consolidate it), with Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (“In our view the pendulum has swung too far, from 
excessive confidence in courts to excessive despair.”). Many of the arguments in this debate—about 
whether court decisions are outpacing public opinion or invalidating the results of the legislative 
process—do not apply to all of the examples in this Article. Although the acceptability of explicit bias 
may be on the upswing, majorities still condemn discrimination based on race and sex. See The Partisan 
Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RESEARCH CTR.  (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.people-
press.org/2017/10/05/4-race-immigration-and-discrimination [https://perma.cc/ZH93-28DB] (reporting 
that 61% of survey respondents agree that “the country needs to continue making changes to give blacks 
equal rights with whites”); Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Wide Partisan Gaps in U.S. over How Far 
the Country Has Come on Gender Equality, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 18, 2017), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/10/18/wide-partisan-gaps-in-u-s-over-how-far-the-country-has-
come-on-gender-equality [https://perma.cc/XFG6-6E63] (reporting that 82% of survey respondents agree 
that “it is very important for women to have equal rights with men in our country”). 
 514 Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
1728, 1730 (2017). 
 515 See supra notes 377–383 and accompanying text. 
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politicians or racist policies.’”516 News stories interpreted the opinion as 
“delivering a stern rebuke to the state’s Republican general assembly and 
Governor Pat McCrory.”517 Four months after the opinion, McCrory was 
unseated in a close governor’s race by his Democratic opponent.518 The 
general assembly, however, remained in Republican control.519 Over the 
opposition of the assembly, the new governor dropped the state’s petition for 
review of the McCrory decision in the Supreme Court.520 However, it is 
dangerous to infer too much from this example, as the main issue in the 
governor’s race was not voting rights, but controversy over North Carolina’s 
House Bill 2, a law restricting restroom use by transgender people.521 
Commentators now regard North Carolina’s politics as increasingly 
acrimonious and partisan, but the causes are complex, and the role of judicial 
intervention uncertain.522 Yet the McCrory opinion survived the political 
conflict and remains good law. 
A second potential case study is Floyd v. City of New York, the 2013 
case recognizing that explicit bias motivated the NYPD’s stop and frisk 
policy under New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg.523 In response to 
the Floyd litigation, the Bloomberg administration launched a media 
 
 516 US High Court Refuses to Reinstate North Carolina Voter ID, FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/08/31/us-high-court-refuses-to-reinstate-north-carolina-voter-
id.html [https://perma.cc/6XJQ-8CBB]. 
 517 David A. Graham, North Carolina’s Deliberate Disenfranchisement of Black Voters, ATLANTIC 
(July 29, 2016, updated 9:30 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/north-carolina-
voting-rights-law/493649 [https://perma.cc/3CVH-LKFS]; see also Linda Greenhouse, The Courts Begin 
to Call Out Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/opinion/the-
courts-begin-to-call-out-lawmakers.html [https://perma.cc/V9M6-SCXR] (“Legislators, perhaps 
assuming they had friends in high judicial places, had taken bold, even flagrant steps to suppress the black 
vote . . . . Judges responded . . . .”). 
 518 David A. Graham, North Carolina’s ‘Legislative Coup’ Is Over, and Republicans Won, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/north-carolinas-
republicans-succeed-in-power-grab/510950 [https://perma.cc/7KUV-TX6G]. 
 519 Id. 
 520 See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari). 
 521 Veronica Stracqualursi, Gov. Pat McCrory Concedes NC Governor’s Race to Democratic 
Challenger Roy Cooper, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gov-pat-
mccrory-concedes-nc-governors-race-democratic/story?id=43985544 [https://perma.cc/YJ6H-NY92] 
(reporting that 66% of voters in North Carolina exit polls opposed House Bill 2). 
 522 Jason Zengerle, Is North Carolina the Future of American Politics?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 20, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/magazine/is-north-carolina-the-future-of-american-
politics.html [https://perma.cc/YGS7-AVTB] (discussing partisan acrimony, the urban-rural divide, the 
restroom controversy pitting LGBT rights and business interests against religious traditionalists, 
gerrymandering, and demographic changes in North Carolina). 
 523 See supra notes 207–211 and accompanying text. 
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campaign to delegitimize the case and the judge.524 The opinion’s 
straightforward allegations of racism likely played a role in that backlash. 
After the decision, the police commissioner “stated that the District Court’s 
conclusions were particularly questionable given the NYPD’s status as ‘the 
most racially and ethnically diverse police department in the world.’”525 The 
diversity of the police force was not an issue in the case, nor was it relevant 
to any issue in the case.526 This misdirected response could be explained as 
an effort by the commissioner to defend himself against the charge that he 
holds racist attitudes. The Floyd decision was handed down during a 
contested New York City mayoral campaign. Democrat Bill de Blasio 
prevailed in that election, in part due to his pledge to reform stop and frisk.527 
The de Blasio administration then dropped the City’s appeal of the Floyd 
decision.528 Some researchers give credit to the Floyd litigation for decreases 
in New York City’s stop and frisk practices,529 coinciding with overall 
decreases in crime.530 Even the sensationalist New York Daily News, long a 
critic of the Floyd decision, conceded in 2017 that “[a]ll now agree: The old 
way of stop-and-frisk was wrong. The new way is better. It’s not perfect, but 
it’s progress.”531 
In both of these cases, electoral returns could be interpreted as ratifying 
judicial condemnations of explicit bias. These examples demonstrate that 
 
 524 See Kalhan, supra note 212, at 1062–63 (“While the trial was still underway, the Bloomberg 
administration—after failing to persuade the court to dismiss the complaints, grant summary judgment, 
or deny class certification in any of the stop and frisk cases—initiated an aggressive media campaign 
personally attacking Judge Scheindlin, in what some observers regarded as an effort either to intimidate 
Judge Scheindlin or to delegitimize her and the stop and frisk litigation in the eyes of the public.”); id. at 
1068–69 (discussing how City officials reacted to the decision by “continu[ing] to malign Judge 
Scheindlin in personal terms and to question her integrity”). 
 525 Id. at 1068. 
 526 Id. 
 527 Kenneth Lovett, NYC Elections 2013: Exit Polls Show Bill de Blasio Swept Virtually Every 
Demographic over Joe Lhota, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013, 1:46 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/election/exit-polls-show-bill-de-blasio-swept-demographic-article-
1.1507854 [https://perma.cc/BM7Z-EPBQ] (reporting that of the “55% of voters [who] considered the 
use of stop-and-frisk as excessive . . . nearly 9 out of 10—87%—backed de Blasio”). 
 528 Kalhan, supra note 212, at 1128. 
 529 Michael D. White et. al., Federal Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural 
Experiment Exploring the Effects of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 52–53 (2016) (noting that, between 2011 and 2014, the NYPD decreased its 
number of stop and frisk incidents by 93% and arguing “[i]t is reasonable to assert an association between 
the Floyd case—as well as the attention it garnered—and the substantial decline in stop-and-frisk that 
began in 2012. Certainly, the change in mayor and police commissioner in early 2014 . . . explains the 
continued decline in 2014”). 
 530 Id. at 60. 
 531 Editorial, A Policing Rift that Healed: The Remarkable Transformation of Stop-and-Frisk in New 
York City, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 26, 2017, 4:10 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ 
policing-rift-healed-article-1.3651968 [https://perma.cc/7M7T-AX7A]. 
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there is no inevitable backlash that will undermine the staying power of 
judicial decisions recognizing explicit bias. However, conclusions about 
cause-and-effect cannot be drawn, and it is uncertain whether these judicial 
decisions may contribute to longer term trends in political polarization. It is 
impossible to assess whether these decisions would have been less divisive 
if they had rested on other grounds, such as disparate impact theories, 
assertions of implicit bias, or the universal rights to vote and to be free from 
unwarranted police harassment. But there are good reasons to be skeptical.532 
Professor Samuel Bagenstos points to the 2016 election campaign, in which 
vice presidential candidate Mike Pence argued that those pointing out 
implicit bias in policing were “bad mouthing” law enforcement.533 
Progressives are advocating the same policy agenda, only they have 
reframed their arguments in terms of implicit and explicit bias.534 This 
distinction is unimportant to opponents of antidiscrimination policies. To 
these opponents, “the notion that the bias is ‘implicit’ and endemic to the 
human condition . . . [is] background noise.”535 
Backlash arguments take a different form in employment 
discrimination cases. Courts recognizing explicit bias in employment 
discrimination cases would be following the instructions of Congress rather 
than invalidating the actions of the elected branches. But another type of 
backlash argument relates to the free speech objection: that without 
discriminatory speech as a “safety valve,” people are more likely to engage 
in discriminatory actions.536 There is experimental evidence suggesting that 
when people suppress prejudice because they believe others are censoring 
them, the effect may be to increase discrimination rather than diminish it.537 
 
 532 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After 
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2852 (2014) (“Compassion fatigue may limit the utility of a universalist 
response to civil rights problems.”); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 769 (2006) (explaining that disparate impact theories are controversial “because 
courts typically are reluctant to identify ambiguous behavior as discriminatory”). 
 533 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting Full Transcript: 2016 Vice Presidential Debate, POLITICO 
(Oct. 5, 2016, 11:56 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-2016-vice-presidential-
debate-229185 [https://perma.cc/M2KX-9BDP]). 
 534 Id. at 22–23. 
 535 Id. at 22. 
 536 Browne, supra note 491, at 541 (making a “safety valve” argument with respect to harassment 
and arguing that “[e]xpressions of hostility may be superior to the manifestations of hostility that might 
result if the expression is prohibited”). 
 537 See, e.g., Thomas E. Ford et al., Putting the Brakes on Prejudice Rebound Effects: An Ironic 
Effect of Disparagement Humor, 157 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 458, 459–60, 469 (2017) (discussing several 
studies on rebound effects in which participants asked to suppress prejudices later exhibit more biases, 
and reporting on the results of an experiment showing suppression of humor that disparages social groups 
caused participants to indicate they would take action against the disparaged groups); Lisa Legault et al., 
Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (but Also 
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This is a good argument for rethinking diversity trainings and other 
interventions that rely on generating external, rather than internal, 
motivations for compliance.538 But the possibility that opponents of 
discrimination law will retaliate by covertly discriminating is not a reason to 
allow overt discrimination. This is an argument for policing covert forms of 
discrimination, not for ignoring explicit bias. 
Concerns about judicial legitimacy often focus on how far courts can 
push powerful interests—government officials and corporate leaders 
accused of discrimination—but ignoring bias may also undermine judicial 
legitimacy. The public and victims of discrimination may lose faith in the 
judicial system if judges behave like “ostriches,” sticking their heads in the 
sand to ignore blatant and well-publicized facts about discriminatory 
intent.539 
IV. RECOGNIZING EXPLICIT BIAS 
This Article’s prescriptive advice is simple: courts should consider 
explicit bias as evidence of discrimination, employing normal rules of 
evidence. Arguments for foreclosing consideration of explicit remarks, 
including interpretive difficulties, remedial problems, First Amendment 
implications, and prudential concerns, do not justify a de facto evidentiary 
privilege for explicitly biased remarks. While there are many legal reforms 
that would better address inequality, few are plausible in the current political 
climate.540 The aim of this Article is to draw judicial and public attention to 
explicit bias and to resist efforts to legitimize it. 
Implementation of this Article’s proposal requires only the 
conscientious efforts of judges, who should find ample bases for 
 
Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1472, 1472 (2011) (“Ironically, motivating people to reduce 
prejudice by emphasizing external control produced more explicit and implicit prejudice than did not 
intervening at all.”). 
 538 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation 
in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1960–71 (2009) (discussing 
reasons diversity trainings fail and proposing alternatives based on motivational principles that “support 
employee autonomy, competence, and relatedness”); Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best 
Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. 
REV. 589, 590 (2006) (“We find a clear pattern in the data. Structures establishing responsibility . . . are 
followed by significant increases in managerial diversity. Programs that target managerial stereotyping 
through education and feedback . . . are not followed by increases in diversity.”). 
 539 This point has been advanced by a number of judges in the travel ban litigation. See, e.g., Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 345 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Wynn, J., concurring) 
(“Ignoring relevant information—particularly when, as with the President’s statements regarding the 
suspension on entry, the information is widely known and disseminated—also undermines judicial 
legitimacy by making the public believe judicial decisions rest on a false or inaccurate characterization 
of the governing facts.”). 
 540 See EDELMAN, supra note 352, at 218–19. 
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distinguishing cases from Palmer, Feeney, and the stray remarks doctrine. 
While the Supreme Court may be a hostile forum for constitutional 
discrimination cases generally,541 its doctrines do not preclude lower courts 
from considering explicit bias. Trump v. Hawaii will generally be 
distinguishable because it pertained to an immigration policy with national 
security implications involving the entry of noncitizens.542 Arlington Heights 
calls for a holistic review of evidence of discriminatory intent, considering 
history, context, effects on minority groups, and statements by decision-
makers.543 Lower courts might protect their rulings from review with careful 
appraisals of all of the facts, in local and historical context.544 
In employment discrimination cases, courts should disband with the 
stray remarks doctrine and use a holistic inquiry to assess evidence of 
disparate treatment. Federal circuit courts should follow the example of the 
California Supreme Court in eliminating the stray remarks doctrine 
altogether.545 Federal courts would be wise to abandon the regressive 
formalism that plagues employment discrimination law generally and 
renders evidence of explicit bias inconsequential.546 They should at least be 
more vigilant in correcting district court opinions that apply the stray 
remarks doctrine formalistically, divorced from the context of the other 
evidence in the case.547 Progressive state courts have more options for 
recognizing explicit bias than federal ones, and litigants might think 
carefully about whether they should bring their claims under state law.548 To 
the extent judges are trained on implicit bias, they should learn about the 
resilience of explicit bias as well.549 
 
 541 See, e.g., Haney-López, supra note 14, at 1871–77 (describing hostile treatment of all 
discrimination claims in the Supreme Court except those challenging affirmative action plans). 
 542 See supra note 158. 
 543 See supra notes 365–71. 
 544 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982) (holding that the “clearly-erroneous standard 
applies to the trial court’s finding . . . of discriminatory purposes” and stating “this Court has frequently 
noted its reluctance to disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts”). 
 545 Reid v. Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988, 1006–11 (Cal. 2010). 
 546 See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 239, at 88–90. 
 547 Some circuits have attempted this on occasion. See, e.g., Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 
478 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 548 See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A 
Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1312 (2017); see also, e.g., Chuck Henson, Title VII Works—
That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41, 109–11 (2012) (discussing 
varying state approaches to employment discrimination law). 
 549 I make this recommendation on the assumption that such trainings are inevitable. I note the 
evidence on whether diversity trainings are effective is mixed. See Katerina Bezrukova et al., A Meta-
Analytical Integration of Over 40 Years of Research on Diversity Training Evaluation, 142 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 127, 127 (2016) (finding diversity trainings increase awareness and skills, but are less effective in 
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This Article does not argue that explicit bias is always relevant to 
discrimination cases, nor that a finding of bias must automatically invalidate 
public policy or an employment decision. Rather, explicit bias should be 
treated like other types of evidence—evaluated for its relevance on a case-
by-case basis—not routinely screened out through the use of special 
doctrines. Using normal rules of evidence, and considering the totality of the 
circumstances, courts might conclude that some biased statements were so 
far removed from a challenged decision that the prejudicial effects of 
introducing the evidence outweigh its probative value.550 A finding of bias is 
not a basis for automatic invalidation—the law also asks whether a policy or 
decision might have been independently justified by compelling 
nondiscriminatory reasons.551 
It is true that legal confrontation of explicit bias, on its own, may not 
lead to any victories by plaintiffs. Courts are generally skeptical of 
discrimination claims,552 and when it becomes harder to dismiss them on one 
ground, courts find another.553 Moreover, confrontation with explicit bias 
will not achieve all the goals of any civil rights movement. The causes and 
consequences of inequality are complex. Inequality is persistent, ever 
morphing into new social forms. 
This Article advocates a holistic approach to problems of inequality, 
not one that would limit potential evidence of discrimination to statements 
of explicit bias. Such a limited view would reinforce the “bad apple” theory 
of discrimination—that inequality is driven solely by biases on the part of a 
few individuals, rather than sustained by individuals in interaction with 
social, economic, and institutional structures. The “bad apple” view risks 
turning discrimination law into a “hunt for individual bigots.”554 On this 
understanding, the solution to problems of inequality is simply to fire those 
employees who express biased views, or to vote those politicians who 
express racist and sexist ideas out of office. This may once again cause 
 
changing attitudes and behaviors); Kalev et al., supra note 538, at 604 (finding diversity trainings have 
mixed effects, sometimes causing counterproductive reactions). 
 550 See supra notes 507–509 and accompanying text. 
 551 See supra notes 405–18 and accompanying text. 
 552 See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 77, at 1278–79 (discussing research on meritocracy beliefs as an 
explanation for the high loss rate for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases). 
 553 See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA 
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2027–28 (2013) (finding that, after Congress made it 
more difficult to dismiss disability discrimination cases on the ground that the plaintiff was not disabled, 
courts began dismissing more cases on an alternative ground: that the plaintiff was not qualified). 
 554 See Haney-López, supra note 14, at 1798. 
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people to hide their bigotries and engage in covert discrimination.555 
Systemic enforcement efforts by administrative agencies,556 more thoughtful 
and empirically grounded approaches by employers,557 and creative public 
policy solutions558 are required for change. Any broad-based national effort, 
however, seems unlikely in the short term. The hope of this Article is that 
for now, some courts can at least recognize explicit bias, joining the effort to 
resist the normalization of prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Antidiscrimination scholars are surely correct to decry the lack of legal 
options for combatting the effects of implicit bias, structural inequality, and 
other subtle forces that narrowly constrict equal opportunity and perpetuate 
systems of racism, sexism, and religious intolerance. But they should stop 
arguing that explicit bias is in the past. Explicit bias is ubiquitous. Important 
norms against discrimination are in jeopardy. While legal recognition of 
explicit bias will not eliminate the ideologies, prejudices, and material forces 
of racial injustice, anti-Muslim hatred, or the subordination of women, it 
would at least resist the message that these biases are legitimate grounds for 
action in politics, law enforcement, and the workplace. 
 
 555 See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2516 (2015) (describing the evolution of discrimination in housing markets from formal segregation to 
both overt and covert discriminatory actions). 
 556 See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in 
American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1339–41 (2012). 
 557 See, e.g., Frank Dobbin et al., Rage Against the Iron Cage: The Varied Effects of Bureaucratic 
Personnel Reforms on Diversity, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 1014, 1014 (2015). 
 558 See ROITHMAYR, supra note 11, at 135–50. 
